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Creativity is astir: reborn, re-conjured, re-branded, resurgent. The 
old myths of  creation and creators – the hallowed labors and privi-
leged agencies of  demiurges and prime movers, of  Biblical world-
makers and self-fashioning artist-geniuses – are back underway, 
producing effects, circulating appeals. Much as the Catholic Church 
dresses the old creationism in the new gowns of  ‘intelligent design’, 
the Creative Industries sound the clarion call to the Cultural Entre-
preneurs. In the hype of  the ‘creative class’ and the high flights of  
the digital bohemians, the renaissance of  ‘the creatives’ is visibly 
enacted. The essays collected in this book analyze this complex re-
surgence of  creation myths and formulate a contemporary critique 
of  creativity.
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Introduction: On the Strange Case of 
‘Creativity’ and its Troubled Resurrection 
Gerald Raunig, Gene Ray and Ulf Wuggenig 
Creativity is astir: reborn, re-conjured, re-branded, resurgent. The old 
myths of creation and creators – the hallowed labors and privileged 
agencies of demiurges and prime movers, of Biblical world-makers and 
self-fashioning artist-geniuses – are back underway, producing effects, 
circulating appeals. Much as the Catholic Church dresses the old 
creationism in the new gowns of ‘intelligent design’, the Creative 
Industries sound the clarion call to the Cultural Entrepreneurs. In the 
hype of the ‘creative class’ and the high flights of the digital bohemians, 
the renaissance of ‘the creatives’ is visibly enacted. On the resonant 
conceptual ground of creativity, new social functions are unfolding – or 
are projected. In the tradition of the aesthetics of genius and charismatic 
imagination, a social selection is performed: the truly creative social 
actors, the designated elect who generate and release innovations, are 
marked apart – and marked up for symbolic ascension.  
At the same time, powerful populist impulses are mobilized. Radical 
cultural-political demands – encapsulated in the slogan ‘Culture for all’ 
and Joseph Beuys’s dictum ‘Everyone an artist’ – are perverted into a 
logic of the total creative imperative. In this social and semantic 
recoding, old notions of art and ‘the artistic’ are being replaced, even as 
they are absorbed, by the new concepts of creativity and creative 
industry. The claims made in the name of the latter rose up in the skies 
of metropolitan capital in pace with the bubbles of real estate, stock and 
derivatives markets. For the gurus of the rising creative class, not even 
global economic meltdown should shake the faith of the new elect and 
Gerald Raunig, Gene Ray and Ulf Wuggenig 
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their backers. For Richard Florida, one of the main promoters of the 
new discourse, the full flowering of creativity and entrepreneurship 
actually requires the stimulus of crisis. Not to worry, we are told, 
investments in creativity always pay off; the ‘Great Reset’ and the era of 
‘post-crash prosperity’ are on the way.1 
The essays collected here analyze this complex resurgence of 
creation myths and formulate a critique of creativity. The concept of 
critique in this context should perhaps be clarified. The theoretical 
orientations of the authors contributing to this volume are not identical; 
important differences in approach and position will emerge from the 
texts themselves. But all the critical practices deployed here can agree 
on one point: critique should be more than a gesture of global negation 
or a predictable ritual of rejection. Beyond this shared minimum, an 
attempt to re-conceptualize critique more precisely is also legible. Its 
outlines are indicated by ‘Transform’, the three-year (2005-8) research 
project of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies 
(eipcp) that forms the context for these essays. The Transform project 
set out explicitly to rethink the modalities of critique and contemporary 
critical practices. Emerging from those inquiries, discussions and textual 
exchanges was a willingness to re-conceive critique as a capacity for 
differentiation and for the embodiment of difference.2 In this spirit, the 
problem of a resurgent creativity is approached through a rich diversity 
of critical practices and interpretations of contemporary social 
processes. We hope readers will find these inter-textual tensions and 
differences as stimulating and productive as we have. 
In order to shape this abundance into an emerging critique of 
creativity, we have structured the book into four sections. In the first 
section, ‘Creativity’, the sources and exemplary forms of the new 
discourses of creativity are traced and deconstructed. In his essay, 
Stefan Nowotny leads us into the genealogy of critique as ‘cre-activity’ 
and into the question of the immanent effects of critique. This 
perspective performs a de-theologization of creativity and with Bakhtin 
leads back from the mythically individualist quality of creativity to its 
foundational sociality. In her text here, the Brazilian psychoanalyst and 
art theorist Suely Rolnik takes a Deleuzean approach to the changing 
cultural field. She argues that the openings of transformation have been 
accompanied by a capturing geopolitics that Rolnik calls ‘pimping’: the 
taking over of struggles and creativity from 1968 by cognitive 
capitalism, but also the movements of exodus that came out of 1968. 
Introduction 
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Next, Maurizio Lazzarato scrutinizes the notion of ‘artistic critique’, a 
keyword in the French debates that continue to flare around the work 
of Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello. While Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
theses have become known to English readers through the translation 
of their Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Pierre-Michel Menger’s analyses of 
cultural employment are relatively unknown beyond the borders of 
France. Lazzarato, who has made decisive interventions into these 
debates, aims to show exactly how both Boltanski and Chiapello and 
Menger have gotten it wrong. In his essay, Ulf Wuggenig investigates 
the current Anglophone discourse on innovation and creativity and 
presents a critique of the reinterpretations of the history of nineteenth-
century art by network theoretical sociologist Harrison C. White. Along 
the way, the figure of the art dealer as heroic entrepreneur who paved 
the way of modernist avantgarde art is brought down from his pedestal. 
The second section explores the ambivalences of ‘Precarization’, the 
placeholder in critical discourses of what the jargon of creativity 
celebrates as ‘flexibility’ and freedom. Isabell Lorey’s work on the 
relations between biopolitical governmentality and the self-precarization 
of cultural producers has stimulated much discussion. In her text for 
this volume, Lorey brings her theses to bear on debates in the German 
feuilletons around the ‘dependent precariat’. In their essay, Brigitta 
Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos consider Spinoza as the ‘pre-thinker’ of 
precarity and borrow Paolo Virno’s phenomenology of fear and anxiety 
in order to explore The Village, the feature film by M. Night Shyamalan. 
At film’s end, Kuster and Tsianos uncover the possibility of a 
destroying grin of precarity. With another co-author (namely Dimitris 
Papadopolous) and in another context (that of political sociology), 
Tsianos had reconnoitered the macro-political side of this grin, the 
problem of the place and reemergence of a political subject moved by 
fear. The section ends with ‘Wit and Innovation’, by Paolo Virno, an 
author whose texts on virtuosity, culture industry and the ambivalence 
of the multitude have contributed much to the formation of the 
background shared by many of the writers in this volume. 
The third section, ‘Creativity Industries’, offers detailed studies of 
the creative industries as they are actually developing in four concrete 
fields of practice. Angela McRobbie, who has been investigating the 
British creative industries for more than ten years, reports on the ‘Los 
Angelesation’ of London since the 1990s. McRobbie parses the three 
successive ‘short-waves’ that have transformed the micro-economies in 
Gerald Raunig, Gene Ray and Ulf Wuggenig 
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which young women bring their creative work to market. Against this 
background of Blairite cultural politics and its miserable consequences, 
Monika Mokre thematizes the confusion of Austrian cultural politics in 
the face of the new cultural-political subject. She investigates the 
exemplary failure of ‘Quartier 21’, the would-be flagship advertisement 
of the Creative Industries in Vienna. In her essay, Marion von Osten 
analyzes the concrete and heterogeneous developments of cultural labor 
in the self-organized design and multi-media sector in Zurich. Her work 
leads her to the surprising thesis that the so-called Creative Industries in 
fact have yet to appear. Raimund Minichbauer offers a critical analysis 
of creativity discourses, as these have taken hold in the cultural policies 
of the European Union. Reviewing the official programs and positions 
since the implementation of the so-called Lisbon strategy, he finds a 
clear and accelerating economization of cultural policy. 
The fourth and last section, ‘Culture Industry’, focuses on the 
famous arguments of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. As 
many of the writers in this book note, the revalorizations of the 
‘creative industries’ enact a neutralizing recoding of Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s critical category. In his contribution, Gene Ray re-reads 
Adorno’s culture industry arguments against the alarming background 
of the national security-surveillance state and the planetary ‘war on 
terror’. Arguing that theories of subjectivation must give due weight to 
the objective tendencies of a global capitalist process, he proposes that 
the Lacanian notion of ‘enjoyment’ mobilized by the culture industry 
entails the category of ‘enforcement’ epitomized by state terror. In her 
essay, Esther Leslie tracks the twists and turns of the current recoding 
of ‘culture industry’, which she sees reflected in the ‘segue’ from cultural 
populism to the rhetoric of choice within the field of cultural studies. In 
the new cultural policies, she finds a contemporary form of that 
‘aestheticization of politics’ which Walter Benjamin identified as a 
strategy of fascism. Finally, Gerald Raunig analyzes four elements of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of culture industry. Bringing post-
structuralist theory to bear on the problems of precarity and 
subjectivation, he deconstructs the contemporary Creative Industries 
and also offers some critical reflections on Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
manipulation thesis. 
In sum, the essays collected here advance a critique of contemporary 
creative industries both as ideology and as specific material relations of 
exploitation. From numerous theoretical perspectives, the authors 
Introduction 
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expose and analyze the forms and modalities of precarity and 
subjectivation, as well as the potentials and actual practices of resistance 
operative in the current cultural field. 
Notes 
1 Florida, 2002, was a landmark in the establishment of the discourse of 
creativity among urban policymakers and branders. The title of his new 
sequel (2010) indicates the self-affirming circuits of this discourse: The Great 
Reset: How New Ways of Living and Working Drive Post-Crash Prosperity. 
2 See especially ‘Critique’ and ‘Do You Remember Institutional Critique?’, the 
relevant issues of the multi-lingual eipcp web journal transversal, online at 
<http://transform.eipcp.net/tranversal/0806> and <http://transform. 
eipcp.net/tranversal/0106>; and Raunig and Ray, 2009. 
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1 
Immanent Effects: Notes on Cre-activity 
Stefan Nowotny 
translated by Aileen Derieg 
In the preface to the first edition of his cycle Monsieur Teste, written in 
1925, Paul Valéry recalled writing the first text that he devoted to the 
figure of Teste thirty years before: 
It seemed necessary to me to strive for the sensation of effort, and I did 
not appreciate the happy results that are merely the natural fruits of our 
innate abilities. In other words, the results in general – and 
consequently the works – were far less important to me than the energy 
of the creator – the essential core of the things to which he aspires. This 
proves that a little theology is to be found everywhere. (Valéry, 1978: 8, 
trans. Derieg) 
My intention here is basically to start from these sentences, or at least 
remain in their field of resonance, to circle around the question of a 
possible critique of creativity. In doing so, as will become evident, there 
is no easy way past theology: as soon as one speaks of something like 
the ‘energy of the creator’ – cipher for so many designations of what is 
presumed to be at work in creativity – a reality is already invoked that 
rises above all other reality; a reality that surpasses the ‘natural fruits’, as 
Valéry says with a certain irony, indeed the results and works in general. 
It is obvious that Valéry immediately attributes this surpassing to a 
certain youthful enthusiasm, a youthful presumptuousness, which seeks 
exertion, but has not yet been overcome by the results of its exertions. 
Yet exactly this – being overcome by the results of one’s own exertions 
– describes the situation of an author, who finds himself accompanied 
Stefan Nowotny 
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throughout his life by a figure (Monsieur Teste) created in his younger 
years and reflects on this figure thirty years after its creation. And as it 
initially appears, this also exactly describes the situation and perspective 
of a critique of creativity, as it is to be treated here. 
The Question of a Critique of Creativity and How Boltanski and 
Chiapello Do Not Answer It 
In comparison with critical investigations of a number of other objects, 
the peculiarity of a ‘critique of creativity’ is undoubtedly its confidence 
in a certain critical capability on the part of its object. As a critique of 
the object ‘creativity’ (‘critique of creativity’ as genitivus obiectivus), it aims 
to distinguish the possibilities and limitations of a creativity that is 
ultimately characterized by its own inherent critique or critical capacity 
(‘critique of creativity’ as genitivus subiectivus). Hence we are dealing with a 
critique that aims less to reject its object (as idols, ideologies, false gods, 
and so forth) than to achieve an enlightening understanding of it, which 
seeks to separate what is idolatrous, ideological, false about this object 
from what may appear all the more legitimate about it, the more it is 
purified through critique from all that is idolatrous, and so forth. In this 
sense, the task of a critique of creativity could additionally be 
understood in a certain analogy to the Kantian project of a critique of 
reason. Just as in Kant’s critique of the various capacities of reason, 
reason is not only the object of the critique, but is also actualized in 
some of its capacities at the same time in the course of carrying out this 
critique, in the same way it could be possible that a certain capacity of 
creativity is actualized in the procedure of a critique of creativity. Indeed 
this capacity would then assume an irrevocable difference to that which 
could ever come into view as the ‘object’ of creativity – and every object 
named ‘creativity’ would conversely always already be an immanent 
effect of a certain creative activity. 
Let us first consider an argument that must at first glance appear as 
a possible elaboration of this kind of approach, at least in its initial 
aspect: the idea that a critique of creativity has to do with a critique and 
critical capacity inherent to creativity itself also seems to be a principle 
point of departure in the recently much discussed study The New Spirit of 
Capitalism by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello. One of the central 
motifs of this book is the critique of what the authors call ‘artistic 
critique’, that is of a critique that one might suspect derives from 
creativity or at least from a special relationship to creativity. The study 
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suggests that this artistic critique has turned primarily against the 
‘disenchantment’, the ‘lack of authenticity’, the ‘loss of meaning’ and the 
‘oppression’ proceeding from the hollowness and the standardization of 
the bourgeois commodity society, raising instead demands for 
‘freedom’, for ‘autonomy’ and ‘mobility’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 
83). However, this form of critique, which entered into history above all 
in the context of May 1968 in Paris, inspired (and this is where 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s ‘critique of creativity’ starts in the form of a 
critique of the ‘artistic critique’) new strategies of business management 
and in this way ultimately resulted in effects that were accompanied by 
new forms of exploitation and precarization and thus, not least of all, 
forestalled the equality and security demands of the other main strand 
of the critique, which the authors call ‘social critique’ (and with which 
the ‘artistic critique’ connected in a hitherto unknown way in May 
1968). 
In light of this line of argument, two points are immediately 
conspicuous: one is the alleged reference of the critique of creativity 
(genitivus obiectivus) to a creativity of critique (or ‘critique of creativity’ as 
genitivus subiectivus) subsumed under the name ‘artistic critique’; the other 
is the theme of an effect of critique, which becomes the actual object of 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s ‘critique of critique’, because it ultimately 
undermines the concern and intention of the critique that engenders it 
to criticize capitalism, partly due to a certain blindness that blocks its 
motives, partly due to the way these motives are appropriated and taken 
over by exploitative capitalist interests. In terms of the first point, it is 
quickly evident that despite expectations of Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
book, it is not really addressed at all: creativity or the specific experience 
of creativity play no role whatsoever where the concept of an artist 
critique is introduced; the artist critique is rooted much more ‘in the way 
of living of the Boheme’, shares ‘individualism’ with bourgeois 
modernity from the start, and finds its ‘epitome in the figure of the 
dandy in the mid-19th century’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 83, 86 
and 84). The only – and certainly significant – indication of something 
like a question of creativity that Boltanski and Chiapello offer in this 
context is found in an insertion, which at least acknowledges that the 
dandified stylization of ‘non-production’ involves a specific exception: 
the ‘exception of self-production’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 84) – 
In other words a form of self-engendering in the sense of engendering a 
certain way of living. 
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With regard to the second point – the question of the effectiveness 
of critique – it is worth taking a closer look at Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
concept of critique: 
The idea of critique […] only makes sense if there is a discrepancy 
between a desirable and an actual state of things. To make as much 
room for critique as it deserves in the social world, issues of justice 
cannot be simply reduced to power. However, one must also not be so 
blinded by the norm of justice as to lose sight of the actual 
circumstances of power. To claim validity, critique must be able to 
justify itself. In other words, it must clarify its normative relational 
system, especially if it has to react to justifications that those criticized 
produce for their actions. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 69) 
As frequently as the link between the concept of critique and the 
necessity of clarifying a ‘normative relational system’ may be 
encountered, this link cannot claim to be self-evident.1 It is based on a 
fundamental distance between the subject exercising critique and what 
is being criticized, or more precisely: on a flexible ability to take a 
distance, which is carried out in the space opened up by the discrepancy 
between the ‘actual’ and the ‘desirable’ state. However, the idea of 
taking a distance in this way is not only in danger of misjudging the very 
involvement in the existing circumstances of power which applies to the 
criticizing subject her/himself in their activity (and which is by no 
means covered simply by keeping an eye on the ‘actual circumstances of 
power’). In conjunction with the demand to indicate a ‘normative 
relational system’, this idea is also in danger of repeating an exclusion, 
which could virtually be called a leitmotiv in the history of political 
conceptions, and which was already clearly formulated by Aristotle. I 
refer here to the separation of ‘mere voice’ that is only capable of 
expressing ‘pleasure or pain’ from the power of speech ‘intended to set 
forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and 
the unjust’. (Aristotle, 1988: 3) The demand that criticism must clarify a 
‘norm of justice’ is thus linked not only with an implicit fundamental 
privileging of verbal expression, it also establishes a hierarchy among 
the modes of speaking and hence largely forestalls access to the – even 
though never consistently expressed – origin of criticism in the affective 
(experiences of violence, overexertion, displeasure, and so on, but also 
desire, experiences of pleasure, and so on).2 
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At the same time, the aforementioned emphasis on distance does 
not solely determine Boltanski and Chiapello’s perspective of the 
subject exercising criticism. It also fixes the question of the effects of 
critique to a thinking of exteriority, thus missing the second aspect of 
the implications of a critique of creativity outlined above, which allows 
the question of effects to appear as a question of immanent effects. 
This thinking of exteriority is manifested in Boltanski and Chiapello at 
several levels: exteriority (distance), which determines the relationship 
of the subject exercising critique in reference to ‘actual’ and ‘desirable’ 
states; mutual exteriority (fundamental disconnectedness and even 
incompatibility) of ‘artistic critique’ and ‘social critique’; exteriority of 
the intentions of critique in reference to its effects (the misery of the 
artist critique that Boltanski and Chiapello object to is based on a 
certain blindness with regards to demands for equality, which is 
inherent to its critical intentions; the actual effects of this critique, 
however, first become tangible in networked capitalism driven by 
entirely different interests and projects of legitimation). 
Critique as Cre-activity 
A critique of creativity in the aforementioned sense is thus hardly to be 
found in the described approach. Nevertheless, I think it is important to 
avoid two misunderstandings: on the one hand my point is not at all to 
principally disparage or discredit the analyses presented in the book by 
Boltanski and Chiapello, which I consider important on many points. 
On the other, it is even less my intention to defend any kind of ‘artistic 
critique’ – a category that I generally find of dubious use in contexts of 
social analysis – and thus end up in the waters of an overly familiar 
emphasis on art. For this reason, in the following the question of the 
connection between critique and creativity is initially not to be treated 
from the perspective of any kind of ‘artistic critique’, but rather with a 
view to what Boltanski and Chiapello call ‘social critique’ and qualify as 
being ‘inspired by the socialists and, later, the Marxists’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 1999: 84). 
Whereas Kant’s critical philosophy summarizes the theoretical 
implications of critique as a theoretical procedure (the explication of 
which forms the project of the post-Kantian idealists in many respects), 
something similar could be said about Marx when it is a matter of 
accounting for critique as a practical activity in the sense of changing 
politics and society. Even the first of Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ 
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speaks of the ‘significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, 
activity’ (Marx, 1975: 422) and locates the problem, to a certain extent, 
in between idealism and materialism. Whereas the former ‘does not 
know real, sensuous activity as such’ and therefore has an abstract 
concept of practice, materialism so far (primarily that of Feuerbach) has 
not yet come to an understanding of practice at all and thus considers 
reality ‘only in the form of the object or of contemplation’ (Marx, 1975: 421). 
Marx’s central example, explained in his fourth thesis, relates to 
Feuerbach’s criticism of religion. If religion, as Feuerbach writes, is 
nothing other than a projection of earthly human condition, then it is 
not sufficient to unmask this projection at a purely theoretical level for 
the criticism to take effect; ‘the secular basis’ of this projection must 
indeed ‘be both understood in its contradiction [or, to disentwine 
Marx’s idea from its dialectical grounding, let us say: in its circumstances 
of power] and revolutionized in practice’ (Marx, 1975: 422). And this 
revolutionizing cannot be reduced, as noted already in the third thesis, 
to the general formula of ‘the changing of circumstances’, but instead 
implies a ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity or self-changing’ (Marx, 1975: 422). 
What is most remarkable about the concept of critique formulated 
in the Marxian Feuerbach theses is initially that they sketch an image of 
a fundamental involvement in an operative structure (‘circumstances’) 
that the notion of external ‘conditions’ only insufficiently covers, and 
which applies equally to critical and uncritical subjects. In short, it is not 
enough to fix ‘objects’ worthy of criticism or to strive for their ‘change’, 
if an operative structure is reproduced at the same time, which 
persistently produces precisely these objects in their reality. This form 
of criticism resembles a race dog chasing a fake rabbit attached to its 
own neck with a pole: it keeps running, yet it never comes any closer to 
its goal. For this reason there can be no change without self-change, a 
self-change that is by no means an individual private matter, but rather 
starts from the subjective (as Marx calls it: sensuous, practical) mode of 
reproducing the structure. The concept of self-change thus occupies the 
intersection between the first named aspect of the Marxian emphasis on 
involvement in the criticized circumstances and a third characteristic of 
the concept of criticism articulated in the Feuerbach theses: contrary to 
a widely held understanding in relation to Marx (and equally in relation 
to the question of critique in a more general sense, as seen in Boltanski 
and Chiapello), this concept of critique needs no clarification of its 
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‘norm references’ and no orientation to a ‘desirable state’; it needs no 
purpose orientation at all, with the specific exception perhaps of the 
destitutive purpose of a ‘dispossession’ of the criticized operative 
structure, but such a purpose can ultimately only be resolved through a 
self-changing practice – and is therefore not exterior to this practice. 
A clear echo of this practical concept of criticism formulated by 
Marx is found in Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’ from 
1921, specifically where Benjamin compares the ‘political’ to the 
‘proletarian general strike’: whereas the first form of the general strike is 
simply to achieve certain purposes or ends that remain exterior to the 
action itself and hence only achieve external modifications of the 
circumstances of action (or work), the second form is like ‘a wholly 
transformed work… an upheaval that this kind of strike not so much 
causes as consummates’ (Benjamin, 1978: 292) – in other words, an 
overthrow that ultimately makes the strike appear not only abstract as a 
cessation of work, but as a release of a different, self-changing activity 
(assemblies, processes of exchange beyond the functionality of work, 
and so forth). And in reference to activities of art, a similar direction is 
also indicated by Benjamin’s shifting of the question ‘What is the attitude 
of a work to the relations of production of its time?’ in the direction of 
the question: ‘What is its position in them?’, as formulated in ‘The Author 
as Producer’ (Benjamin, 1978: 222). Involvement, self-change, the lack 
of a definition of purpose – these three aspects determine Benjamin’s 
reflection on a practical critique as well as Marx’s. 
Especially the last of these three aspects finally reveals an 
unmistakable link to the question of creativity. This is not primarily in 
the sense that the usually vague and indeterminate talk of art as non-
purposed or as ‘an end in itself’ suggests – an idea that cannot be 
regarded outside of any connection with the problem posed here, but 
one that belongs primarily to the history of the ideas of artistic 
autonomy from the nineteenth century. What is more crucial is that the 
lack of a purpose indicates a certain shift of the question of creation or 
creativity, in which this question begins to detach itself from the onto-
theological schema to which the opening quotation from Paul Valéry 
alludes, and in which it was held over the course of centuries or even 
millennia. This schema perpetually tied the ‘purpose’ or ‘end’ (final 
cause) of a creation to a primary, sovereign primal reality removed from 
the causal connection of the world and grounding this purpose, to a 
reality ontologically superior to every possibility, the prototype of which 
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is found in the ‘unmoved mover’ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book XII: 
demiurge, prime cause and creator of the world, which Christian 
scholastic theology was to adapt as the actus purus. Valéry’s allusion to 
the ‘energy of the creator’ (following a long tradition of translation, the 
Aristotelian term enérgeia is translated into German as ‘reality’; the 
corresponding Latin term is actus) is to be understood against this 
background particularly as an indication that this construction has been 
less replaced by modern ideas of creativity relating to ‘creating art’ than 
it has been assimilated by them – at least in a certain presumptuousness 
of these ideas that is still in effect today, which insists on the artist 
subject as a reality of creating that is removed from the world, ‘drawing 
from itself’. 
In this kind of construction the world always appears as a secondary 
reality, and yet at the same time it finds itself fixed on being ‘reality’, 
which is always posited in a more or less distinctive opposition to 
possibility (the ‘results in general’, the ‘natural fruits’ or even the ‘innate 
abilities’ in Valéry’s words). Exactly at this point, however, a shift 
becomes recognizable in the movement leading to modernism and, not 
least of all, to the ideas of Karl Marx and others. In a text entitled ‘On 
Creation’, Jean-Luc Nancy sees this shift expressed primarily in the 
works of Descartes, Spinoza and especially Leibniz. This shift sees the 
world as ‘something possible, before it is something real’ (Nancy, 2002: 
81). In other words, it is real precisely in that it is possible, at stake, 
‘capable of being perfected’ (Leibniz) or ‘capable of being 
revolutionized’ (according to Marxian logic). And this real possibility, in 
which the field of possibilities is limited neither to an existing nor to a 
presupposed reality, always refers at the same time to an inalienable 
involvement in the world (another world is only possible by virtue of 
changing this world and not as a castle in the clouds) and to the 
necessity of a self-change, which opens up new fields of possibility (the 
former ‘creatures’ become themselves potential ‘creators’, specifically 
and not least of all – and not only among dandies – as creators of 
themselves).3 
‘That there is in the world or even as the world (under the name 
“human” or “history”, “technology”, “art”, “existence”) a putting at 
stake of its origin and its end, its being-possible and hence its being and 
being in general’ – in this, according to Nancy, a ‘hitherto unknown 
problem of “creation”’ becomes evident, which can neither be broken 
down to the register of ‘production’, nor refers to one prior subject of 
Immanent Effects 
  17 
creation, but rather to a ‘multiplicity of existences’ that are involved in 
this problem (Nancy, 2002: 83). Nancy’s list of the various names under 
which this problem can be recognized should be taken seriously, not 
only because ‘art’ is only one element of a series in it; we should also 
append the name ‘critique’ to this list, especially in the sense of the 
practical critique articulated by Marx or Benjamin, for example. In this 
sense, critique is a manner (but not the only one) of carrying out an 
activity, which I would like to call cre-activity here – to refrain from 
continuing the problematic and charged name of ‘creativity’. The effects 
of critique are accordingly to be regarded as immanent effects of this 
cre-activity, which means that the ‘cause’ of these effects is not exterior 
to them, but is instead actualized in them, especially through the modes 
of subjectivation, which the cre-active activity (or the cre-active critique 
as one of its forms) engenders. 
Consequently, Walter Benjamin’s point could be taken up again, this 
time in reference to the question of critique: the question is not where 
one stands vis-à-vis the effects of critique, but where one stands within 
them. 
The Perspectives of a Genealogy of Cre-activity 
Against this background referring to the question of critique, art has no 
special privileges at all. Nevertheless, it is one of its modern names, one 
of the forms under which cre-activity is carried out. At the same time, 
to recall Valéry’s allusion again, the history of modern forms of 
accounting for ‘art’ is not free from continuations and secularized 
adaptations of the onto-theological construction of creation mentioned 
above. The reservation of ‘secular’ crea(c)tivity for art issues usually 
corresponds to an isolated and isolating view of the artistic subject, 
which does justice to its situation amongst a multiplicity of cre-active 
existences at best in certain styles of biography, which are then again 
concerned with detaching a special subject from its surrounding reality. 
Robert Walser’s text ‘Poetenleben’ (Poet’s Life) might perhaps be read 
as a kind of counter-sketch to this. Its humorous concise prose speaks 
of nothing but contingencies and also of the many ‘prosaic’ historical-
social localizations of the poet’s life, seeing the poet’s work as no more 
ennobled than any other ‘work carried out with determination’ (Walser, 
1986: 121); this prose text fades out in the end in sentences that lay the 
question of the poet’s secret to rest with gentle irony, because they have 
Stefan Nowotny 
 18 
begun to speak of one life – and that means whatever life in the midst 
of a multiplicity of lives: 
In this way he lived on. 
What became of him, what may have happened to him later is outside 
the scope of our knowledge. For the time being, we have not been able 
to discover any further traces. Perhaps we may be able to some other 
time. We will see what endeavors might yet be undertaken. We will wait 
and see, and as soon as something new might have come to light, 
assuming that sufficient new interest will have kindly been made 
known, we will be happy to convey it. (Walser, 1986: 130) 
Walser’s text takes its place among countless documents that work 
towards a de-theologization of ‘creativity’ in the modern history of the 
arts themselves, thus articulating, to a certain extent, a cre-active critique 
of creativity. Antonin Artaud’s protest against the ‘European ideal of 
art’, which aims to ‘cast the mind [esprit] into an attitude distinct from 
force but addicted to exaltation’ (Artaud, 1958: 10), is as much a part of 
this history as, for example, the anarchisms of Dada, the interventionist 
practices of the Situationists, the techniques of a ‘Theater of the 
Oppressed’ initiated by Augusto Boal, among many other examples. On 
a theoretical level, the use of these cre-active critiques can be 
comprehended, not least of all, in Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the novel, 
which contends that conventional stylistics of genre overlook ‘the social 
life of the word outside the artist workshop, in the squares and streets, 
in cities and villages, in groups, generations and eras’, in turn defining 
the novel drawing from this manifold life as ‘artistically organized 
diversity of speech’ (Bakhtin, 1975: 154, 157). All these critiques, as well 
as Robert Walser’s ‘Poetenleben’, are concerned with making the 
‘crucial social tone’ (Bakhtin) heard, which makes the question of 
‘creativity’ understandable as the problem of cre-activity in a multiplicity 
of existences (instead of attributing and subordinating it to the 
individualism of a Boheme, as Boltanski and Chiapello do, the final 
effect of which – indeed, the effect of this critique – only ends up 
burying the history of the cre-active critique of ‘creativity’ once again). 
For this reason, there would also be little use in starting from the 
aforementioned and other names of the existing canonizations to 
append yet another one denoting a certain ‘tendency’ in art history 
(histories). It would be far more propitious to develop the perspective 
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of a necessarily interminable genealogy of cre-activity, not as a new art-
specific discipline, but instead equally in reference to the history of 
forms of social protest, the emergence and various uses of technologies, 
and so forth. 
Two elements that this kind of genealogy of cre-activity must 
inevitably take into consideration are outlined here in conclusion: 
1) The history of what is here called cre-activity cannot be 
considered independent from the institutions and forms of 
governmentality in which it takes place and which it engenders. In terms 
of art, this applies not only to obviously institutional structures such as 
museums, but also, for example, to ideas of artistic autonomy, which 
from a historical perspective – far removed from expressing an actual 
‘self-regulation’ – basically reflect little other than the battle over a 
certain cultural policies model in the formational phase of something 
generally like cultural policies as a separate field of political 
administration.4 And this applies not only to the forms of government 
and self-government, in which ‘art’, ‘culture’ and other areas of social 
life are situated, but naturally also to how they have been re-formed in 
times of neo-liberalism and the corresponding individual and collective 
self-practices in project-based contexts.5 These re-formulations have 
also generated a new type of institution, namely the project institution, 
which has no stable institutional structure at its disposal at all, which 
allows it a certain flexibility, but is on the other hand also linked with 
new forms of instrumental purpose-orientation and with the fact that 
this type of institution has little to counter the current spread of 
individual and social precarity. 
2) This last point brings us back to Paul Valéry’s words quoted at 
the beginning: the ‘effort’ that Valéry speaks of and the ‘sensation’ of it 
that his youthful theological caprice sought, is still found in Valéry’s 
distancing gesture as the effort of an isolated artist subject able to 
‘autonomously’ decide on its creation techniques. Yet this subject is as 
little neutral and general, or conversely: it is as presupposed and 
predetermined as its predecessors from the theological tradition and 
their secular counterparts. We need only place a brief statement from a 
different voice, the voice of Virginia Woolf, next to Valéry’s words to 
see this, a statement that was made only three years after Valéry’s 
preface was written, namely in 1928: ‘[…] a woman must have money 
and a room of her own if she is to write fiction’ (Woolf, 2004: 4). It is 
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not a coincidence that this statement appears again in a central position 
in one of the programmatic texts emerging from the struggles and 
solidarity movements of the French Intermittents (Précaires Associés de 
Paris, 2003). It refers to a discriminating policy and social practice, 
which continues to attribute certain activities (particularly symbolically 
valued ones such as ‘creativity’) to a certain preferred type of 
presupposed (gendered, racialized, or otherwise qualified) subjects, and 
which should not be lost sight of in the perspective of a genealogy of 
cre-activity or in any contemporary cre-active critique. For cre-activity 
in the sense developed here has nothing to do with an ordering of 
subjects, but rather with the multiplicity of existences and the 
subjectivation processes that take place in them. 
 
Notes 
1 Cf. the criticism of Michel Foucault in Habermas, 1985 and 1987, which 
includes reference to similar criticism by Nancy Fraser. 
2 Boltanski and Chiapello’s mention of ‘sources of indignation’ or ‘motives of 
indignation’ forms only a weak reflection of this origin, for their validity as 
critique remains constantly tied to the presence of ‘norm references’. 
3 In the ‘monadological’ thinking of Leibniz, which ultimately remains framed 
in theology, the three aspects of the Marxian concept of critique developed 
above are already very clearly presaged: involvement – every monad is 
embedded in a monad universe and thus a ‘reflection of the world’ (for 
which reason it also needs no ‘window’, because it is perceptio per se of this 
embeddedness); self-change – change is unthinkable without an ‘inner 
principle of change’, in other words without the monad’s self-changing; lack 
of a defined purpose – the world is not the ‘best of all worlds’ because it is 
perfect (final cause), but because it is perfectible. 
4 On this, see Georg Bollenbeck’s relevant remark about the ‘class [meaning 
the nineteenth-century German Bildungsbürgertum] that barred any 
intervention in culture on the part of the authoritarian state by invoking the 
“state of culture”, assigning to this authoritarian state at the same time the 
responsibility for supporting “culture”’ (Bollenbeck, 1999: 16). 
5 It is one of the unfortunate curtailments of some more recent discourses in 
the cultural field that ‘governmentality’ appears to have begun with neo-
liberalism; it is sufficient, and not only in more recent times, to go into any 
museum and analyze one’s own self-restraint, in order to grasp the 
governmentality – embedded in specific historical political formations – that 
has been inscribed in ‘culture’ and the cultural field from the beginning. 
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That political economy is governmentality’s ‘most important form of 
knowledge’ (Foucault, 2004a: 162) does not mean that it is its only form of 
knowledge or that the forms of symbolic socialization historically circulating 
under the term ‘culture’ are not in need of separate attention. On this, see 
Bennett, 1995. On the differentiation of liberal and neoliberal 
governmentality at the economic level, see Lorey, 2009. 
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2 
The Geopolitics of Pimping 
Suely Rolnik 
translated by Brian Holmes 
Powerful winds of critique have begun shaking the territory of art again 
since the mid-1990s. With different strategies, from the most activist to 
the most strikingly aesthetic, this movement in the air of the times finds 
one of its origins in an unease with the politics that govern the 
processes of subjectivation, and especially the place of the other and the 
destiny of the power of creation: a politics characteristic of the finance 
capitalism that established itself across the planet from the mid-1970s 
onward. 
It is curious to notice that in Brazil this movement only began to 
take shape at the turn of the century, among elements of the new 
generation of artists who were beginning to express themselves publicly, 
frequently organized as ‘collectives’. Still more recent is the participation 
of this local movement in the discussion that has long been maintained 
outside the country.1 Today, this type of theme has even begun to enter 
the Brazilian institutional scene, in the wake of what has been 
happening outside the country for some time, where artistic practices 
involving these questions have been transformed into a ‘trend’ within 
the official circuit – a phenomenon characteristic of the media, with its 
market-based logic, which orients a great deal of artistic production 
today. In this migration the critical density of those questions is often 
dissolved, in order to constitute a new fetish that feeds the institutional 
art system and the voracious market that depends on it. 
A certain number of questions arise concerning the emergence of 
these themes in the territory of art. What are such preoccupations doing 
here? Why have they become increasingly recurrent in artistic practices? 
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And in the case of Brazil, why have they appeared so recently? What 
interest do the institutions have in incorporating them? What I will do 
here is to sketch out a few prospective pathways of investigation, in 
order to confront these questions. 
At least two presuppositions orient the choice of those pathways. 
The first is that theoretical questions always arise on the basis of 
problems that present themselves within a singular context, insofar as 
those problems affect our bodies, provoking changes in the tissue of 
our sensibility and a resultant crisis of meaning in our references. It is 
the uneasiness of the crisis that triggers the work of thinking, a process 
of creation that can be expressed in different forms: verbal (whether 
theoretical or literary), visual, musical, cinematographic, and so on, or 
again in a purely existential form. Whatever the means of expression, we 
think/create because something in our everyday lives forces us to invent 
new possibilities, in order to incorporate into the current map of 
meaning the sensible mutation that is seeking passage in our day-to-day 
experience. All of this has nothing to do with the narcissistic demand to 
align oneself on the ‘trend’ of the moment, in order to obtain 
institutional recognition and/or media prestige. 
The specificity of art as a mode of the production of thought is that 
the changes of the sensible texture are embodied in artistic action and 
they present themselves alive within it. Hence the power of contagion 
and transformation this action potentially bears: it puts the world to 
work and reconfigures its landscape. Thus it is hardly surprising that art 
should investigate the present and partake of the changes that are 
occurring in actuality. If we grasp the use of thinking from this 
perspective, and if we accept art as a way of thinking, then the 
insistence on this type of theme in the artistic territory can indicate to us 
that the politics of subjectivity – and especially of the relation to the 
other and of cultural creation – is in crisis, and that a transformation in 
these fields is surely underway. So, if we want to answer the questions 
posed above we cannot avoid the problematization of this crisis and the 
process of changing it involves. 
The second presupposition is that to think this problematic field 
requires us to summon up a transdisciplinary gaze, for innumerable 
layers of reality are interwoven there, whether on the macropolitical 
plane (facts and lifestyles in their formal, sociological exteriority) or on 
the micropolitical one (the forces that shake reality, dissolving its forms 
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and engendering others in a process that involves desire and 
subjectivity). What will be proposed next are some elements for a 
cartography of this process, sketched essentially from a micropolitical 
point of view. 
In Search of Vulnerability 
One of the problems of the politics of subjectivation that artistic 
practices face has been the anesthesia of our vulnerability to the other – 
an anesthesia all the more devastating when the other is represented by 
the ruling cartography as hierarchically inferior, because of his or her 
economic, social or racial condition, or on any other basis. But 
vulnerability is the precondition for the other to cease being a simple 
object for the projection of pre-established images, in order to become 
a living presence, with whom we can construct the territories of our 
existence and the changing contours of our subjectivity. Now, being 
vulnerable depends on the activation of a specific capacity of the 
sensible, which has been repressed for many centuries, remaining active 
only in certain philosophical and poetic traditions. These traditions 
culminated in the artistic vanguards of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, whose activity produced effects that have left their 
mark on art across the twentieth century. More broadly, they 
propagated throughout the social tissue, ceasing to be a privilege of the 
cultural elites, particularly from the 1960s on. Neuroscience itself, in 
recent research, corroborates this observation that each of our sense 
organs is the bearer of a double capacity: cortical and subcortical.2 
The former corresponds to perception, allowing us to apprehend 
the world in terms of forms, in order to then project upon them the 
representations we have available, so as to give them meaning. This 
capacity, which is the most familiar to us, is associated with time, with 
the history of the subject and with language. With it arise the very 
figures of subject and object, clearly delineated and maintaining a 
relationship of exteriority to each other. The cortical capacity of the 
sensible is what allows us to preserve the map of reigning 
representations, so that we can move through a known scenario where 
things remain in their due places with a minimum of stability. 
The second, subcortical capacity, which is less known to us because 
of its historical repression, allows us to apprehend the world as a field 
of forces that affect us and make themselves present in our bodies in 
the form of sensations. The exercise of this capacity is disengaged from 
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the history of the subject and of language. With it, the other is a living 
presence composed of a malleable multiplicity of forces that pulse in 
our sensible texture, thus becoming part of our very selves. Here the 
figures of subject and object dissolve, and with them, that which 
separates the body from the world. In the 1980s, in a book, which has 
recently been reissued (Rolnik, 2006a), I began referring to this second 
capacity of our sense organs as the ‘resonant body’. It is our body as a 
whole that has this power of resonating with the world. 
Between the capacity of our body to resonate and its capacity of 
perception there is a paradoxical relation, for these are modes of 
apprehending reality that work according to totally distinct logics, 
irreducible to each other. It is the tension of this paradox that mobilizes 
and galvanizes the potential of thought/creation, to the extent that the 
new sensations that incorporate themselves in our sensible texture carry 
out mutations that are not transmittable by our available 
representations. For this reason they throw our references into crisis 
and impose on us the urgency of inventing new forms of expression. 
Thus we integrate into our body the signs that the world gives us, and 
through their expression, we incorporate them to our existential 
territories. In the course of this operation a shared map of references is 
reestablished, with new outlines. Moved by this paradox, we are 
continually forced to think/create, as suggested above. The exercise of 
thought/creation therefore has a power to intervene in reality and to 
participate in the orientation of its destiny, constituting an essential 
instrument for the transformation of the subjective and objective 
landscape. 
The weight of each of these modes of knowledge of the world, as 
well as the relation between them, is variable. Which is also to say that 
the place of the other varies, along with the politics of relation to him or 
her. The latter in its turn defines a mode of subjectivation. The politics 
of subjectivation are known to change along with historical 
transformations, since each regime depends on a specific form of 
subjectivity in order to become viable in the daily life of everyone. It is 
on this terrain that a regime acquires existential consistency and 
concreteness; hence the very idea of differing ‘politics’ of subjectivation. 
Yet in the specific case of neoliberalism, the strategy of subjectivation, 
of relation with the other and of cultural creation takes on essential 
importance, because it holds a central role in the very principle that 
governs the contemporary version of capitalism. For this regime feeds 
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primarily on subjective forces, and especially on those of knowledge and 
creation, to the point where it has recently been described as ‘cultural’ 
or ‘cognitive’ capitalism.3 Considering what has been indicated above, I 
will now propose a cartography of the changes that have led art to 
engage with this kind of problem. To do so, I will take the departure 
point of the 1960s and 70s. 
Birth of a Flexible Subjectivity 
Until the early 1960s we lived beneath a disciplinary Fordist regime that 
reached its height in the ‘American way of life’ triumphant in the 
postwar period, when a politics of identity reigned in subjectivity, along 
with a rejection of the resonant body. These two aspects are in fact 
inseparable, because only to the extent that we anesthetize our 
vulnerability can we maintain a stable image of ourselves and the other, 
that is, our supposed identities. Without this anesthesia, we are 
constantly deterritorialized and led to reconfigure the outlines of our 
selves and our territories of existence. Until the early 1960s, the creative 
imagination operated mainly by sneaking away to the fringes. That 
period came to an end in the course of 1960s-70s as a result of cultural 
movements that problematized the governing regime of the time, calling 
for l’imagination au pouvoir. Those movements brought the dominant 
mode of subjectivation into crisis, and it soon collapsed along with the 
entire structure of the Victorian family and its Hollywood apogee – a 
structure which had been fundamental for the regime whose hegemony 
began to fade at that moment. A ‘flexible subjectivity’4 was then created, 
accompanied by radical experimentation with modes of existence and 
cultural creation which shattered the ‘bourgeois’ lifestyle and its politics 
of desire, with its logic of identity, its relation to otherness and its 
culture.  
In the resulting ‘counter-culture’, as it was called, forms were created 
to express that which was indicated by the resonant body affected by 
the otherness of the world, at grips with the problematics of its time. 
The forms thus created tend to transmit subjectivity’s incorporation of 
the forces that shake up the environment and deterritorialize it. The 
advent of such forms is inseparable from a becoming-other of the self, 
but also of the environment. It can be said that the creation of these 
new territories has to do with public life, in the strong sense of the 
phrase: the collective construction of reality moved by the tensions that 
destabilize the reigning cartographies, as these affect the body of each 
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person singularly, and as they are expressed on the basis of that singular 
affect. In other words, what each person expresses is the current state 
of the world – its meaning, but also and mainly, its lacks of meaning – 
as it presents itself within the body. So, the singular expression of each 
person participates in the endless tracing of a necessarily collective 
cartography. 
Today these transformations have consolidated themselves. The 
scenario of our times is completely different: we are no longer beneath 
the regime of identity, the politics of subjectivation is no longer the 
same. We all now have available a flexible and processual subjectivity as 
instituted by the counter-cultural movements, and our force of creation 
in its experimental freedom is not only favorably viewed and welcomed, 
but is even stimulated, celebrated and frequently glamorized. However, 
in all this there is a ‘but’, which is hardly negligible. In the present, the 
most common destiny of flexible subjectivity and of the freedom of 
creation that accompanies it is not the invention of forms of expression 
motivated by an attention to sensations that signal the effects of the 
other’s existence within our resonant body. What guides us in this 
creation of territories for our post-Fordist flexibility is an almost 
hypnotic identification with the images of the world broadcast by 
advertising and mass culture. 
By offering ready-made territories to subjectivities rendered fragile 
by deterritorialization, these images tend to soothe their unrest, thus 
contributing to the deafness of their resonant body, and therefore to its 
invulnerability to the affects of the time that are presented within it. But 
that may not be the most deadly aspect of this politics of subjectivation, 
which instead is the very message that such images invariably convey, 
independently of their style or their target-public. At stake here is the 
idea that there exist paradises, that these are now in this world and not 
beyond it, and above all, that certain people have the privilege of 
inhabiting them. What is more, such images transmit the illusion that we 
could be one of these VIPs, if we simply invested all our vital energy – 
our desire, affect, knowledge, intellect, eroticism, imagination, action, 
etc. – in order to actualize these virtual worlds of signs in our own 
existence, through the consumption of the objects and services they 
propose to us. 
What we are faced with here is a new élan for the idea of paradise 
developed by Judeo-Christian religions: the mirage of a smoothed-over, 
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stable life under perfect control. This kind of hallucination has its origin 
in the refusal of one’s vulnerability to the other and to the 
deterritorializing turbulence that he or she provokes; and also in the 
disdain for fragility that necessarily derives from such an experience. 
This fragility is nonetheless essential because it indicates the crisis of a 
certain diagram of sensibility, its modes of expression, its cartographies 
of meaning. By disdaining fragility, it does not call up the desire for 
creation anymore; instead it provokes a sentiment of humiliation and 
shame whose result is the blockage of the vital process. In other words, 
what the Western idea of a promised paradise amounts to is a refusal of 
life in its immanent nature as an impulse to continuous processes of 
creation and differentiation. In its terrestrial version, capital has replaced 
God in his function as keeper of the promise, and the virtue that makes 
us worthy of it now becomes consumption: this is what constitutes the 
fundamental myth of advanced capitalism. In such a context, it is at the 
very least mistaken to consider that we lack myths today: it is precisely 
through our belief in this religious myth of neoliberalism, that the 
image-worlds produced by this regime turn into concrete reality in our 
own existence. 
Flexible Subjectivity Surrenders to Its Pimp 
In other words, the ‘cultural’ or ‘cognitive’ capitalism that was 
conceived as a solution to the crisis provoked by the movements of the 
1960s and 1970s absorbed the modes of existence that those 
movements invented and appropriated their subjective forces, especially 
that of the creative potential, which at the time was breaking free in 
social life. The creative potential was in effect put into power, as was 
called for by those movements. Yet we know now that this rise of the 
imagination to power is a micropolitical operation that consists in 
making its potential into the major fuel of an insatiable hypermachine 
for the production and accumulation of capital – to the point where one 
can speak of a new working class, which some authors call the 
‘cognitariat.’5 This kind of pimping of the creative force is what has 
been transforming the planet into a gigantic marketplace, expanding at 
an exponential rate, either by including its inhabitants as hyperactive 
zombies or by excluding them as human trash. In fact, those two 
opposing poles are interdependent fruits of the same logic; all our 
destinies unfold between them. This is the world that the imagination 
creates in the present. As one might expect, the politics of 
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subjectivation and of the relation to the other that predominates in this 
scenario is extremely impoverished. 
Currently, after almost three decades, it is possible to perceive this 
logic of cognitive capitalism operating within our subjectivity. Yet in the 
late 1970s, when its installation began, the experimentation that had 
been carried out collectively in the decades before in order to achieve 
emancipation from the pattern of Fordist and disciplinary subjectivity 
was quite difficult to distinguish from its incorporation into the new 
regime. The consequences of this difficulty are that the cloning of the 
transformations proposed by those movements was experienced by a 
great many of their protagonists as a signal of recognition and inclusion: 
the new regime appeared to be liberating them from the marginality to 
which they had been confined in the ‘provincial’ world that was now 
fading away. Dazzled by the rise to power of their transgressive and 
experimental force of creation which was now thrusting them beneath 
the glamorizing spotlights of the media, launching them into the world 
and lining their pockets with dollars, the inventors of the 
transformations of earlier decades frequently fell into the trap. Many of 
them surrendered themselves voluntarily to their pimp, becoming the 
very creators and constructors of the world fabricated by and for the 
new-style capitalism. 
This confusion undoubtedly stems from the politics of desire that 
characterizes the pimping of subjective and creative forces – a kind of 
power-relation that is basically exerted through the sorcery of seduction. 
The seducer conjures up a spellbinding idealization that leads the 
seduced to identify with the seducer and submit to him: that is to say, to 
identify with and submit to the aggressor, impelled by an inner desire, in 
hopes of being recognized and admitted into the seducer’s world. Only 
recently has this situation become conscious, which tends to break the 
spell. This transpires in the different strategies of individual and 
collective resistance that have been accumulating over the last few years, 
particularly through the initiative of a new generation which does not in 
any way identify with the proposed model of existence and understands 
the trick that has been played. It is clear that artistic practices – through 
their very nature as expressions of the problematics of the present as 
they flow through the artist’s body – could hardly remain indifferent to 
this movement. On the contrary, it is exactly for this reason that these 
questions emerged in art from the early 1990s onward, as mentioned at 
the outset. Using different procedures, these strategies have been 
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carrying out an exodus from the minefield stretching between the 
opposite and complementary figures of luxury and trash subjectivity, the 
field in which human destinies are confined in the world of globalized 
capitalism. Amidst this exodus, other kinds of worlds are being created. 
Profitable Wound 
But the difficulty of resisting the seduction of the serpent of paradise in 
its neoliberal version has grown even greater in the countries of Latin 
America and Eastern Europe which, like Brazil, were under totalitarian 
regimes at the moment when financial capitalism took hold. Let us not 
forget that the ‘democratic opening’ of these countries, which took 
place during the 1980s, was partially due to the advent of the post-
Fordist regime, whose flexibility could only encounter the rigidity of the 
totalitarian systems as an obstacle. 
If we approach the totalitarian regimes not by their visible or 
macropolitical side, but instead by their invisible or micropolitical side, 
we can see that what characterizes such regimes is the pathological 
rigidity of the identity principle. This holds for totalitarianisms of the 
Right and the Left, since from the viewpoint of the politics of 
subjectivation such regimes are not so different. In order to hold on to 
power, they do not content themselves with simply ignoring the 
expressions of the resonant body – that is, the cultural and existential 
forms engendered in a living relation with the other, which continually 
destabilize the reigning cartographies and deterritorialize us. As a matter 
of fact, the very advent of such regimes constitutes a violent reaction to 
destabilization, when it exceeds a threshold of tolerability for 
subjectivities in a state of servile adaptation to the status quo. For them, 
such a threshold does not summon up an urgency to create, but on the 
contrary, to preserve the established order at any price. Destructively 
conservative, the totalitarian states go much further than a simple scorn 
or censorship of the expressions of the resonant body: they obstinately 
seek to disqualify and humiliate them, to the point where the force of 
creation, of which such expressions are the product, is so marked by the 
trauma of this vital terrorism that it finally blocks itself off, and is 
thereby reduced to silence. A century of psychoanalysis has shown that 
the time required to confront and work through a trauma of this scope 
can extend to as much as thirty years.6 
It is not hard to imagine that the meeting of these two regimes 
makes up a scenario even more vulnerable to the abuses of pimping: in 
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its penetration to totalitarian contexts, cultural capitalism took 
advantage of the experimental past which was exceptionally audacious 
and singular in many of those countries; but above all, it took advantage 
of the wounds inflicted on the forces of creation by the blows they had 
suffered. The new regime presented itself not only as the system that 
could welcome and institutionalize the principle of the production of 
subjectivity and culture by the movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as 
had been the case in the United States and in the countries of Western 
Europe. In the countries under dictatorships it gained an extra power of 
seduction: its apparent condition as a savior come to liberate the energy 
of creation from its bonds, to cure it of its debilitated state, allowing it 
to reactivate and manifest itself again. 
Power by seduction, characteristic of the worldwide governance of 
finance capital, is no doubt ‘lighter’ and subtler than the heavy hand of 
local governments commanded by the military states that preceded; yet 
its effects are no less destructive, though with entirely different 
strategies and ends. It is therefore clear that the combination of these 
two historical factors, as occurred in these countries, has considerably 
aggravated the state of pathological alienation of subjectivity, especially 
with respect to the politics that governs the relation to the other and the 
destiny of the force of creation. 
Anthropophagic Zombies 
If we now focus our micropolitical gaze on Brazil, we will discover an 
even more specific feature in the process of neoliberalism’s installation, 
and of its cloning of the movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In Brazil 
those movements had a particularity, because of a reactivation of a 
certain cultural tradition of the country, which had come to be known 
as ‘anthropophagy’. Some of the characteristics of this tradition are: the 
absence of an absolute and stable identification with any particular 
repertory and the non-existence of any blind obedience to established 
rules, generating a plasticity in the contours of subjectivity (instead of 
identities); an opening to the incorporation of new universes, 
accompanied by a freedom of hybridization (instead of a truth-value 
assigned to a particular repertory); an agility of experimentation and 
improvisation to create territories and their respective cartographies 
(instead of fixed territories authorized by stable and predetermined 
languages) – all of this carried out with grace, joy and spontaneity. 
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The tradition had initially been circumscribed and named in the 
1920s by the Brazilian modernists gathered around the Anthropophagic 
Movement. Like all the cultural vanguards of the early twentieth 
century, the visionary spirit of the local modernists already pointed 
critically to the limits of the politics of subjectivation, of relation to the 
other and of cultural production that characterized the disciplinary 
regime, taking its logic of identity as a major target. But whereas the 
European vanguards tried to create alternatives to this model, in Brazil 
there was already another model of subjectivation and cultural creation 
inscribed in people’s memory since the very foundation of the country. 
Maybe this was the reason why Oswald de Andrade, the major 
reference of the Anthropophagic Movement, could glimpse in the 
national tradition a ‘program for the reeducation of the sensibility’ that 
could function as a ‘social therapy for the modern world’.7 The service 
that the Brazilian modernist movement did for the country’s culture by 
highlighting and naming this politics was to lend it value, making 
possible a consciousness of cultural singularity. It could then be asserted 
against the idealization of European culture, a colonial heritage that 
marked the intelligentsia of the country. It’s worth noting that even 
today this submissive identification affects a great deal of Brazil’s 
intellectual production, which in some sectors has merely replaced its 
former object of idealization with North American culture, as is 
especially the case in the field of art. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, as we have seen, the inventions of the early 
part of the century ceased to be restricted to the cultural vanguards; 
after a few decades, they had contaminated the politics of 
subjectivation, generating changes that would come to be expressed 
most strikingly by the generation born after the Second World War. For 
the members of this generation, the disciplinary society that attained its 
apogee at that moment became absolutely intolerable, which made them 
launch upon the process of rupture with this pattern as manifested in 
their own everyday existence. Flexible subjectivity thus became the new 
model, the model of a counter-culture. It was in the course of this 
process that the ideas of anthropophagy were reactivated in Brazil, 
reappearing most explicitly in cultural movements such as Tropicalismo, 
taken in its widest sense.8 By calling up the traits of a tradition that was 
deeply inscribed in the Brazilians’ bodies, the counter-culture of the 
country attained an especially radical freedom of experimentation, 
generating artistic proposals of great force and originality. 
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Now, the same singularity that gave such strength to the counter-
cultural movements in Brazil also tended to aggravate the cloning of 
those movements carried out by neoliberalism. The anthropophagical 
savoir-faire of the Brazilians gives them a special facility for adapting to 
the new times. The country’s elites and middle classes are absolutely 
dazzled by being so contemporary, so up-to-date on the international 
scene of the new post-identity subjectivities, so well-equipped to live 
out this post-Fordist flexibility (which, for example, makes them 
international champions in advertising and positions them high in the 
world ranking of media strategies).9 But this is only the form taken by 
the voluptuous and alienated abandonment to the neoliberal regime in 
its local Brazilian version, making its inhabitants, especially the city-
dwellers, into veritable anthropophagic zombies. 
Predictable characteristics in a country with a colonial history? 
Whatever the response, an obvious sign of this pathetically uncritical 
identification with finance capital by part of the Brazilian cultural elite is 
the fact that the leadership of the group that restructured the Brazilian 
state petrified by the military regime, and that made the process of re-
democratization into one of alignment on neoliberalism, was composed 
to a great extent of leftist intellectuals, many of whom had lived in exile 
during the period of the dictatorship. 
The point is that anthropophagy itself is only a form of 
subjectivation, one that happens to be distinct from the politics of 
identity. But that doesn’t guarantee anything, because any form can be 
invested with different ethics, from the most critical to the most 
execrably reactive and reactionary, as Oswald de Andrade already 
pointed out in the 1920s, designating the latter as ‘base 
anthropophagy’.10 What distinguishes between the ethics is the same 
‘but’ that I mentioned above, when I referred to the difference between 
the flexible subjectivity invented in the 1960s and 1970s and its clone 
fabricated by post-Fordist capitalism. The difference lies in the strategy 
of the creation of territories and, implicitly, in the politics of the relation 
to the other. In order for this process to be oriented by an ethics of the 
affirmation of life it is necessary to construct territories with a basis in 
the urgencies indicated by the sensations – that is, by the signs of the 
presence of the other in our resonant body. It is around the expression 
of these signals and their reverberation in subjectivities that breathe the 
same air of the times that possibilities open up in individual and 
collective existence. 
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Now, that is emphatically not the politics of the creation of 
territories that has predominated in Brazil. Instead, neoliberalism 
mobilized only the worst of this tradition, the basest anthropophagy. 
The ‘plasticity’ of the border between public and private and the 
‘freedom’ of private appropriation of public goods – taken with derision 
and exhibited with pride – is one of its worst facets, clearly imbued with 
the colonial heritage. Indeed, this is exactly the facet of anthropophagy 
to which Oswald de Andrade had called attention when he designated 
its reactionary side. And this lineage is so intoxicating for Brazilian 
society, especially for its political and economic elites, that it would be 
naïve to imagine it could simply disappear as though by magic. 
There have been five centuries of anthropophagic experience, and 
almost one of reflection upon it, since the moment when the 
modernists circumscribed it critically and made it conscious. Against 
this backdrop the Brazilians’ anthropophagic savoir-faire – especially as 
it was actualized in the 1960s and 1970s – can still be useful today, but 
not to guarantee their access to the imaginary paradises of capital; on 
the contrary, to help them problematize the disgraceful confusion 
between the two politics of flexible subjectivity and to separate the 
wheat from the chaff, essentially on the basis of the place or non-place 
that is attributed to the other. This knowledge would offer the 
conditions for fertile participation in the debate that is gathering 
internationally around the problematization of a regime that has now 
become hegemonic, and also in the invention of strategies of exodus 
outside the imaginary field whose origins lie in its deadly myth.11 
Art has a special vocation to carry out such a task, to the extent that 
by bringing the mutations of sensibility into the realm of the visible and 
the speakable, it can unravel the cartography of the present, liberating 
life at its points of interruption and releasing its power of germination – 
a task utterly distinct from and irreducible to macropolitical activism. 
The latter relates to reality from the viewpoint of representation, 
denouncing the conflicts inherent to the distribution of places 
established in the reigning cartography (conflicts of class, race, gender, 
etc.) and struggling for a more just configuration. These are two distinct 
and complementary gazes on reality, corresponding to two different 
potentials of intervention, both participating in their own ways in the 
shaping of its destiny. Nonetheless, problematizing the confusion 
between the two politics of flexible subjectivity so as to intervene 
effectively in this field and contribute to breaking the spell of the 
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seduction that sustains the neoliberalism power at the very heart of its 
politics of desire, necessarily entails treating the illness that arose from 
the unfortunate confluence in Brazil of the three historical factors that 
exerted a negative effect on the creative imagination: the traumatic 
violence of the dictatorship, the pimping by neoliberalism and the 
activation of a base anthropophagy. This confluence clearly exacerbated 
the lowering of the critical capacity and the servile identification with 
the new regime. 
Here we can return to our initial inquiry into the particular situation 
of Brazil within the geopolitical field of the international debate that has 
been gathering in the territory of art for over a decade, around the 
destiny of subjectivity, its relation to the other and its potential of 
invention under the regime of cultural capitalism. The unfortunate 
confluence of these three historical factors could be one of the reasons 
why the debate is so recent in this country. It is clear that there are 
exceptions, as is the case of the Brazlian artist Lygia Clark, who just one 
year after May 1968 already foresaw this situation. As she described it at 
the time:  
In the very moment when he digests the object, the artist is digested by 
the society that has already found a title and a bureaucratic occupation 
for him: he will be the future engineer of entertainment, an activity that 
has no effect whatsoever on the equilibrium of social structures. The 
only way for the artist to escape co-optation is to succeed in unleashing 
a general creativity, without any psychological or social limits. This 
creativity will be expressed in lived experience.12 
What Are the Powers of Art? 
From within this new scenario emerge the questions that are asked of 
all those who think/create – and especially artists – in the attempt to 
delineate a cartography of the present, so as to identify the points of 
asphyxiation of the vital process and to bring about, at exactly those 
points, the irruption of the power to create other worlds. 
A first bloc of questions would relate to the cartography of pimping 
exploitation. How does the tourniquet that leads us to tolerate the 
intolerable, and even to desire it, come to take hold of our vitality? By 
means of what processes is our vulnerability to the other anesthetized? 
What mechanisms of our subjectivity lead us to offer our creative force 
for the fulfillment of the market? And our desire, our affects, our 
The Geopolitics of Pimping 
  37 
eroticism, our time? How are all of the potentials captured by the faith 
in the promise of paradise by the capitalist religion? Which artistic 
practices have fallen into this trap? What allows us to identify them? 
What makes them so numerous? 
Another bloc of questions, which is in fact inseparable from the 
former, would relate to the cartography of the movements of exodus. 
How to liberate life from its new dead ends? What can our force of 
creation do in order to confront this challenge? Which artistic devices 
are succeeding in that confrontation? Which of them are treating the 
territory of art itself, a territory that is increasingly lusted for and at the 
same time undermined by the pimping that takes it as a bottomless well 
for the extortion of the surplus value of creativity, in order to increase 
its seductive power? In short, how to reactivate in our times, in each 
situation, the political potential inherent in artistic activity, its power to 
unleash possibilities? By which I mean, its power to embody the 
mutations of the sensible, and thereby, contribute to reconfiguring the 
contours of the world. 
Answers to these and other questions are being constructed by 
different artistic practices, along with territories of all kinds that are 
being reinvented every day, outside the imaginary field whose origins lie 
in the deadly myth proposed by cultural capitalism. It is impossible to 
foresee the effects of these subtle perforations in the compact mass of 
dominant brutality that envelops the planet today. The only thing we 
can say is that by all indications, the geopolitical landscape of globalized 
pimping is no longer exactly the same; molecular currents would be 
moving the earth. Could this be a mere hallucination? 
 
Notes 
1 Translator’s note: Here the author refers to a number of political art 
collectives that have significantly multiplied in recent years primarily in the 
region of São Paulo Contra Filé, including Bijari, Cia Cachorra, Catadores 
de Histórias, c.o.b.a.i.a., A revolução não será televisionada, TrancaRua, 
Frente 3 de Fevereiro. If some of the most ‘visible’ and ‘institutional’ 
moments of the articulation of this ‘local movement’ are compared with 
similar activities taking place outside Brazil – a concatenation to which 
Suely Rolnik refers without going into detail – this results in an interesting 
diagram of contemporary forms of a transnational articulation of artistic 
and politicized practices that have occurred in these years. Their 
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characteristics are, above all, a progressive connection with local and 
translocal social and political practices (e.g. the movement Sem Teto do 
Centro) and a ‘flexible’, ideologically unbiased relationship to the art 
institution with fluid entries into and exits from the institutions. See for 
example the participation of 13 collectives in the IX Biennial of Havana 
under the title Territorio São Paulo 
(http://www.bienalhabana.cult.cu/protagonicas/proyectos/proyecto.php?i
db=9&&idpy=23), the exhibition Kollektive Kreativität in Kassel, 
organized by the collective What, How & For Whom (WHW) 
(http://www.fridericianum-kassel.de/ausst/ausstkollektiv.html#inter 
funktionen_english), the group Etcétera (http://www.exargentina.org/ 
participantes.html) and the exhibition Self-Education in the National Center 
for Contemporary Art Moscow, coordinated by Daria Pirkyna and the St. 
Petersburg collective Chto Delat? (What is to be done?) 
(http://transform.eipcp.net/calendar/1153261452). On Collective 
Creativity, WHW, Etcétera, Ex Argentina, Grupo de Arte Callejero (GAC), 
see Brumaria 5, Arte: la imaginación política radical, Summer 2005, 
http://www.brumaria.net. 
2 See Hubert Godard, ‘Regard aveugle’, in Diserens and Rolnik, 2005: 73-8. 
The text is the transcription of a filmed interview I conducted with Godard 
in the context of a project I have been developing since 2002, seeking to 
construct a living memory of the experimental practices proposed by Lygia 
Clark and of the Brazilian and French cultural context within which they 
originated. 
3 The notions of ‘cognitive’ or ‘cultural’ capitalism, proposed from the early 
1990s onward, chiefly by the researchers now associated with the French 
journal Multitudes, represent a further elaboration of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s ideas relative to the status of culture and subjectivity in the 
contemporary capitalist regime. 
4 I derive ‘flexible subjectivity’ from Brian Holmes’s notion of the ‘flexible 
personality’ in Holmes 2002. In recent texts I have developed from the 
viewpoint of the process of subjectivation; see Rolnik 2005a and 2006b. 
5 See note 3 above. 
6 At the outset of the military dictatorship in Brazil, the cultural movement 
persisted with all its vigor. With the promulgation of Institutional Act no. 5 
in December of 1968, the regime reasserted itself and the movement 
faltered, tending toward paralysis. Like any totalitarian regime, its deadliest 
effects may not have been the palpable and visible ones of prison, torture, 
repression and censorship, but other more subtle and invisible ones: the 
paralysis of the force of creation and the subsequent frustration of the 
collective intelligence, these being associated with the terrorizing threat of a 
punishment that could extend even to death. One of the most tangible 
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effects of such a blockage was the significant number of young people who 
underwent psychotic episodes at that time. Many of them were interned in 
psychiatric hospitals and not a few succumbed to the ‘psychiatricization’ of 
their suffering, never again returning from madness. Such psychotic 
manifestations, partly stemming from the terror of the dictatorship, also 
occurred in relation with the ‘extreme experiences’ characteristic of the 
counter-culture movement, consisting in all kinds of sensory 
experimentation, generally including the use of hallucinogenics, in a posture 
of active resistance to the bourgeois politics of subjectivation. The diffuse 
presence of terror and paranoia that this engendered no doubt contributed 
to the pathological destiny of these experiences of the opening of sensibility 
to its capacity for resonance. 
7 See Oswald de Andrade’s 1953 text ‘A marcha das utopias’ in Andrade, 
1990.  
8 The counter-cultural movement in Brazil was especially radical and broad, 
Tropicalism being one of the major expressions of its singularity. The active 
youth of the period were divided into the counter-culture and the political 
militants, both of which suffered equal violence from the dictatorship: 
prison, torture, assassination, exile, in addition to those who succumbed to 
madness, as already noted. Nonetheless, the counter-culture was never 
recognized for its political potency, unless it was by the military regime that 
fiercely punished those who participated, placing them in the same jails as 
the official political prisoners. Brazilian society projected a pejorative image 
on the counter-culture, originating in a conservative vision that in this 
specific aspect was shared by both Right and Left (including the militants of 
the same generation). Such a negation, even today, persists in the memory 
of the period, which on the contrary preserves and elevates the militant 
past. 
9 Brazilian television occupies an important place on the international scene. 
A sign of this is the fact that the telenovelas of the Globo network are now 
broadcast in over 200 countries. 
10 See Andrade’s 1928 text ‘Manifesto Antropófago’ in Andrade, 1990. 
11 In the early 1990s I began to work on the question of anthropophagy in the 
sense whereby it is problematized here. See Rolnik, 1998a, 1998b and 
2005b. 
12 Clark, 1997; this text originally appeared in 1971, in the Paris journal Robho 
no. 5-6. 

  41 
3 
The Misfortunes of the ‘Artistic Critique’ and 
of Cultural Employment 
Maurizio Lazzarato 
translated by Mary O’Neill 
In the work of sociologists and economists who are concerned with the 
transformations in capitalism and more specifically the changes in the 
artistic and cultural labor market, there is a tendency to use artistic 
activity and those conditions of professional practice as the model from 
which, they argue, neoliberal economics draws its inspiration. This is an 
ambiguous discourse and it deserves to be examined more closely. Luc 
Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme (1999; in 
English as The New Spirit of Capitalism, 2005) has the merit of making the 
so-called ‘artistic critique’ one of the economic, political and social 
actors of the century just past, and of the post-1945 period in particular. 
But both the exact definition of this ‘artistic critique’ and the role the 
authors assign to it in contemporary capitalism are puzzling in many 
respects. 
The thesis that runs throughout The New Spirit of Capitalism is the 
following: the ‘artistic critique’ (based on and demanding freedom, 
autonomy and authenticity) and the ‘social critique’ (based on and 
demanding solidarity, security and equality) ‘are most often developed 
and embodied by different groups’ and are ‘incompatible’.1 
The torch of the ‘artistic critique’, which was handed over by the 
artists to the students in May 1968, was then apparently taken up by 
‘trendy’ individuals working in the sectors of media, finance, show-
business, fashion, the internet and so on – that is, the ‘creatives’ at the 
‘top of the socio-cultural hierarchy’. The ‘social critique’, on the other 
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hand, developed and embodied by the workers of May ‘68, was taken 
up by the ‘little people’, subordinates, those excluded by liberalism. 
‘Artistic critique’ and ‘social critique’ are therefore ‘largely incompatible’. 
The ‘artistic critique’ provokes in the authors an unease, even a kind 
of contempt, which they have difficulty hiding. Seen from their point of 
view, this is entirely understandable since the ‘artistic critique […] is not 
naturally egalitarian; indeed it always runs the risk of being reinterpreted 
in an aristocratic sense’ and ‘untempered by considerations of equality 
and solidarity of the ‘social critique’, [it] can very quickly play into the 
hands of a particularly destructive form of liberalism, as we have seen in 
recent years’. Besides, the ‘artistic critique’ is  
not in itself necessary to effectively challenge capitalism, a fact 
demonstrated by the earlier successes of the workers’ movement 
without the support of the artistic critique. From this point of view, 
May ‘68 was exceptional. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2000)  
Reading it, one also feels that the book is pervaded by a certain 
resentment against May 1968 that for some years now has been 
prevalent among the French intellectual elites. Michel Foucault, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who (it is argued) as the key thinkers of 
1968 inadvertently sowed seeds of liberalism in people’s minds, are 
bearing the brunt of that resentment in this text, as well as in the mind 
of the former Minister of Education. 
So not only is the ‘artistic critique’ not necessary, other than to 
‘moderate the excess of equality in the social critique’ that is in danger 
of ‘treating freedom with disdain’2, but what is more, it acts like a 
Trojan Horse for liberalism, to which it is related by the aristocratic 
taste for freedom, autonomy and authenticity, which the artists 
supposedly handed on to ‘the students’ and which then went into 
circulation via ‘the trendy, left-wing bobos’.3 Here Boltanski and 
Chiapello give us a re-run of the opposition between freedom and 
equality, between autonomy and security. This opposition dates from 
another era and, it must be said, has resulted in the failure of socialism 
as well as communism. 
‘No Culture Without Social Rights’ 
The concept of ‘artistic critique’ doesn’t hold up for theoretical as well 
as political reasons: 
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a) As far as this last aspect goes, Boltanski and Chiapello’s theses 
were roundly refuted four years after publication. The misfortunes of 
their ‘artistic critique’ are many, but the greatest of these befell it with 
the emergence of the ‘Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires’4 and 
the resistance movement among the ‘artists’ and the ‘technicians’ in the 
performing arts sector of the cultural industry (l’industrie du spectacle); 
indeed this coordinating group constitutes the most successful 
expression of that resistance. The six words of one of this movement’s 
slogans ‘No culture without social rights’ are more than enough 
grounds on which to base a criticism of Boltanski and Chiapello’s book 
and to highlight all the weaknesses in their analysis of contemporary 
capitalism. If the slogan ‘No culture without social rights’ is translated 
into Boltanski and Chiapello’s terms, what is considered to be 
potentially aristocratic-liberal and incompatible with social justice will, 
as a result, become a battleground, perhaps the only one, where the 
neo-liberal logic can be thwarted: ‘no freedom, autonomy, authenticity 
(culture) without solidarity, equality, security (social rights)’. 
Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme was published in 1999, but it ceased to 
apply both theoretically and politically on the night of 25 June 2004, 
when the Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires was founded at 
the Théâtre Nationale de la Colline. When, developed and embodied as 
it was by ‘artists and technicians in the show-business industry’, by 
cultural workers, the ‘artistic critique’ became organized and adopted a 
name, it brought together what the authors held to be incompatible: the 
artist and the temporary worker, the artist and the intermittent (or 
casual) worker, the artist and the unemployed person, the artist and the 
Rmiste5 living on minimum benefit payments. 
The strongest and fiercest resistance (the conflict has been going on 
for three years) to the French employers’ liberal scheme of ‘social 
reconstruction’ comes from cultural workers in the performing arts 
sector. It was the individual Coordinations des Intermittents et 
Précaires, and not just the cultural workers, who developed and put 
forward a model of indemnification for ‘workers in discontinuous 
employment’, based on solidarity, security and justice. It was again these 
representative groups who indicated the battlegrounds for a system of 
unemployment insurance that is based on both security and autonomy 
and is capable of functioning even in the mobile labor market. 
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b) From a theoretical point of view, the concept of ‘artistic critique’ 
introduces a whole host of misunderstandings. Only the top three have 
been taken into consideration here: 
 
1. The divisions which liberal policies have created in society have 
nothing to do with the caricature of the social composition and the 
mapping of inequalities described in this book. Let us look again at the 
description of the social groups embodying the ‘artistic critique’, 
according to Boltanski and Chiapello, and try to see why indeed it is 
such a caricature (bordering on populism): 
Moreover, it must be said that the artistic critique is today embodied by 
people at the top of the socio-cultural hierarchy, university graduates, 
often working in the creative sectors (marketing, advertising, media, 
fashion, internet, etc.) or in the financial markets or in consultancy 
firms; their awareness of what, at the other end of the social scale, the 
life of a temporary worker or the life of someone who has no interest 
whatsoever in mobility is like, is virtually non-existent. (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2000) 
The divisions that the neo-liberal policies outline are not divisions 
between the new liberal professions and the new proles, between the 
trendy types and the unemployed, between a new ‘creative class’ 
working in the ‘creative industries’, and an old working class employed 
in the traditional industries. The inequalities exist within the so-called 
creative professions that, according to Boltanski and Chiapello, embody 
the ‘artistic critique’. Each of the professions that they cite as being 
engaged in the ‘artistic critique’ is not a homogeneous entity but rather a 
collection of situations that are highly differentiated internally by status, 
salaries, social cover, workload, and job. You can work in the same 
profession, enjoy wealth and job security or be poor and in highly 
precarious employment. Between these two extremes, there is an almost 
infinite gradation and modulation of situations and statuses. 
The divisions are not between individuals who work in the media, 
advertising, theatre, and photography on the one hand, and the workers, 
employees, casual and unemployed workers on the other. The divisions 
cut across the new liberal professions because, quite simply, a certain 
proportion of the people working in these professions are poor, with 
little or no guarantee of secure employment. 
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Exactly the same could be said of almost all the professions cited by 
the authors, particularly in research and in the university sector, areas 
with which these authors ought to be more familiar. It is a situation that 
the movement of ‘casual-contract research staff’ helped to bring to 
public attention, some months after the intermittent workers’ 
movement. 
Let us take an example for which there is supporting data. With 
Antonella Corsani and Jean-Baptiste Olivo and the various 
Coordinations des Intermittents et Précaires, we carried out a survey on 
a representative sample of more than 1000 intermittent workers, artists 
and technicians in the sectors of TV, radio and live performance. Let us 
look at the internal distribution of employment (the hours worked) and 
of salaries (without unemployment benefit): 
 
Table 1: Relationship between NHW6 and annual salary (based on the SMIC, 
the French guaranteed minimum wage; numbers in the cells in %) 
 
What comes across very clearly is that the majority of intermittent 
workers (56.4 percent) earn an annual salary of between half the 
guaranteed minimum wage in France – known as the SMIC, this stands 
at around 1,200 euros gross – and just above that minimum wage. 
However, at either end of the spectrum, 9.1 percent earn a sum 
equivalent to more than twice the minimum wage, while 13.1 percent 
earn less than 0.3 of that minimum wage. 
So the majority of intermittent workers barely live above the 
threshold for indemnification (507 hours), but there is an unspecified 
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number of ‘artists’ who are not indemnified and who live in a state of 
even greater precarity, juggling casual work, RMI and other benefit 
payments for those on the lowest incomes. Remember that, in Paris, 20 
percent of those in receipt of minimum benefit payments state their 
profession as ‘artist’. If what we call ‘visual artists’ are included in that 
group, then the ‘artists’ are a highly diverse category, not amenable to 
classification within those ‘molar’ and all-embracing categories of artists, 
individuals working in the media, etc. 
 
Table 2: Average salary, median salary and standard deviation by profession 
 
2. Boltanski and Chiapello have taken the artist and artistic activity as 
the model of the liberal economy, whereas this model was constructed 
on (the idea of the individual) as ‘human capital’, as an entrepreneur of 
her/himself. We are going to use Foucault’s work Naissance de la 
biopolitique (2004b) to account for the misconception according to which 
it is claimed that the model of contemporary economic activity is to be 
found among artists. 
As Foucault reminds us, neoliberalism needs to reconstruct a model 
of homo oeconomicus but, as we shall see shortly, this has very little to do 
with either the artist or artistic ‘creativity’. Neoliberalism does not seek 
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its model of subjectivation in the ‘artistic critique’ since it already has its 
own model: the entrepreneur, a figure that neoliberalism wants to 
extend across the board to everyone, artists included, as in the case of 
the French intermittent workers. In the ‘reform’ of intermittent 
employment, the new period of indemnification for intermittent 
workers is considered ‘a capital’ derived from indemnified days, which 
the individual has to manage as ‘capital’. 
What is this little word ‘capital’ doing among wage earners? How 
does it work? It states that unemployment benefits are part of the 
multiplicity of ‘investments’ (in education and training, mobility, 
affectivity, etc.) that the individual (the ‘human capital’) has to make in 
order to optimize his performance. Foucault’s analysis can help us to 
see the ‘positive’ target of neoliberal logic, what it encourages people to 
aim for through its model of ‘human capital’. Capitalization is one of 
the techniques that must contribute to the worker’s transformation into 
‘human capital’. The latter is then personally responsible for the 
education and development, growth, accumulation, improvement and 
valorization of the ‘self’ in its capacity as ‘capital’. This is achieved by 
managing all its relationships, choices, behaviours according to the logic 
of a costs/investment ratio and in line with the law of supply and 
demand. Capitalization must help to turn the worker into ‘a kind of 
permanent, multipurpose business’. The worker is an entrepreneur and 
entrepreneur of her/himself, ‘being her/his own capital, being her/his 
own producer, being her/his own source of revenue’ (Foucault, 2004b: 
232). Individuals are expected to deliver not the productivity of labor, 
but the profitability of a capital investment (of their own capital, a 
capital that is inseparable from their own selves). The individual has to 
regard her/himself as a fragment of capital, a molecular fraction of 
capital. The worker is no longer simply a factor of production; the 
individual is not strictly speaking a ‘workforce’ but rather a ‘capital-
competence’, a ‘machine of competences’. 
This idea of the individual as an entrepreneur of her/himself is the 
culmination of capital as a machine of subjectivation. For Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1980: 571; and 1987: 457), capital acts as a 
formidable ‘point of subjectivation that constitutes all human beings as 
subjects; but some, the “capitalists”, are subjects of enunciation […], 
while others, the “proletarians”, are subjects of the statement, subjected 
to the technical machines’. We can talk about the fulfillment of the 
process of subjectivation and exploitation since, in this case, it is the 
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same individual who splits in two, becoming both the subject of 
enunciation and the subject of the statement. On the one hand, s/he 
brings the subjectivation process to its pinnacle, because in all these 
activities s/he involves the ‘immaterial’ and ‘cognitive’ resources of 
her/his ‘self’, while on the other, s/he inclines towards identification, 
subjectivation and exploitation, given that s/he is both her/his own 
master and slave, a capitalist and a proletarian, the subject of 
enunciation and the subject of the statement. 
If we continue to take Foucault as a point of departure, the claim 
that freedom was introduced into capitalism by the events of May 1968 
and by the students can be strongly criticized. According to Foucault, 
liberalism is a mode of government that consumes freedom; to be able 
to consume freedom, it is first of all necessary to produce and promote 
it. Freedom is not a universal value, the enjoyment of which ought to be 
guaranteed by government; rather, it is the freedom (freedoms) that 
liberalism needs in order to function. Freedom is quite simply ‘the 
correlative of devices of security’ that Foucault describes in Naissance de 
la biopolitique. The great difference from Keynesian liberalism is that this 
freedom, which must be created and organized, is above all the freedom 
of business and of the entrepreneur, while the freedom of ‘labor’, of the 
‘consumer’, of politics, elements which were at the heart of the 
Keynesian intervention, must be radically subordinated to it. It is always 
about the freedom of the entrepreneurs. 
 
3. The problem is that the concept of the ‘artistic critique’ refers us to a 
notion of artistic activity that belongs to the past and one that, in the 
terms outlined by Boltanski and Chiapello, may never really have 
existed: 
But we know very well that, since the eighteenth and above all the 
nineteenth centuries, the artistic critique, allied as it was with 
conceptions of art as ‘sublime’ and the artist as a ‘genius’, has often 
been accompanied by a contempt for the ‘commonplace’, for the ‘petty 
bourgeois’, for the narrow-minded, middle-class beaufs, and so on. 
Admittedly, the ‘people’ or the ‘proletariat’ might appear protected 
from such contempt, but that was only because the critics nurtured an 
idealized, purely abstract image of it. The ‘people’, as an entity, was seen 
as ‘admirable’. However, when the supporters of the artistic critique 
chanced upon real representatives of the ‘people’ with their ‘mundane’, 
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‘reactionary’, etc. concerns, these could only have been a 
disappointment. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2000) 
This image of the artist corresponds perfectly to the image imposed on 
intermittent workers by the Culture Minister through the cultural 
employment policies. It is the liberal members of the French Ministry of 
Culture who have this image of the artist today. 
 
4. Boltanski and Chiapello, again: 
Since the mobility of ‘little people’ is most often something imposed on 
them, it is not really likely to generate a network. Buffeted by 
circumstances that are dictated by the end of their contracts, they run 
from one employer to the next so as not to drop off the radar 
completely. They circulate like goods in a network whose links they 
have no control over. They are then exchanged by others, who use 
them to maintain their own connections. As we explain when we refer 
to the nature of exploitation within the network, the mobility of the 
great person, the source of fulfilment and of profit, is the exact 
opposite of the mobility of the little person, which is nothing but 
poverty and precarity. Or, to use one of our formulas: the mobility of 
the exploiter is counterbalanced by the flexibility of the exploited. 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2000) 
It is the poorest, the most minor ‘little people’ who have carried the 
intermittent workers’ movement. It is the most minor ‘little people’ who 
have shown themselves to be a great deal more ‘creative’, more ‘mobile’, 
more ‘dynamic’ than the employees’ trades unions developing and 
embodying the social critique. Among their numbers, the coordinating 
groups count not only intermittent workers, but casual workers, 
unemployed people and people living on the RMI minimum benefits 
too, and it is this group of ‘little people’ which has initiated and 
managed one of the most innovative conflicts of recent years. 
Proof that Boltanski and Chiapello’s theory is very limited comes 
from the fact that liberalism has not extended more widely the working 
conditions of intermittent workers, the only artists with the status of 
wage-earners. And yet it has imposed on them the economic constraints 
borne by that model of human capital, the entrepreneur of her/himself. 
Indeed it is the cultural workers – the artists and technicians of live 
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performance – who have to adopt the behaviours and lifestyles 
associated with ‘human capital’. 
Menger and the Misfortunes of Permanent Employment in the 
Culture Industry 
By advocating a policy of permanent employment in the culture 
industry, Pierre-Michel Menger establishes the limits of possible and 
reasonable action in the cultural labor market: the ‘regulation’ of the 
‘excess’ of intermittent artists and technicians. Menger’s work clearly 
shows the complicity, the interweaving, the complementarity and the 
convergence of the ‘right’ and ‘left’ around the battle for employment. 
His latest book (2005a) is entirely based on the ‘disciplinary’ opposition 
between normal and atypical, as the title clearly indicates: Les intermittents 
du spectacle: sociologie d’une exception. For Menger,  
it is not about ordinary unemployment any more than it is about 
ordinary work […] The regulation of unemployment among 
intermittent workers is the regulation of atypical cover against atypical 
risk. But flexibility beyond the norms has very serious consequences. 
(Menger, 2005b) 
Extraordinary unemployment and employment, atypical risk and 
atypical cover against risk, flexibility ‘beyond the norms’: we are at the 
very heart of disciplinary ‘exception’. Menger frames his arguments on 
the cultural sector and the system of intermittent employment within an 
elaborate conceptual structure designed to enclose the questions posed 
by the intermittent workers’ movement within the reassuring framework 
of what is abnormal, exceptional, atypical.7 The employment policies to 
be implemented must eradicate the exceptional and ensure that the 
labor market functions normally again, allowing for both the 
reconstruction of the entrepreneur’s function (her/his autonomy) and 
the re-imposition of the wage-earner’s function (her/his subordination), 
so that rights and duties can be assigned to each of them. 
To express it in the Durkheimian terms of the scholar, a ‘direct, 
organized hierarchy’ must be re-established in a labor market 
deregulated by behaviours that do not conform to the normality of the 
capital/work relationship. We know that these functions are not natural; 
they must be created and reproduced through the continuous 
intervention of employment policies. That is precisely what the reform 
has been used to do. 
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While Menger’s analysis of intermittent employment seems to be the 
opposite of the neoliberal version, his conclusions fit perfectly with 
theirs. Given that ‘the number of individuals who enter the system of 
intermittent employment is increasing far more rapidly than the volume 
of work they have to share among themselves’ (Menger, 2005a), the 
cultural labor market is characterized by an extreme level of flexibility 
that leads to increased competition between intermittent workers. The 
increase in competition between workers has negative consequences for 
their conditions of employment (shorter and increasingly fragmented 
contracts), for their pay (a downward trend in salaries) and for their 
bargaining power with companies. 
The ‘assessment’ that there are too many intermittent workers for it 
to be possible for all of them to be guaranteed good conditions of 
employment and indemnification imposes the same solution as the 
reform does. The numbers of intermittent workers must be reduced by 
making access to the system of unemployment insurance more difficult, 
but also by selecting candidates for entry into the performing 
professions via a series of restrictions on that entry (qualifications, state-
controlled education and training). The primary consequence of the 
fight against extreme flexibility, against underemployment and against 
the low wages of intermittent workers, and of the fight too to guarantee 
stable, continuous employment, ‘good’ pay and ‘good’ indemnifications 
for a minority of intermittent workers is that the ‘excess’ of these 
workers is redirected to the system of minimum benefit payments,8 of 
courses and short-term work placements, to precarity, to basic survival, 
to poverty. 
The initial data on the effects of the reform demonstrate the 
triumph of neo-liberal policy and the complete subordination of the 
cultural employment policies.9 What is being played out here once again 
is precisely what has been happening in other sectors of the economy 
for the past 30 years. In its disregard for the current conditions of 
production, the cultural employment policy – aimed at creating ‘real’, 
stable, full-time jobs – actually divides and fragments the labor market 
by creating an increasing disparity in jobs. All it does is fuel the 
differentiation, multiply the number of inequalities and thus pave the 
way for the neoliberal management of the labor market to become 
established and widespread. Cultural employment policies are 
subordinated to the liberal logic because, with their aim of reducing 
competition in the ‘corporation’, they only segment and differentiate 
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further down the line, and increase the competition between workers 
who are ‘guaranteed’ and those who are ‘not guaranteed’, between 
stable jobs and casual employment. In this way, they facilitate the policy 
of ‘optimizing differences’, the differential management of inequalities 
in the governing of behaviours in the labor market. 
Unemployment and Invisible Work 
The analysis of unemployment results in the same disciplinary 
distinction between the normal (unemployment insurance as it was 
introduced in the post-war period) and the atypical (unemployment 
insurance as it has been used, diverted, appropriated by intermittent 
workers). Menger, like all experts on cultural employment policies, 
wants to return the unemployment-benefits system, distorted by 
intermittent employment (since it also finances the activities, cultural 
and artistic projects and long-term plans of intermittent workers), to its 
so-called ‘natural’ function of simple cover against the risk of job loss. 
But, like the experts, Menger seems to ignore the fact that, in a system 
of flexible accumulation, the meaning and function of unemployment is 
altered. The distinct, clear-cut separation between employment and 
unemployment (unemployment being viewed as the reverse of 
employment), having been established in a very different system of 
flexible accumulation (standardization and continuity of production and 
therefore stability and continuity of employment), has been transformed 
into an ever tighter interweaving of periods of employment, periods of 
unemployment and periods of education and training. 
If one analyzes the cultural sector, what is first of all striking – 
indeed it cannot be missed – is the disjunction between work and 
employment. The length of employment only partially describes the 
actual work, which in fact goes beyond it. The ‘work’ habits of 
intermittent workers (education and training, apprenticeship, the 
circulation of knowledge and experience, conditions of cooperation, 
and so forth) are routed through employment and unemployment, but 
they are not to be reduced to this simple opposition.10 Since the early 
1970s, the time spent in a job only partially encompasses practices of 
work, education and training, and cooperation by intermittent workers; 
unemployment cannot simply be reduced to a period of time spent out 
of work. Unemployment insurance is not limited to covering the risk of 
job loss. It guarantees the continuity of income that facilitates the 
interweaving of all these practices and temporalities and allows it to be 
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reproduced; this is income that is not completely the wage-earner’s 
responsibility here as it is in other sectors. 
Employer/Wage-Earner 
The statements – slogans of employment – prevent Menger from 
grasping the significance of another transformation that not only 
disrupts the clear-cut distinction between work and unemployment, but 
also disrupts the functions that the ‘Code of work’ allocates to wage-
earners (subordination) as well as those it assigns to entrepreneurs 
(autonomy). Menger is unable to distinguish between the ‘legal 
definition of wage-earners as a body’ and the real transformations in 
wage-earners’ activities. So the fact that ‘some 86 percent of current 
jobs today are permanent contracts’11, means he is exempted from 
asking questions about what [wage-earners] do and how they go about 
doing it. 
The distinct, clear-cut separation between wage-earner and 
entrepreneur is increasingly irrelevant, particularly in the system of 
intermittent employment in which, over the years, a figure neglected by 
statistics and sociological analyses has emerged. In our research, we 
have referred to this figure as an ‘employer/employee’. This hybrid 
figure has been established and managed by intermittent workers to 
adapt to the new demands of cultural production and at the same time 
bring their own personal projects to a successful conclusion. The 
employers/employees elude the traditional codifications of the labor 
market. They are neither wage-earners, nor entrepreneurs, nor 
freelancers. They combine their different functions without necessarily 
being confined to any single one of these categories. 
This development of hybrid statuses creates many problems for the 
governing of the labor market. The Latarjet report on the live 
performance sector identifies it as the main factor in the poor 
functioning of that sector. It recommends a return to a ‘normal’ 
functioning of professional relations, which would end this ‘exception’ 
by re-establishing the subordination of the wage-earner (with her/his 
rights) and the autonomy of the entrepreneur (with her/his duties and 
responsibilities). This obsession with a return to normality is quite 
simply a disciplinary mechanism that seeks to suppress and devalue 
these new forms of activity. 
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In contrast, our survey on intermittent workers means we can 
entirely subscribe to a comment in the CERC12 report on ‘Job Security’ 
that does not seek to turn all these hybridizations, exposed by the 
system of intermittent employment, into an exception or an anomaly – 
indeed far from it.  
In place of a clear separation between work and unemployment, 
between salaried employment and freelance work, we find a sort of 
“halo” of employment with an unspecified status – someone is both 
unemployed and a wage-earner, for example, or a freelancer and a 
wage-earner – while the various types of temporary contracts (short-
term and intermittent contracts, temporary work) are on the increase. 
(CERC, 2005) 
The alleged ‘exception’ of intermittent employment is becoming the 
‘norm’ in the wage-earning system, something the groups representing 
intermittent workers have been claiming since 1992. The ‘ordinary’ or 
‘classic’ categories that Menger wishes to reinstate within the system of 
intermittent employment are difficult to apply even in the ‘normal’ 
sectors of the economy. Contrary to what he maintains, the difference 
between intermittent unemployment and the unemployment found in 
other sectors is a difference of degree, not of kind. 
 
Notes 
1 This and subsequent quotations are from Boltanski and Chiapello, 2000, an 
interview with Yann Moulier Boutang for the journal Multitudes. Online at 
http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Vers-un-renouveau-de-la-critique.html. 
2 Translator’s note: the use of faire fi à rather than faire fi de is a grammatical 
error noted by Lazzarato. 
3 Translator’s note: bobos is an abbreviation for bourgeois-bohèmes. 
4 Translator’s note: The Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires is an 
organization established to coordinate intermittent and casual workers and 
represent their claims for indemnification due to the precarity of their 
employment. 
5 Translator’s note: A Rmiste is a person living on RMI, or Revenu minimum 
d’insertion, a form of income support. 
6 Translator’s note: NHW is the Number of Hours Worked, a translation of 
NHT or Nombre d’heures travaillées. 
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7 Menger compares the extreme flexibility of intermittent employment 
(abnormality) with a relative stability in the other sectors of the economy 
(normality). This assessment is highly debatable because it has been arrived 
at by contrasting data on intermittent employment, evaluated in terms of 
flow, with data relating to the rest of the economy, which is measured in 
terms of stocks. If we also interpret the latter in terms of flow, as an Insee 
study (Insee Première, N° 1014, May 2005) and the 2005 CERC report on 
‘Job Security’ have done, it is obvious that flexibility (of employment) is far 
from being a specific exception within the system of intermittent 
employment:  
Every year the number of wage-earners rises in many companies and 
falls in others without a corresponding rise or fall in the balance of total 
employment figures. These gross trends in corporate employment 
cannot be compared with the net variations in total employment. So, in 
seven years, in the period between 1995 and 2001, it is possible to 
calculate 17.6 million annual employment transactions for a net balance 
of 1.6 million jobs. 
  Every year, millions of people lose their job and millions more find another 
(there are 33,753 transactions in and out of the job market daily). In its 2002 
report on ‘Job Security’, the CERC draws the same conclusions from its 
survey of the private sector alone:  
In 2002, the total employment figure (for metropolitan France and its 
overseas territories) stood at around 25 million people, with 23 million 
in salaried employment. From 2001 to 2002, the number of those in 
employment grew by around 170,000 people. But this rise is the result 
of a flow in appointments and departures, both of which reached 
extraordinarily high levels. Thus, in a field of around 13 million private-
sector wage-earners, companies made 5.2 million appointments during 
2002 (excluding temporary contracts and non-renewable contracts of 
less than a month’s duration to cover absences due to wage-earners’ 
annual leave). So the rate of recruitment is close to 40 percent. At the 
same time, around 40 percent of wage-earners left their jobs. 
8 Translator’s note: Lazzarato refers here to the RMI and a raft of other 
benefits available to those on the lowest incomes. 
9 None of the objectives of the ‘regulation’ proposed by Menger has been 
achieved. Since 2003, the salaries of intermittent workers, who have 
remained within the system and who constitute the culture industry’s 
‘human capital’, have fallen while unemployment benefit has gone up, in 
particular for those categories working directly for the culture industry 
(cinema and television). The rise in income (salary plus allowances) of 
intermittent workers who have not left the system and who constitute the 
culture industry’s ‘human capital’ is financed by inter-professional solidarity; 
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yet the CFDT [French trade union], Medef [representative body of the 
majority of French employers’ interest groups] and the official experts do 
not find fault with any of this. 
10 Menger claims to have studied this field for thirty years, yet he blithely and 
systematically confuses these two temporalities. His analyses and 
recommendations are concerned with ‘employment’ exclusively, while the 
concept of ‘work’ is never considered. 
11 Translator’s note: In a CDI or contrat à durée indéterminée, the duration of 
employment is not contractually specified. 
12 Translator’s note: CERC is the abbreviation for the Conseil de l’emploi, des 
revenus et de la cohésion sociale, French government institution 
researching the links between employment, income and social cohesion. 
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4 
‘Creativity and Innovation’ in the Nineteenth 
Century: Harrison C. White and the 
Impressionist Revolution Reconsidered 
Ulf Wuggenig 
translated by Larissa Buchholz, Aileen Derieg and Karl Hoffmann 
According to interpretations in the dominant hagiographic literature on 
art, as well as in the writings of some well known critics and 
intellectuals, the Impressionists of the 1860s and 1870s in Paris 
challenged and overthrew the artistic orthodoxies and thus paved the 
way for aesthetic modernism.1 According to Clement Greenberg (1993), 
Edouard Manet’s paintings became the first Modernist ones, as they 
stressed flatness and two-dimensionality. Michel Foucault echoes this 
formalist interpretation and goes even further when he declares that the 
way in which Manet’s paintings represented the material aspects of the 
surface has made possible the whole art of the twentieth century 
(Foucault, 2010). Social historians of art such as T. J. Clark, by contrast, 
understand the emergence of modernist painting in Paris primarily as a 
response to the experience of modernity – of the dehumanizing aspects 
of life under capitalism associated with a loss of certainty about the very 
act of representation (See Clark, 1984). 
Despite all the differences in interpretation there is a tendency to 
particularly highlight the role of Manet, who is credited with having set 
painting upon a new course. This is also true for Pierre Bourdieu, one 
of the few sociologists whose work refers to this artistic movement: 
‘The revolutionary hero, the liberator, is evidently Manet. 
Understanding the revolution brought about by Manet is also 
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understanding the birth of the modern artist and of modern painting’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 4). Bourdieu interprets this revolution as a symbolic 
one, that is, as a fundamental change of mental structures, of the 
hierarchy of signifier and signified and the manner of representing it, of 
the function of painting. On the other hand, he outlines that the 
Impressionist revolution led by Manet brought about a different 
understanding of the artist: he ceases to be a master and becomes an 
artist in the modern sense with an extraordinary biography, the object 
of outstanding and celebrated singularity. For Bourdieu, Manet invented 
the position of the autonomous artist and imposed it on a field of art 
that was itself in a state of attaining relative autonomy. 
Yet what Bourdieu emphasizes as well is that historical figures can 
gain important functions in contemporary debates: ‘The works of the 
past, whether literary or pictorial, are always a matter of struggles in the 
present’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 5). Bourdieu’s eulogy on Manet was presented 
shortly after the opening of the Musée d’Orsay in Paris in 1986. This 
‘presidential museum’ initiated by Giscard d’Estaing was dedicated to 
the art of the second half of the nineteenth century. Among French 
cultural leftists at that time, it was interpreted as an attempt to 
rehabilitate academic art – art pompier – marginalized by formalist as well 
as revisionist art history and criticism. Among these academic painters 
were, just to mention a few, Jean-Louis-Ernest Meissonier, hardly 
known anymore today, yet of the painters still living at the time in the 
nineteenth century, the one who achieved the highest prices on the 
market; Jean-Leon Gérome, Academy member who fought against 
Impressionism up into the 1890s; and also Alexandre Cabanel, whose 
Naissance de Venus was personally purchased by Napoleon III straight 
from the Salon of the year 1863, from which Manet’s Déjeuner sur l’herbe 
had been banned (See Zola, 1867: 107ff.). 
The academism that dominated the Academy, the École des Beaux 
Arts, the Salon, the art sections, and the taste of the broader public, 
were oriented toward producing copies, toward conformity in regard to 
tradition, and a clear hierarchy of legitimate subjects and objects to be 
depicted. Painting was generally oriented toward precision, perfection 
and consummation; the artists were therefore more or less 
exchangeable. Bourdieu thus classified the academic artist type, 
following Max Weber’s sociology of religion, as ‘priestly’ rather than 
‘prophetic’. 
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In view of the classification of academism and impressionism, as 
well as of the importance of historical figures and positions for 
contemporary discourses, I want to draw attention to the writings of an 
American author, Harrison C. White. He is well known in the field of 
Impressionism research as well as in the social sciences, where he is 
‘regarded by some as the greatest living sociologist’ (Collins, 2005: ix). 
In art discourse Harrison C. White is particularly known for a study of 
the institutional changes in the nineteenth century French art world, 
written together with art historian Cynthia White in the early 1960s. 
This study is recognized for having established the concept of the 
‘dealer and critic system’ and having described and explained the 
emergence of the modern institutional system of art or rather the 
beginnings of an art market in today’s sense, largely separated from the 
state (White and White, 1993). 
In sociology, White is regarded as having inaugurated network 
analysis and a school of talented followers, among them Mark 
Granovetter and Ronald S. Burt, famous for their work on ‘weak ties’ 
and ‘structural holes’, notions also used in a study on the artworld by 
Katherine Guiffre (1999), another pupil of White. His major theoretical 
work Identity and Control was published in 1992 and in a revised and 
expanded version in 2008. Especially the first edition was written in 
such an idiosyncratic and technical style that hardly anyone was able to 
understand it; it gained the status of an intelligence test for sociologists. 
A spin-off of this work is White’s second book on art, which was 
published in 1993. Even its title, Careers and Creativity, already 
demonstrates that it can be seen as belonging to the social science 
literature that is interested in innovation and creativity and their role 
and function for economic processes. A flood of literature on ‘creative 
industries’, ‘creative cities’, ‘creativity and innovation’ and so on 
emerged in the late 1990s, after this theme had been taken up in the 
political field by Tony Blair and the ‘third way’ spin-doctors in Great 
Britain (see Schlesinger, 2007). White’s book on the arts was thus 
published ahead of this wave of literature, and long before writers such 
as Richard Florida (2002) made this theme popular. 
Although White is not at all reducible to the pop sociology and 
economy of the usual creative industries literature, his scientific 
approach bears similarities with this literature in several respects, for 
example in regard to: a) the supposed economic importance of 
creativity; b) the uncritical use of this term; c) the position towards the 
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differentiation of high and low art, for which in his view the same social 
and economic laws regarding innovations apply; d) the treatment of the 
opposition between art and economy, which in contrast e.g. to 
Bourdieu (1993) is explicitly or implicitly denied. Some of the 
theoretical features of his approach also resemble other aspects of the 
creative industries type of literature, for instance, the use of general 
theory and the reliance on the notion of ‘art world’ in the tradition of 
Howard S. Becker (1982). This concept implies that the different actors 
involved in the production, distribution and reception of art are 
principally more or less of similar importance; it thus decenters the 
author or artist. In White’s approach this presupposition leads to a 
revaluation and celebration of the role of economic actors in the history 
of art, who appear to be as significant for artistic innovations as the 
artists themselves. This idea is reflected in a series of propositions on 
innovation in art. I will only mention and comment on three of them: 
Innovation in style involves change in social organization coordinated 
with cultural change across art worlds. (White, 1993: 72) 
Artistic innovation itself is thus far from sufficient for major changes of 
conventions in art. Whereas in art history and philosophy most often 
aesthetic or purely symbolic aspects of domains are regarded as decisive 
for changes of style, the approach of the Whites in Canvases and Careers, 
to which this more recent proposition refers, already emphasises that 
stylistic and institutional changes have to go hand in hand for radical 
innovations to occur. In Careers and Creativity, White discusses this thesis 
mainly in regard to Impressionism and Abstract Expressionism, but also 
with some examples from music, dance and theatre. 
White stresses that a radical shift in ‘style’ requires many and 
prolonged efforts. It presupposes social and economic support as well 
as changes in the social organization of art, that is, its institutional 
frame. This argument already constituted the central theme of Canvases 
and Careers, which was essentially the story of an old system being 
replaced by a new one after a period of hybridity in which the two 
systems were merged. White’s general ‘process’ proposition for 
innovation in the arts reads as follows:  
A new style results from an intermediate period of overlay and melding 
between one style and another in both social and cultural 
infrastructures; the new style is followed by rejection of the separate 
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styles that went into its formation and then again became separate. 
(White, 1993: 82) 
This hypothesis emphasises the overlapping and the phase of 
coexistence between an earlier and a newly emerging system in 
processes that include both social and artistic aspects. One indication of 
the novelty of a style is its rejection and denunciation by established 
criticism. The old one was the ‘academic system’, wrongly interpreted as 
a system under peer group control by Wijnberg and Gemser (2000), 
since it was not a relative autonomous field but an authoritarian system 
under state control (cf. Bourdieu, 1987; 1993: 238ff.). This hierarchical 
institution according to the Whites was unable to react in a flexible way 
to changes in its environment, especially the dramatic rise of artists in 
Paris in the nineteenth century and the flood of pictures to be handled 
in the central exhibition and art market space, the Salon. At a time when 
visual mass media like television and film did not yet exist, this Salon 
attracted hundreds of thousands of visitors.2 According to the 
morphological hypothesis of White and White (1993), the crisis into 
which the Academy and the Salon had slid resulted from the success of 
the system itself, because the profession of painter had become 
increasingly attractive in symbolic and economic terms. Thanks to 
Andrée Sfeir-Semler’s study, meanwhile we know much more about 
details of the morphological changes in the artworld in Paris than at the 
time when Canvases and Careers was first published. While at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century the number of painters at the 
Salons was around 200, it had increased to around 1,300 by 1863. The 
number of pictures submitted to the Salon rose to between 4,000 and 
6,000 in the 1860s and 1870s. (See figure 1) 
This development – documented by the curve of artists applying to 
the Salon showing an exponential growth from 1791 to 18803 – exerted 
– at least that’s how White and White specify the necessary 
precondition for changes – enormous pressure on an organizational and 
economic frame that had been conceived for merely a few hundred 
painters. From the perspective of Bourdieu (1987, 1993) it was an 
‘overproduction crisis’, which had the effect of creating a large 
precarious artistic ‘lumpenproletariat’, being a decisive step in the 
development of the artist in the modern sense. This morphologically 
induced crisis from his point of view was used by some artists – first of 
all Manet – for realizing a symbolic and an institutional revolution. 
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Figure 1: Number of applicants (artists) for the Salon in Paris 1791 - 1880 (data 
source: Sfeir-Semler, 1992: 40-43; exponential curve – fit R2 = 0,79 – added with 
SigmaPlot TableCurve 2D). 
 
Against the background of the academic system in crisis, its failure in 
supporting and guiding the careers of painters due to its lack of 
flexibility, and the dissatisfaction of the artists being rejected on account 
of the system’s rigid concept of art, the beginnings of Impressionism 
are to be dated in the 1860s. As a movement, it appeared from 1874 on 
with the offensive measure of organizing its own exhibitions and 
breaking the monopoly of the state-run Salons, a strategy that ultimately 
succeeded (See Rewald, 1961; Denvir, 1993). 
These ideas most likely sprung from the ‘Circle of Batignolles’, to 
which Fantin-Latour’s famous group portrait from 1870 refers, 
depicting Manet in his studio in the middle of a group of artists who 
obviously admire him – a nucleus of the future Impressionists with, 
among others, Bazilles, Monet and Renoir. The idea of a self-organized 
group exhibition probably came up for first time in this studio in 1869. 
In the the end, Manet did not participate in any of the eight 
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Impressionist exhibitions between 1874 and 1886, because he shunned 
the image of a rebel and didn’t want to see himself associated too 
closely with the Impressionists (Cachin, 1995; and Brombert, 1996). 
The Whites emphasized that this bureaucratic and monopolist 
system was successfully attacked by a network of artists, dealers, critics 
and collectors. They added a lot of sociological insights to the well-
known heroic art history stories that highlight the Salon des Refusés, 
Manet’s Pavilion and the series of self-organised group exhibitions 
outside the Salon in the 1870s and 1880s as the decisive events in a 
struggle between academic art and the revolutionary ‘painters of 
modern life’. 
The new system, according to the Whites, was supported by a highly 
functional new ideology in intellectual as well as in economic respect, 
namely individualism, or, to be more precise, charismatic individualism. 
Instead of single pictures, as it was in the old system influenced by the 
Salon, the new system shifted the artist to the centre of attention. For 
both the newly emerging type of dealers – real entrepreneurs for the 
first time – and for the increasingly important art criticism, highlighting 
a personality and the entire oeuvre of a painter seemed obvious. As an 
isolated object a single work was too transient to serve as the focus of a 
system of trade or advertising. Conversely, the concept of the ‘genius’ 
developed in the Romantic era, which implies being unrecognised and – 
in its Kantian version – not following any rules, proved especially 
suitable for concentrating on the artist. In about twenty years, according 
to Emile Zola, one of the numerous writers who sought to distinguish 
themselves as intellectuals through art criticism at that time, one would 
be able to see the unrecognised and derided Manet in the Louvre. A 
view like this enabled not only unrecognised artists to maintain their 
motivation despite a lack of acknowledgement. At the same time it also 
opened up the possibility for speculations in taste in an economic sense 
and for the development of an ultimately highly speculative art market 
as we know it today (See Watson, 1992; Moulin, 2009). 
For the development of a new system, however, still other factors 
were important, such as the change in the type and formats of artistic 
production. A greater number of smaller, often quickly painted pictures 
were produced, which was facilitated by technical progress in the field 
of paints. These took the place of the larger, planned ‘machines’ of 
academism. In addition, accessing new classes of buyers assumed a 
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central significance. A potential market for art was to be found in the 
expanding middle class and in the more prosperous bourgeoisie, if one 
was capable of accessing this market. 
Another central proposition from White refers to this in a general 
form, by seeking to specify a necessary context for artistic innovations: 
The key to innovation in arts is flexibility in reception; that is, a field of 
alternative reception must be feasible not only culturally but also in 
material and social technology. (White, 1993: 81) 
This hypothesis referring to demand and consumption shifts attention 
away from artistic practice to those protagonists who are capable of 
influencing desires and preferences and thus generating or opening up a 
demand for innovative art. In principle there are various art-world 
protagonists who could be considered for this – the artists themselves, 
critics, dealers, collectors and museum representatives. White sets 
flexible reception in opposition to the notion of individual creation 
widespread in art historical hagiography, which isolates it from its 
acceptance in a ‘field’ in the sense of systems theoretical psychology of 
creativity (Csíkszentmihályi, 1999), where this notion is used for the 
aggregate of actors, who evaluate, select, conserve and transmit artefacts 
produced in ‘domains’, not to be confounded with a field in the sense 
of Bourdieu (1993). 
And in this context White’s attention undergoes a remarkable 
reorientation from the first to the second study on impressionism, a 
symptomatic transformation from the 1960s to the 1990s. As the 
conscious use of the term ‘dealer and critic system’ in the first work 
shows, where the dealer is the first protagonist named, at that time 
White already regarded the dealers as the central actors of the new 
system. It was not until the 1990s, however, that White went as far as 
using formulations that virtually amounted to an apotheosis of one 
dealer in particular, namely Paul Durand-Ruel. White notes that the 
concept of the ‘dealer-critic system’ introduced in Canvases and Careers in 
the early 1960ies, since then often taken up in literature, was conceived 
as an homage to Durand-Ruel. It deserves to be pointed out that in this 
way the roles of both the producers and the collectors in the art field 
are implicitly lowered in value. 
From White’s new perspective Durand-Ruel now appeared just as 
important for the recognition and establishment of Impressionism as 
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those who had carried out the innovation on the level of symbolic 
production. In White’s view, Durand-Ruel created a new role for the 
dealer, the dealer as an entrepreneur in the modern Schumpeterian 
sense. White writes in regard to him, that he recognised the speculative 
potential of purchasing unknown or unrecognised painters and 
persuaded others that this could be a profitable investment. He was 
generous toward initially unsuccessful artists, sometimes assuming the 
role of their patron. And finally, he also made use of new strategies, 
such as seeking control over all the works by an artist to gain a 
monopoly, or making informal contracts with the artists to bind them 
to him. In the end he introduced solo exhibitions for artists, similar to 
those that dominate the ‘dealer and critic system’ today. According to 
White, he was also aware of the high value of publicity and advertising. 
These observations take White substantially beyond the 
conventional remarks in art historical literature that Durand-Ruel was 
the central dealer of the Impressionists. White even chooses 
formulations in which Durand-Ruel is elevated to the ‘father’ of the 
entire new system and ultimately even to a ‘genius’ with a significance 
homologous to that of Paul Cézanne:  
The real core of a new style however is always dual. […] Durand-Ruel 
was central to just such dual realization of the Impressionists. In so 
doing, he can be called the father of a whole new system of art world. 
(White, 1993: 75) 
And in his response to the question of who the impressionists actually 
were artistically, White himself takes recourse to the charismatic 
individualist ideology of the ‘dealer and critic system’. 
The dealers of the nineteenth century were supposed to remain 
entirely in the background in light of what is perhaps best described by 
Bourdieu (1993) as the anti-economism of the art field. Witness to this 
is borne by, for example, the well-known group portraits in the anti-
academic milieu of the 1860s and 1870s such as Frédéric Bazille’s 
L’Atelier de la rue de la Condamine (1870) and Henri Fantin-Latour’s 
Hommage à Delacroix (1864) and Un atelier aux Batignolles (1870). In 
addition to painters, there are indeed depictions of writers and critics 
such as Baudelaire and Zola, who among other critics on the path to the 
autonomy of the art field were important allies (see Bourdieu, 1996), 
and in one case also that of a befriended collector, but never dealers. 
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They were never included in these portraits of artistic networks, as little 
as Berthe Morisot and Mary Cassatt – the female members of the 
Impressionist movement with the highest reputation today. (Table 1 
below gives their contemporary Artfacts. Net ranks.) 
Whereas the Whites still described the role of the dealers 
dispassionately and analytically in the 1960s, already speaking of a 
‘dealer-critic system’, in the 1990s we find that Durand-Ruel is 
supposed to have been the ‘genius’ that ultimately brought forth the 
impressionists. Indeed, according to him the Impressionists were not 
the first to make use of Impressionist painting techniques, they did not 
really invent the new style but rather the Barbizon artist Charles-
François Daubigny:  
My own answer to this question of who the Impressionists were 
artistically centers on Paul Durand-Ruel, who to a sociologist seems as 
predominant a genius in one way as was Cézanne in the painterly 
dimension among the Impressionists-to-be. Subsequent recognition of 
‘them’ as the impressionists, I argue, was accomplished by Durand-
Ruel’s agency, not by some immanent painterly style. (White, 1993: 75) 
White especially emphasises that Durand-Ruel, driven by his weak and 
vacillating success in France, came to prominence in the 1880s when he 
succeeded in finding a new audience, particularly in the USA, where 
there were no comparable blockades the way academism had created 
them in France. He opened a gallery in New York after organising a 
first major Impressionist exhibition in 1887. Durand-Ruel thus 
exemplified the proposition of flexible reception with the ability to 
reach new relevant groups of the public, namely collectors, and win 
them over for a more than merely symbolic appropriation of the new 
French art. 
Against the backdrop of the demise of the academic system, the 
needs of painters, dealers and critics were united in this way with the 
wishes of buyers and collectors for pictures that were suitable for 
bourgeois households. Through a complex process a new system 
emerged by the end of the nineteenth century, which took the control 
over the status and rewarding of artists out of the hands of the 
academic system. The prices paid for academic painters fell abruptly, 
professorships at academies and art schools lost their significance for 
the selection of art works and for constructing the status of artists, 
‘Creativity and Innovation’ in the Nineteenth Century 
  67 
which was henceforth increasingly determined by non-state expert and 
market forces. 
Whereas Bourdieu, in line with such diverse authors as Clement 
Greenberg, André Malraux, Michael Fried and Michel Foucault, is 
inclined toward an heroisation of Manet in conjunction with the 
Impressionist revolution, Harrison C. White tends to emphasize a single 
protagonist from the relational constellation of fields and networks, 
namely Durand-Ruel. In a turn that seems symptomatic for a new 
thought-syle regarding cultural production, it is not an artist like Manet, 
but rather a dealer like Durand-Ruel who is celebrated as a radically 
innovative ‘genius’. 
What evidence is there for the emergence of the new system and the 
role of Durand-Ruel in particular? David Galenson and Robert Jensen 
(2007), who refer only to the previous study by White and White, have 
stressed that it took far longer than is assumed in this study for the 
Salon system to be replaced by a gallery system centred on the one-man 
show ascribed to the initiative of Durand-Ruel. As an intermediate step, 
a system of a plurality of Salons emerged in Paris, which finally gave 
way to the modern system, heavily based on an art market beyond state 
control. According to their analysis, a commercial gallery show devoted 
to a single artist – the dominant format in the twentieth century – was 
no option for young or unrecognised artists until the end of the 
nineteenth century. Durand-Ruel only presented Impressionist artists in 
solo shows whose reputation was already established. White is perhaps 
right in emphasising that of all the major dealers of the time only Paul 
Durand-Ruel bought advanced art in quantity. Yet Galenson and Jensen 
have shown that he bought from the Impressionists primarily only 
during two brief and widely separated periods, in 1872 and 1873, and in 
the early 1880s. Since the independent exhibitions of the Impressionists 
took place from 1874 to 1886, they received almost no financial support 
from him during the most important period of their struggle against the 
Salon. Durand-Ruel only began to buy the work of Impressionists again 
after they had gained substantial symbolic capital through their self-
organized exhibitions. Thus he did not provide effective, continuous 
support for his artists. Furthermore, the French art historian Anne 
Distel (1990) has identified just over two-dozen collectors who bought 
paintings by the Impressionists in Paris during the 1870s and early 
1880s. Only two of them, the opera singer Jean-Baptiste Faure and the 
merchant Ernest Hoschedé, both collectors of the speculative type, 
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appear to have become acquainted with the work of the Impressionists 
through Durand-Ruel. Most of the others bought directly from the 
artists, having become acquainted with them through other artists or 
writers. 
Although White, in his 1993 study, drew special attention to the 
importance of Durand-Ruel’s role in opening the US-American market 
for the Impressionists, the truth is that the most important US 
collectors became acquainted with Impressionism through the painter 
Mary Cassatt. She came from the upper class family of an investment 
banker in Pittsburgh and went to Paris as an artist, where she rose to 
become one of the dozen Impressionist artists later regarded as the core 
of the movement in mainstream art history (See Callen, 2000; and 
Thomson, 2000). There Cassatt became part of the circle of Degas, who 
was himself from the upper class and had a background of bankers with 
network links (family connections) that also reached to the USA. Prior 
to Durand-Ruel’s New York venture, Mary Cassatt had already found a 
small, but crucial number of American collectors who were part of her 
social network, her upper class social capital. Thus she was able to 
convince some of her family members and close friends to buy 
paintings by Manet, Degas, Cézanne and other painters associated with 
Impressionism. Among them was Louisine Elder, who was to marry 
Henry Havemeyer, the future ‘sugar king’ in the USA. Based on 
consultation with Cassatt, the Havemeyers and also Potter Palmer and 
his wife – owners of a big hotel chain – began to build up the 
collections that would become the most important collections of 
Impressionism in the USA. The initial acquaintance with the work of 
the Impressionists, however, was due to an artist, not a dealer. Of 
course, the Havemeyer collection would not have gained such 
importance, had a large part of it not been donated by the widowed 
Louisine Havemeyer, who had meanwhile become a well-known 
bourgeois feminist, to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in 
1917 (See Distel, 1990: 237ff; Weitzenhoffer, 1986). 
However, Manet represents the type of ambitious artists who was 
forcefully striving for a position in the history of art and for whom the 
crucial issue was not acceptance by private collectors – then as now 
usually upwardly mobile people, having become rich or super rich, 
aiming at enhancing their insecure social status. The struggle for 
recognition as an artist, inclusion in art history, is not decided in the 
private but in the public realm. White did not take placement in the 
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museum, either in France or in the USA, into consideration. Within the 
theoretical frame of reference it is also ignored as a decisive aspect of 
consecrating artists. White disregards that art distinguishes itself from 
other luxury goods not least by the fact that it ultimately finds its place 
in a public collection. Nor did he adequately consider the strategies of 
the producers themselves. He neither took into account the role of 
Mary Cassatt, nor Monet’s initiative of 1890. In that year Monet bought 
Manet’s Olympia for about 90 thousand dollars in today’s currency from 
Manet’s widow with the help of money he had raised. His intention was 
to offer this work to the state for placement in the Louvre. Thus he 
tried to force official recognition not only for the most charismatic 
figure of the movement, but also for Impressionism in general. 
Nor did White consider the even more efficient strategy of another 
artist. Gustave Caillebotte, who belonged like Mary Cassatt to the 
aforementioned dozen canonized Impressionist artists, was one of the 
most important collectors and financial supporters of the 
Impressionists. His introduction to the group also had nothing to do 
with Durand-Ruel. Like Manet, Morisot, Degas and Cassatt, Caillebotte 
came from an upper class background, in his case not in terms of 
symbolic capital, but in terms of economic capital, being the heir of a 
wealthy textile industrialist. 
Caillebotte had built up a collection of sixty important works by 
Degas, Manet, Cézanne, Degas, Pissarro and others. As early as 1878 he 
donated his collection to a hostile state, under the condition, that it 
would not disappear into a provincial museum, but would be presented 
in the two most important houses of that time, the Louvre and the 
Musée du Luxembourg.  
I give to the state the pictures I own; only as I want this gift to be 
accepted, and accepted in such a way that the pictures go neither into 
an attic nor to a provincial museum but right to the Luxembourg and 
later to the Louvre, it is necessary that a certain time go by before the 
execution of this clause, until the public may, I don’t say understand, 
but accept this painting. This time could be twenty years or more. 
(Caillebotte, 1883: 197) 
It was the Caillebotte’s bequest of 1883 that finally opened the door for 
the Impressionists into a museum in France in 1896, when at least a 
part of this collection was accepted by a mostly hostile art 
administration. Here again, Durand-Ruel was not involved in 
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Caillebotte’s highly sophisticated strategy which, according to Denvir, 
led to the ‘decisive official recognition of the impressionists in France’ 
(Denvir, 1993). 
Durand-Ruel deserves credit for being the first dealer to recognize 
the importance of the Impressionists. Contrary to White’s portrayal, 
however, neither he nor other dealers of that time were leaders in the 
development of modern art and the development of its markets in the 
nineteenth century. They played their roles in art world networks, but 
these roles were far from being the decisive ones. Even the role of the 
‘ideological dealer’ (Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000), who developed new 
business approaches was not invented by Durant-Ruel. In a recent study 
on the art field of Brussels Jan Dirk Baetens tries to show that the 
business model of the impressionist dealers in Paris was already fully 
operational in Belgium in the 1840s. For this reason it cannot not be 
associated with avant-garde art on an exclusive basis. The conclusions 
based on a case study of the Belgian art dealer Gustave Coûteaux (1815-
1873) read as follows: 
There was nothing in the business approach of Durand-Ruel, the 
champion of avant-garde artists, that was not already there in the 
strategies of Coûteaux. The myth that the ‘heroic’ dealers of the 1870s 
were equally innovative as the artists they represented should be 
exposed as exactly that: an artistic myth belonging to the lofty heights 
of Mount Parnassus – that former realm of absolute and pure beauty, 
now tainted by a touch of commerce – rather than a historical fact. 
(Baetens, 2010: 41)  
Paul Durand-Ruel seems not to have been a person one would easily 
credit as a ‘genius’, which from a sociological point of view seems to be 
a dubious term anyway. Even psychologists meanwhile have stopped to 
ascribe creativity to single individuals.  
Creativity does not happen inside people’s heads, but in the interaction 
between a person’s thoughts and a socio-cultural context. It is a 
systemic rather an individual phenomenon. (Csíkszentmihályi, 1996: 
400; see also Gardner, 1993)  
The limits of Durand-Ruel’s strategies are evident as well in some of 
Anne Distel’s remarks, who basically tends to divide the world into 
geniuses and normal people:  
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Durand Ruel seems to have bought works by Cezanne only at the 
express request of certain faithful customers. He did not care for Seurat 
or Gauguin, though Gauguin’s first exhibition in 1893 was held in his 
gallery. He went so far as to refuse to organize a posthumous exhibition 
for Van Gogh. (Distel, 1990: 31) 
In view of all the evidence on the dealer Durand-Ruel, it seems likely 
that Harrison C. White credits the wrong person and profession with 
being responsible for the flexible reception of the Impressionist 
revolution, for changing the art world in the nineteenth century, and for 
paving the way for the modern art market dealer-critic system. His 
apotheosis of the dealer seems to be due to an ideological bias, which is 
characteristic for a style of thought and a social current that also 
developed the ‘creative industries’ hype. It not only celebrates 
individualism, but also emphasises the role of economic actors in fields 
of cultural production. Meanwhile even art history has become a target 
for reinterpretations in the light of this wave of economist thinking. 
As already indicated, a more adequate sociological explanation of 
aspects of the Impressionist revolution will have to place a stronger 
focus on the strategies of the producers themselves. From an externalist 
sociological point of view, Impressionism is characterized by the fact 
that as good as none of its main proponents came from artist’s families, 
as opposed to the academic masters of the state controlled Parisian art 
world. Hence, they were not exposed in a comparable manner to the 
influence of academic tradition conveyed by family members or 
relatives. In response to Arnold Hauser, who writes that the 
Impressionists ‘come very largely from the lower and middle sections of 
the bourgeoisie’ (Hauser, 1989: 166), the part of column b. of table 1, 
which refers to social origin, demonstrates the privileged descent of 
both the Degas circle (with Mary Cassatt, Caillebotte and Degas 
himself) and other canonized representatives of Impressionism, 
especially Berthe Morisot and Bazille as well as Manet as the 
movement’s forerunner and point of reference. This fact eluded Hauser 
and was later only insufficiently taken into consideration by Heinich 
(2005: 229) in French art sociology, mainly regarding Manet and Degas4 
and in the case of Bourdieu also Renoir, whose work is not interpreted 
in a formalist way. Renoir from his point of view is representing a 
‘simultaneously lyrical and naturalistic adherence to natural or human 
nature’ in contrast ‘both with realist or critical representation of the 
social world […] and with all forms of abstraction’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 20). 
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In the resources that Manet had at his disposal due to his upper-
class background, including the self-confidence associated with this, 
Bourdieu sees a basis for the willingness and ability to transcend artistic 
conventions. Nathalie Heinich extended this argument to include 
Degas. Yet such an argument soon comes upon its limits when one 
considers that Monet and Renoir were capable of relevant innovations 
as well without having such background-related resources at their 
disposal.  
Table 1 includes indicators of the symbolic capital of the 
impressionists as well as of their posthumous economic success. The 
measures of symbolic capital are based on the Artfacts.Net ranking of 
about 60 thousand historical and living artists. Economic success is 
indicated by the highest auction prize a work of the ten artists 
considered yielded until the end of 2010 as well as by the number of 
works above an auction price of 16.5 million USD at this time, which 
means being among the 130 most expensive art works up to this time. 
Column e. in table 1 indicates that the overall symbolic capital of Monet 
and Renoir, artists with a lower middle class and provincial background, 
in the artistic field seems to be higher than that of Manet. The same 
goes for the economic value of their works (See table 1, columns f. and 
g.).  
Even according to Bourdieu in the long run economic value is 
converging with aesthetic value:  
The dominant fractions are what they are if and only if the economic 
principle of stratification asserts its real dominance, which it does, in the 
long run, even in the relatively autonomous field of cultural production, 
where the divergence between specific value and market value tends to 
disappear in the course of time. (Bourdieu 1984: 583, fn. 41) 
Hence, there are two problems for the resources-based argument with 
regard to the innovative force of Manet. First, only a partial explanation 
is given, and second, this explanation appears to be too individualistic. 
The capital directly related to the social background of a wealthy 
bourgeoisie comes into play in the case of the Impressionist revolution 
in a different way as well.  
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Table 1: Impressionists (I): Artistic circles, shows (Salons, I-exhibitions), social 
positions, long-term symbolic capital and economic success.5 
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I. Precursor, reference artist (with impressionist working period) 
Manet m Paris U 15 : 4 0 227 29.6 5 
 
II. Monet circle 
Monet m province LM 4 : 3 4 69 71.8 11 
Renoir m province LM 11 : 4 4 155 71 5 
Bazille m province UM 4 : 1 0 n.a. 4.7 0 
Sisley m Paris MM 3 : 3 4 929 5.1 0 
 
III. Bridges between Monet and Degas circles 
Pissarro m Antilles MM 8 : 3 8 360 13 0 
Morisot f Paris U 7 : 0 7 2379 4.6 0 
 
IV. Degas circle 
Degas m Paris U 6 : 0 7 103 33 5 
Caillebotte m Paris U 0 : 1 5 2629 13 0 
Cassatt f USA U 2 : 3 4 717 5.5 0 
 
V. Postimpressionist ‘dissident’ (with impressionist working period) 
Cézanne m province UM 1 : 14 2 67 55 8 
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It is true that it does not suffice to draw attention solely to artistic 
innovations. Mary Cassatt and Gustave Caillebotte who were part of the 
upper class Degas circle utilized not only their cultural but also their 
social and economic capital. They succeeded in gaining the interest of 
serious collectors and in securing the institutional acknowledgement of 
Impressionism in the world of leading museums and thus for the 
‘Jupiter history’ of art (Foucault, 1997: 60).  
One can hardly deny that there were examples of essential artistic 
innovations e.g. in the case of Monet independent of the artists’ 
individual social background. For the assertion and institutional 
recognition of Impressionism in the field, however, the social and 
economic capital at the disposal of the Impressionist network as a 
whole was of prime importance. The steps toward the increase in the 
relative autonomy of the field and the detachment from state 
patronization could therefore not only find support in the motivations 
of the artists. A sufficiently large fraction of the artists also had those 
resources at their disposal, without which such motivations usually 
don’t make much headway. They used this social and economic capital 
for the ‘flexible reception’ among private individuals, which White 
mainly has in mind, but also for placing the works in public collections. 
Whether one ultimately celebrates the Impressionists for their 
contribution to breaking the nomos of the state, to marginalizing 
academism, to establishing anomie or plurality, and to increasing the 
relative autonomy of the art field with regard to the field of power as 
heroic revolutionaries, or as radical innovators from the bourgeoisie 
who paved the way to the breakthrough of the art market which is 
characteristic for modern capitalism is another question. 
 
Notes 
1 This text is an expanded and updated version of ‘“Kreativität und 
Innovation” im 19. Jahrhundert. Harrison C. White und die 
impressionistische Revolution – erneut betrachtet’, in Raunig and 
Wuggenig, 2007. 
2 The extraordinarily high numbers of visitors of the several Salons – 
between 300,000 and 1.2 million – are documented in Sfeir-Semler, 1992: 
51. This author was part of a movement in art historiography attacked by 
Bourdieu (1987, 1993) that – in the end with limited success – attempted to 
rehabilitate nineteenth-century academic painting and a traditional model of 
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‘homo academicus’ in general. The main contribution of this revisionist 
tradition in France is Vaisse (1993), which had an influence on French art 
history. For competing positions regarding academism and Impressionism, 
see Nord, 2000. 
3 1880 was the last year of the Salon de Paris under dominance of the state. 
The stronger fluctuations of the empirical curve of applications are either 
due to the World’ Fairs in Paris (1855, 1867), to revolutionary events (1848) 
or to war (1870/71). Cf. Sfeir-Semler, 1992: 46. 
4 In sociological works on the Impressionists, these artists are either viewed 
as a unity, as in Hauser (1989) or White (1993), or individual proponents are 
treated as representing the entire group. White not only neglects artistic 
innovation on the symbolic level as such or deems it less important because 
he already finds the Impressionist painting technique in the Barbizon 
School with Daubigny, he also dispenses with discussing the individual 
artistic actors. Hence, the specific strategies to secure recognition, win over 
collectors and place works in museums are disregarded as well. In response 
to White (1993), one must therefore stress that worlds lie between the 
symbolic innovations of a Daubigny and a Manet, and that one must take 
into consideration considerable differences on the level of symbolic 
production between the Impressionists:  
The biggest break going through the group was the division between 
landscape and figure painters, or between colourists and 
draughtsmen. Monet clearly belonged to the former, Degas to the 
latter faction. And while Monet claimed to have no studio and always 
paint his pictures on location in response to motifs, Degas stresses 
that no art is less spontaneous than his, the result of reflecting on and 
studying the old masters. (Dippel, 2002: 12) 
5 U = upper class, UM = upper middle class, MM = middle middle class, LM 
= lower middle class, L = lower class. 
 Sources of data columns a.-d.: Denvir (1993); Herbert (1998); Rewald 
(1961); Thomson (2000); White and White (1993); e.: Artfacts.Net 
(www.artfacts.net); f.: artprice.com (www.artprice.com); g.: MY Arts Inc. 
(www.productionmyarts.com/arts-et-marche/100-oeuvres-fr.htm) 
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5 
Virtuosos of Freedom: On the Implosion of 
Political Virtuosity and Productive Labour 
Isabell Lorey 
translated by Mary O’Neill 
In his book, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary 
Forms of Life, published in German in 2005 as Grammatik der Multitude: 
Öffentlichkeit, Intellekt und Arbeit,1 Paolo Virno, the Italian philosopher, 
formulates the following thesis:  
I believe that in today’s forms of life2 one has a direct perception of the 
fact that the coupling of the terms public-private, as well as the 
coupling of the terms collective-individual, can no longer stand up on 
their own, that they are gasping for air, burning themselves out. (Virno, 
2004: 24)  
The phenomenon, in which Virno examines the indistinguishability 
between both collective and individual, and public and private 
experience, is what we know as current ‘post-Fordist’ forms of 
production. By this he means more than labor in the traditional sense, 
that is as a productive activity; it is rather, as he says: ‘a composite unity 
of forms of life’ (2004: 49). He concerns himself with the hegemonizing 
of forms of production based on communicative and cognitive 
competences, on greater flexibility in the deployment of labor power – 
on the permanent reaction, therefore, to the unforeseen. Under such 
forms of production, the person as a whole becomes better: his/her 
personality, intellect, thinking, linguistic competence and emotions are 
stretched. According to Virno, that leads to the end of labor divisions 
(in the sense of the division of labor) and to considerable personal 
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dependencies; not so much on rules and regulations, it is true, but on 
individual people both in the labor relationship but also in the context 
of networks, in order to move on to the next job as the need arises. We 
may refer to these living and working conditions as ‘precarization’. 
However, in this chapter – and in contrast to Virno – the concept of 
‘virtuosos’ does not apply to all the very diverse precarious conditions, 
but is restricted to cultural producers, whose function is neither avant-
garde nor a paradigm for all precarious workers.3 
Virno describes the implosion of the socio-economic spheres of 
private and public, of the individual and the collective in relation to the 
Aristotelian tripartite division of human experience into Labor (poiesis), 
Intellect (the life of the mind) and Political Action (praxis) (Arendt, 
1998). Despite occasional possibilities for overlap, he maintains, the 
three areas have until now been presented mostly as being separate 
from one another: in this schema, labor means the production of new 
objects in a repetitive, foreseeable process. Set against this is the second 
area, that of the intellect, isolated and invisible by its very nature, since 
the thinker’s meditation eludes the gaze of others. Finally, the third area 
of human experience, the area of political action, affects social relations, 
thereby differing from the sphere of labor, which affects natural 
materials through repetitive processes. What is remarkable here is that 
political action, in this sense, has to do with the possible and the 
unforeseen: it produces no objects but it changes through 
communication (Virno, 2004: 50ff.). Only political action is considered 
public in this partitioning since, to borrow Hannah Arendt’s phrase, it 
means ‘being exposed to the presence of others’ (Arendt, 1998: 132). 
Despite frequent criticism of the inappropriateness of this 
Aristotelian model for the present, this tripartite division of labor, 
intellect and political action is still very much in circulation. This, 
according to Virno, stems not least from Arendt’s considerable 
influence. Yet she too speaks of the indistinguishability of the three 
spheres – rather like Virno, interestingly, in relation to virtuosity, to a 
particular sense of creativity. In her book, Between Past and Future (1977), 
she compares the leading artists, the virtuosos, with those who are 
politically active, those who in her view act politically, who are exposed 
to the presence of others. For with these performing artists, Arendt 
writes,  
Virtuosos of Freedom 
  81 
the accomplishment lies in the performance itself and not in an end 
product which outlasts the activity that brought it into existence and 
becomes independent of it. [….] The performing arts […] have indeed 
a strong affinity with politics. Performing artists-dancers, play-actors, 
musicians and the like – need an audience to show their virtuosity, just 
as acting men [and women] need the presence of others before whom 
they can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their ‘work’, 
and both depend upon others for the performance itself. (Arendt, 1977: 
153-4) 
For Arendt, politics is therefore an art of performance, a performative 
art. Because of the need for an audience, for the ‘exposure to the 
presence of others’, both politics and virtuosity need a ‘a space of 
appearances’. And, as Arendt writes, ‘whatever occurs in this space of 
appearances is political by definition, even when it is not a direct 
product of action’ (1977: 155). With the added qualification, ‘even when 
it is not a direct product of action’, one may conclude that ‘all virtuosity 
is intrinsically political’.4 
In the same text, immediately after stressing how interwoven 
virtuosity and politics are, Arendt writes emphatically about freedom. 
Virno, however, makes no reference to it. And yet this nexus linking 
virtuosity and politics with freedom seems to me to be a central point. 
The space of appearances, in other words, the political-public realm 
– and Arendt always sees the Greek polis in her mind’s eye – is the place 
‘in which freedom can manifest itself’. ‘Without such a space, 
established and equipped especially for it, freedom cannot be realized. 
There is no such thing as freedom without politics because it could not 
last’ (Arendt, 1977: 153, 154). Arendt differentiates this concept of 
freedom from the freedom of thought and will. She sees the latter in 
particular as an egocentric burden from Christianity. For her, on the 
other hand, it is about a political freedom, which has broken away and 
differentiated itself from the private, from the ‘concern about one’s life’ 
(1977: 153): it is about a freedom in the public sphere, a freedom of 
action, not of will or thought. In her view, freedom of will is an 
apolitical freedom because it is ‘capable of being experienced alone’ and 
is ‘independent of the multitude’ (1977: 157). 
Let us return now to Virno, who refers to Marx as well as Arendt to 
explain the current precarious forms of production and life. However, 
from his perspective, Marx recognizes the activity of performing artists 
(among whom he includes teachers, doctors, actors, orators and 
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preachers) as ‘labor without work’ only, and draws an analogy between 
it and the activities of servants. Consequently, in Marx’ terms, neither 
virtuosos nor servants produce a surplus value. For him, they both 
belong to the ‘realm of non-productive activity’ (Virno, 2004: 54). 
However, Marx should not be accused of banishing cultural producers 
in general to the realm of unproductive labor since he does not tie the 
distinction between productive and unproductive labor to the content 
of that labor. On the contrary,  
productive labor is to be a definition of labor that has absolutely 
nothing to do with the specific content of labor, its particular usefulness 
or the peculiar utility value in which it appears. (Marx, 1988: 113)5 
Marx defines productive labor, rather, through a relationship: though 
not a relationship with money in general and with the question of 
whether an activity is performed for financial reward or for free. The 
only relationship that constitutes productive labor, for Marx, is the one 
with capital. ‘Productive labor is exchanged directly for money as 
capital’ and is therefore labor that ‘sets the values it has created against 
the worker himself as capital’ (Marx, 1988: 112). The service of a doctor 
as well as that of a cook signifies, on the other hand, an exchange of 
‘labor for money as money’ and is therefore not considered productive 
(Marx, 1988: 116). Marx also clarifies the distinction between the two 
exchange relationships of labor, taking the example of a virtuoso 
performer:  
A singer, who can sing like a bird, is an unproductive worker. To the 
extent that she sells her song for money, she is a wage laborer or 
tradeswoman. But this same singer, engaged by an entrepreneur who 
has her sing in order to make money, is a productive worker since she 
directly produces capital. (Marx, 1988: 113) 
But what happens when the singer becomes her own entrepreneur? 
Does the relationship between labor and capital implode in her? Should 
she, by Marx’s reasoning, be described as ‘unproductive’ when she, in 
her artistic independence and with projects subject to time limits, takes 
not just her voice to market, but constantly sells her whole personality; 
when singing ‘like a bird’ serves to get her the next job? Acting 
simultaneously as service providers, producers and entrepreneurs of 
themselves, don’t today’s cultural producers stand directly opposed to 
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themselves as capitalized life forms in the values they have created, in a 
manner that resembles and yet is totally different from, the relationship 
that Marx defined as ‘productive labor’? 
Virno too concludes that, in post-Fordism, in the era of cognitive 
capitalism,6 Arendt’s classifications no longer apply and Marx’s 
apparatus clearly does not seem adequate as a means of understanding 
contemporary forms of production and their related life forms. For 
these become intensified in new relationships, where  
productive labor as a whole has adopted the particular characteristics of 
the artistic performing activity. Whoever produces surplus value in 
post-Fordism behaves – seen from a structuralist standpoint, of course 
– like a pianist, a dancer, etc. (Virno, 2004: 154-5) 
Thus, virtuosity structures, in a way that differs from Arendt’s 
formulation, not just political action but, increasingly, new immaterial 
labor relations based on a broad concept of creativity, which can by no 
means be considered ‘unproductive’. Against the background of 
Aristotle’s and Arendt’s tripartite model, the increasing 
indistinguishability between productive labor and immaterial, creative 
activity means that such a virtuoso behaves ‘like a political being as a 
result of this’ (Virno, 2004: 55, translation modified). It means, clearly, 
that the separation into poiesis, intellect and political praxis, and Marx’s 
distinction between productive and unproductive labor can no longer 
be sustained. Such a declaration of ‘indistinguishability’ ought to be 
understood less as a catastrophic scenario, in Giorgio Agamben’s sense 
of the term, than as the need to develop more appropriate analytical and 
political conceptualizations. 
Let us continue with Virno’s thesis that the creative workers who 
are, in the classical sense, political beings since their labor has ‘absorbed 
into itself many of the typical characteristics of political action’ (Virno, 
2004: 51, translation modified). This does not mean, however, that 
increasing virtuosic living and working conditions have resulted in 
increased politicization. On the contrary, the present day has revealed 
instead a ‘crisis of politics’ (Virno, 2004: 51). What is inherently 
attractive in politics has long been present in post-Fordist labor 
conditions and, as a result, the subjects within them are not over-
politicized; they are instead ‘de-politicized’ (Virno, 2004: 51). In turn, to 
the extent that the subjects become depoliticized, ‘contemporary 
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production [becomes] “virtuosic” (and thus political)’ (Virno, 2004: 51, 
translation modified). Thus too, when labor often transforms both into 
intellectual and service labor, and simultaneously into a means towards 
self-enterprise, intellect coincides to a greater extent with the sphere of 
labor, which is in turn no longer distinguishable from the classical 
political praxis. But when labor becomes political in this way, the 
classical sphere of political action – the public space – also changes. 
This latter is then constantly created as virtuoso. To put it another way, 
a permanent re-creation of the public space occurs: because ‘exposure 
to the presence of others’, fundamental to Arendt’s concept of the 
public, has evolved into one of the most crucial features of virtuoso 
working and living conditions. The ‘presence of the others’ has become 
both an instrument and an object of labor. Moreover, according to 
Virno, current modes of production and living are based, in their 
political virtuosity, on the art of the possible and the experience of 
handling the unexpected.7 
What this then means for the increasingly impossible demarcations 
between public and private as well as between production and 
reproduction, I would like to develop in the following discussion, by 
taking the example of specific cultural producers, meaning those on 
whom precarious living and working conditions are not only imposed 
but who actively desire them and above all understand them as a free 
and autonomous decision.8 
The virtuosos I refer to in what follows are by no means restricted 
to the artistic field. They can include academics or media 
representatives, for example. They are engaged in extremely diverse, 
unequally paid project activities and fee-paying jobs, and consider 
themselves entirely critical of society. Sometimes they do not want a 
steady job at all; sometimes they know it is something they can only 
dream about. Yet such cultural producers start from the assumption 
that they have chosen their living and working conditions themselves, 
precisely to ensure that they develop the essence of their being to the 
maximum in a relatively free and autonomous manner. In the case of 
such virtuosos, I refer to self-precarization. 
The interpellation to self-precarization belongs to an elementary 
governing technique of modern societies and is not an entirely new 
neoliberal or post-Fordist phenomenon. Already, with the demand to 
orient oneself towards the normal as part of the modern trend, 
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everyone had to develop a relationship with the self, to control one’s 
own body, one’s own life by regulating and thus controlling oneself. 
Inseparable from this self-conduct are ideas of actuality. Thus, for 
example, we still believe that the effect of power relations is the very 
essence of ourselves, our truth, our own actual core. This normalizing 
self-regulation is based on an imagined coherence, unity and wholeness, 
which can be traced back to the construction of a male, white, 
bourgeois subject. Coherence, once again, is one of the prerequisites for 
the modern, sovereign subject. These imagined, inner, natural ‘truths’, 
these constructions of actuality still foster ideas of being able or having 
to shape one’s life freely and autonomously, and according to one’s own 
decisions. These types of power relations are therefore not easy to 
discern since they often appear as a free decision of one’s own, as a 
personal insight and then trigger the desire to ask: ‘Who am I?’ or ‘How 
can I fulfill myself?’ The concept of ‘personal responsibility’, so 
commonly used in the course of neoliberal restructuring, only operates 
above this old liberal technique of self-regulation. 
Basically, governmental self-regulation, this sovereignty at the 
subject level, takes place in an apparent paradox since this modern self-
regulation means both subjugation and empowerment. Only in this 
ambivalent structure of subjectivation that – in all its diversity in the 
individual – was fundamental both in private as well as in the public 
sphere, both in the family and in the factory or in politics, only in this 
paradoxical subjectivation does the governability of the modern subject 
occur. The freedom to shape one’s own life, however, was an essential 
constitutive element of this supposed paradox between regulation and 
empowerment. 
In liberalism, this normalized sovereign male-white subjectivation 
needed the construction of the abnormal and deviant Other, in this case 
the marginalized precarious worker. In neoliberalism, the function of 
the precarious worker now shifts towards the centre of society and 
becomes normalized. Thus the function of bourgeois freedom can also 
be transformed: away from the separation of precarious others and 
towards the subjectivizing function in normalized precarization. 
Current living and working conditions refer not least to a genealogy 
of the social movements since the sixties. The thoroughly dissident 
practices of alternative ways of life, the desires for different bodies and 
self-relations (in feminist, ecological, radical-left contexts) constantly 
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sought to distinguish themselves from normal working conditions and 
their associated constraints, disciplinary measures and controls. The 
conscious, voluntary acceptance of precarious employment conditions 
was also generally the expression of a need to overcome the modern, 
patriarchal division in reproduction and wage labor. 
In recent years, however, it is precisely these alternative living and 
working conditions that have become increasingly economically 
utilizable because they favor the flexibilization demanded by the labor 
market. Thus the practices and discourses of social movements in the 
past thirty or forty years were not only dissident and directed against 
normalization, but were also simultaneously part of the transformation 
towards a neoliberal form of governmentality. 
On the level of subjectivation, it is increasingly clear that at present 
alternative living and working conditions have by and large not freed 
themselves from the structure of a traditional, bourgeois-white-male 
mode of subjectivation. The ambivalence between a specific bourgeois 
idea of freedom on the one hand, and (self-)regulation and subjugation 
on the other is far from removed. 
The present virtuosos of this ambivalence may be further described 
within a few parameters: they pursue temporary jobs, make their living 
on projects and from contract work from several clients simultaneously 
and from consecutive clients, mostly without any sick pay, paid holiday 
leave or unemployment compensation, without protection against 
wrongful dismissal – basically with minimal social protection or none 
whatsoever. Most do not have children. There is no longer any dividing 
line between leisure time and work. There is an accumulation of 
knowledge during the unpaid hours that is not remunerated separately, 
but which is naturally called on and used in the context of paid work. 
Constant communication via networks is vital for survival. Quite a few 
of them regard themselves as left wing and critical of capitalism. 
But the practices we are concerned with here are linked with desire 
as well as conformity. For, again and again, these modes of existence are 
constantly foreseen and co-produced in anticipatory obedience. The 
unpaid or low-paid jobs, in the cultural or academic industries for 
instance, are all too often accepted as an unalterable fact; nothing else is 
even demanded. Conditions of inequality often go un-remarked. The 
need to pursue other, less creative, precarious jobs to finance one’s own 
cultural production is something one puts up with. This financing of 
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one’s own creative output, enforced and yet opted for at the same time, 
constantly supports and reproduces the very conditions in which one 
suffers and which one at the same time wants to be part of. It is 
perhaps because of this that creative workers, these voluntarily 
precarized virtuosos, are subjects so easily exploited; they seem able to 
tolerate their living and working conditions with infinite patience 
because of the belief in their own freedoms and autonomies, and 
because of the fantasies of self-realization. In a neoliberal context, they 
are so exploitable that, now, it is no longer just the state that presents 
them as role models for new modes of living and working. 
Experiences of anxiety and loss of control, feelings of insecurity as 
well as the fear and the actual experience of failure, a drop in social 
status and poverty are linked with this state of self-precarization. It is 
for this reason too that ‘letting go’ or other forms of dropping out of or 
shedding the hegemonic paradigm are difficult. You have to stay ‘on 
speed’ or else you could be eliminated. You always feel threatened. 
There is no clear time for relaxation and recuperation. Then the desire 
to relax and ‘find oneself’ becomes insatiable. Such reproductive 
practices usually have to be learned all over again. They are no longer 
the most natural thing in the world and have to be fought for, bitterly, 
in a struggle with oneself and others. This in turn is what makes the 
longing for reproduction, for regeneration, so hugely marketable. 
In the current context of precarious, largely immaterial and mostly 
individualized labor and a ‘life’ that mirrors it, the function of 
reproduction also changes as a consequence. It is no longer externalized 
with others, primarily women. Individual reproduction and sexual 
reproduction, the production of life, now become individualized and are 
shifted in part ‘into’ the subjects themselves. It is about regeneration 
beyond work, also through work, but still very often beyond adequately 
remunerated wage labor. It is about (self-) renewal, creating from 
oneself, recreating oneself through one’s own power: of one’s own 
accord. Self-realization becomes a reproductive task for the self. Work 
is meant to ensure the reproduction of the self. 
Following Virno, one may conclude that the separation between 
public and private is imploding not alone in a newly depoliticized public 
sphere, a ‘publicness without a public sphere’ (Virno, 2004: 40). A 
further separation reinforces this implosion: the one between 
production and reproduction in the modes of subjectivation described. 
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At the same time, and in parallel, the traditional social and economic 
spheres continue to exist, together with gender-specific segmentation. 
This subjectivation, which one cannot really differentiate structurally 
according to gender,9 is evidently contradictory because of the 
implosions: in the simultaneity of precarization on the one hand – 
linked with fear, with the feeling of vulnerability and fragmentation – 
and with the continuity of sovereignty, on the other. This continuity of 
modern sovereign subjectivation takes place through the stylizing of 
self-realization, autonomy and freedom, through the shaping of the self, 
personal responsibility and the repetition of the idea of actuality. In 
general, this sovereignty appears to be based, in the first instance, on the 
‘free’ decision for self-precarization. 
However, that could be a key reason why it is so difficult to see 
structural precarization as a neoliberal, governmental phenomenon that 
affects society as a whole, and which is really not based on any free 
decision; why critique of it is still rare; and why a counter-behaviour is 
still largely absent. In this case, the new public sphere is a space for 
opportunism and conformity. 
Even with Hannah Arendt, whose analyses clearly do not seem 
relevant for the current economic and social processes of 
transformation, the fantasies of self-chosen freedom and autonomy 
presented here are open to criticism. For they come very close to 
Arendt’s concept of ‘freedom of will’ and its opposite of ‘political 
freedom’. If ‘the ideal of freedom (…) has shifted from the power to act 
to the desire to act’, then it can ‘no longer be the virtuosity of common 
action, the ideal was rather sovereignty, independence from everyone 
else and, if necessary, self-assertion against them’ (Arendt, 1977: 153). 
Political freedom functions, however, only ‘in the condition of non-
sovereignty’ (Arendt, 1977: 154). 
Instead of reflecting on their own involvement in the context of 
precarization, discussions frequently take place in left-wing circles about 
who still belongs and who no longer does, who is the subject of 
precarious poverty as opposed to precarious luxury. It still seems 
indispensable, first and foremost, to specify the collective to be 
politicized, which is invariably other people. Indeed I think that, as long 
as one’s own self-precarization and the fantasies around it, operate 
beyond the mainstream, the bourgeoisie or wherever else, precisely 
because their own ideas of freedom and autonomy are valid in that 
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particular niche, it will be impossible, both theoretically and politically, 
to understand how a subjectivation that is optimally governable in 
structural terms evolves through self-chosen living and working 
conditions – which is none other than a voluntary submission to 
neoliberal, governmental forms of regulation. 
If one follows Virno’s thesis about the implosion of the Aristotle-
Arendt tripartite division, then one must also thematize a crisis in leftist 
politics. Should we not then be asking the following questions: are new 
public spheres constantly evolving through unreflective self-
precarization; are the separations between private and public, between 
labor and production in one’s own subjectivation being dissolved; yet is 
it not in this very same process, as Virno maintains, that depoliticized 
subjects emerge? 
Notes 
1 This is the subtitle (‘Public Space, Intellect and Labour’) of Klaus 
Neundlinger’s translation (Virno, 2005a), which is the source for citations in 
this chapter. A second German version, translated by Thomas Atzert (Virno 
2005b) renders the subtitle Untersuchungen zu gegenwärtigen Lebensformen, a 
formulation closer to the English translation (Virno, 2004). 
2 Translator’s note: This is to be understood as a reference to ‘today’s forms 
of production’. 
3 The term ‘cultural producers’ is used as a paradox here. It refers to an 
imagined version of the designated subjects: that of their own autonomous 
production and of the shaping of their selves. At the same time, however, it 
deals with the fact that these modes of subjectivation are instruments of 
governing and thus functional effects of western modernity’s biopolitically 
governmental societies. Consequently, the meaning of the term ‘cultural 
producers’ is contradictory, lacking in coherence. The term does not 
primarily denote artists. For a more detailed discussion, see Lorey, 2009. 
4 Arendt, as cited by Virno, 2004: 53. In order to depoliticize the performing 
art activity as a virtuoso, one must therefore create lasting, durable 
products. This is the sense in which Virno’s Glenn Gould example should 
be read. 
5 I wish to thank Karl Reitter for this reference. 
6 See Corsani, 2004. 
7 See also Virno, 2003. 
8 For a more detailed discussion on this, see Lorey, 2007: 121-36. 
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9 This is certainly due in no small part to the fact that the virtuosos discussed 
here do not have children. One reason for this is their precarization despite 
self-exploitation and imagined self-realization. The socially structuring lines 
of separation do not significantly follow gender lines here. For a discussion 
of how this changes with the ‘additional condition of motherhood’ or 
‘duties of care that are still linked with femininity’, see Voß and Weiß, 2005: 
65-91. On the neoliberal restructuring of gender relations between ‘re-
traditionalization trends’ and ‘flexibilized gender image(s)’, see Pühl and 
Sauer, 2004: 165-79. 
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6 
Experiences without Me, or, the Uncanny Grin 
of Precarity 
Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos 
translated by Aileen Derieg 
I. 
We will start with a story that many probably have experienced already 
in much the same way.1 It relates to the production of social meaning 
through forms of address.2 A person applies as a freelancer for a job as 
proofreader for a publication. The person does not know those offering 
the contract, but the job has been passed on through networks of 
various personal contacts, so this person makes a phone call and speaks 
with a representative of the editorial team for a publication on an 
academic conference, of whom it may be assumed that this is not the 
person to make the final decision, and offers her work. She introduces 
herself and addresses this representative informally. The response from 
the other side is a moment of hesitation, after which the respondent 
takes a breath and answers with a formal mode of address. The moment 
of a brief communication crisis arises, but our applicant quickly assesses 
the situation and switches – naturally without making an issue of it – to 
formal address. She thus subordinates herself to her conversation 
partner, who has taken a position of distance through the mode of 
address. With the informal mode of address, the freelancer’s offer 
anticipated, one could say, the resource of trust, the portion of the 
informality of the work she was applying for, which in her experience 
represents a conventional requirement of these kinds of jobs. What she 
was to supply is a non-standardizable final product, because no one will 
be able to check whether she has done the editing well. What 
distinguishes her as a ‘good worker’, in comparison, although this will 
be evident, at most, in a future, reactivated working relationship, is that 
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she does the job in a way that could be described from the perspective 
of her employer as trustworthy and skillful self-responsibility. The 
aspiration to equality with a potential contract employer, which this 
contractor activates through the mode of address, represents an almost 
essential precondition for the manner in which the work of single 
persons within the project framework, in which mostly knowledge and 
cultural workers are active, becomes productive. In fact, the working 
conditions in these areas presuppose a more casual relationship between 
non-designated production and standardized forms of utilization as 
‘normal’: individuals are knowledgeable and active in the areas in which 
their labor is utilized at certain times. 
The crucial negotiation between the informal and the formal modes 
of address is what struck us as interesting in this story. It indicates the 
instability, the flexibility, the mutability, but also the risk of a ‘false’, 
inappropriate or possibly ineffective mode of address, from which there 
seems to be no escape. This is specifically because it also always 
simultaneously indicates both the intactness of the social places and 
relations offered by this mode of address and that it is no longer 
possible to operate solely with these social places and relations with 
these work requirements: an informal mode of address among equals or 
an informal mode of address directed upward and marking a challenge – 
and opposite to this a formal mode of address in a certain or 
indeterminate social situation enabling a radical difference among 
equals. Someone can address me formally and indicate specifically in 
this way that they are indeed the boss. 
The rejection of being addressed formally by a boss and in its place 
the attempt to generalize an informal mode of address as an 
addressability among equals, which characterizes our freelancer, could 
be taken in an expanded narrative context of the story of modes of 
address in work situations as a criticism of the rigid hierarchies of 
Fordism and the places they offered in institutions of so-called normal 
working and living conditions. The informal mode of address as a type 
of behavior relating to the production conditions has meanwhile largely 
become established in cultural or knowledge production. The 
institutions in this field themselves, however, appear to be oddly 
unaffected by this. In terms of her authority, for instance to sign a work 
or fee contract, the formality of the response of the representative of 
the editorial team on the telephone, speaking with the voice of an 
institutional place, did not, in fact, occupy this place at all. The informal 
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mode of address, according to our thesis, characterizes a new paradigm 
of productivity, but one which, on the other hand, does not have an 
external relationship to the institutions: the demands on the skills and 
abilities of the subjects are immediate and equal; they are the person 
addressed informally and hence also represent ‘more’ than what is 
expected from a person addressed formally. 
In a sense, the performative ‘informal address’ of our freelancer 
holds aspects of what could be called an instituent practice, where the 
level of recognition does not consist of the prospect of a place (in an 
institution), but rather a recognition ‘as an equal’ through an increase in 
productivity and the activation of the abilities employed – as the 
freelancer is contacted again, for instance, or recommended somewhere 
else, thus circulating in the network of contracts as a potentiality that 
can be actualized at any time. It is at the point of this potentiality where 
the implicit threat also starts, which resonates in the communication 
crisis between the informal and the formal mode of address or in the 
distancing formal mode: it already articulates the possibility of exclusion 
– specifically at the level of no longer appearing as one informally 
addressed – from a future past that defines the present. Inherent to the 
instituent practice of our freelancer are thus not only traits of 
productivity, assets and promise, but also the creased brow of a fear 
that stems from the search for a protective closeness in being informally 
addressed. 
So if we develop the thesis with this story that a kind of formula of 
the crisis of subjectivation in precarity is evident within the intact and 
simultaneous appellations as one informally addressed and/or formally 
addressed, then the question of the location of instituent practices 
cannot choose between self-precarization or self-exploitation on the 
one side and possible resistive or even affirmative forms of self-
institution on the other, but must instead address exactly the 
arrangement that covers the informal appellation and the formal 
appellation equally and enables a compulsively desiring subjectivation in 
precarization. 
 
II. 
Spinoza could be suspected of anticipating precarity when he thinks of 
the addressability of the subject as an attributability, which can prove to 
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be a pleasure as well as a pain; they are emotions that are both equally 
indeterminate on the one hand and tied on the other to the project that 
the subject adheres to. With Spinoza we can imagine the same origins of 
hope and fear in precarity as a social pulsing of the relationship between 
pleasure and pain:  
Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past 
or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue. Fear is an 
inconstant pain, arising from the idea of something past or future, 
whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue. (Spinoza, 1883) 
Our idea here is to grasp precarity as an outrageous indeterminacy, in 
other words as the wavering of the affection between the familiar, 
informal addressee of a possible pleasure in the future and/or past of 
equals, and a pain, always brought about through this same past or 
anticipated future, over the formal mode of address as a moment of fear 
that grips the one informally addressed. The latter’s pleasure, however, 
has long since been inscribed in the production paradigm of post-
Fordism. Less attention, though, has been given to her pain and its 
productive inscription. It may be observed that this pain is immediately 
coded out or recoded as a pleasure. Pain is the compulsion to make 
pleasure capable of being articulated, being utilized and distinguished, 
and even to increase it. It is something like being overcome with doubt 
about the good issue of something that I can nevertheless not avoid 
pursuing. It is as when something that I do with pleasure is not 
commensurately honored, and I do it despite that as though it were 
being commensurately honored, because I do not have the nerve to 
articulate the conflict. In some mysterious way, it seems that the pain 
irritatingly accompanies production processes of subjective labor. What 
is vacillating, indeterminate about precarity is, in our opinion, linked 
with a politics of pain, even fear, which reveals itself as the debate about 
security: what is scandalous about precarization, according to most 
critical discourses, is found in the absence of guarantees for places. This 
form of criticism is a disambiguation – informal or formal mode of 
address – because it reduces the indeterminacy. We also argue in favor 
of a determination, a disambiguation, but in the exactly opposite 
direction of scandalization. It relates less to the pain, in other words the 
anxious concern for security, but more to the pleasure that paves an 
insecure path with fear. Because we think that fear, seen in the context 
of security, generates more fear. 
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Back to Spinoza, who was no melancholic and thought of the 
indeterminacy of the emotion, of pleasure and pain, in modalities of 
time:  
However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many 
experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, 
and are usually in doubt about its issue [who are in other words exactly 
there, where our experience with precarization currently is] it follows 
that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so 
constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things 
[perhaps the images of furnishings that would make the indeterminate 
space of precarization more inhabitable], until men become assured of 
the issue. (Spinoza, 1883) 
 
III. 
Taking recourse to the distinctions between fear and anguish in Kant 
and Heidegger’s works, Paolo Virno develops the thesis that the 
difference proposed by these authors between a specific, socially 
immanent fear of something and an absolute anguish that accompanies 
being-in-the-world is currently vanishing, because experience in post-
Fordism is coupled with a changed dialectic of fear and security, as 
Virno says. He identifies indicators of this transformation in the fusion 
of fear and anguish into a fear that ‘is always anguish-ridden’ and in a 
life that assumes ‘many of the traits which formerly belonged to the 
kind of terror one feels outside the walls of the community’ (Virno, 
2004: 33). 
A virtually mythic image of fear is presented in the film The Village, 
by M. Night Shyamalan. The film is about the village of Covington in an 
indistinct period, which is reminiscent, however, of the early US 
American colonial period in its atmosphere. In the middle of a forest, 
cut off from possible other villages or inhabited zones, a community 
live a simple, autarkic life. On the basis of this film we want to take a 
closer look at the fusion of fear and anguish, specifically as a 
differentiation of the way in which fear and anguish reluctantly conjoin 
in various moments of the transformation of the sociality of this village. 
The rules in the village are reproduced through the fear of the 
inhabitants of the forest surrounding the village, called only ‘those we 
do not speak of’. They are the threatening outside of the community, 
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with which a pact has been made: as long as no villager enters the 
forest, ‘those we do not speak of’ will not attack the village. The village 
recognizes social forms of care, ways of dealing with fear, but also the 
subjectivation of courage, as when the young men standing with their 
backs to the edge of the forest open their arms. The first dramatic turn 
of the film then consists of the emergence of fearlessness, yet it does 
not grow out of some kind of a violation of the rules, but rather out of 
their subjective embodiment, which only just misses them. 
Lucius Hunt is a member of the village who even goes beyond the 
mere fulfillment of these rules. He is so much and so seriously 
preoccupied with them that it leads to his wish to leave the village, to 
overcome the limitations of the community. The argument for this that 
he presents to the ruling council of elders is the vulnerability within the 
community. He states that he wants to obtain medication from the city 
beyond the forest to heal another member of the village, Noah Percy. 
His wish qualifies the boundary to the forest as an instable one. Lucius 
is fearless in this respect, because he believes that by embodying the 
rules immanent to the community he can counteract the fear, that he 
can be ‘pure’ and invulnerable. 
The second figure of fearlessness is Noah. The proposed healing is 
intended for him. However, he is not actually depicted as sick, but 
rather as someone who is ‘different’, as someone who, for some 
undefined reason, embodies and lays bare what is monstrous about the 
rules. Unlike all the others, he does not fear ‘those we do not speak of’, 
but seems instead to await their arrival. The color red is a forbidden 
code, the color of ‘those we do not speak of’. Everything that has to do 
with this color is carefully avoided in the village, because according to 
the rule it attracts ‘those we do not speak of’; the color yellow, on the 
other hand, has a protective effect. Noah wanders through the area 
between the village and the forest collecting red berries, which he enjoys 
carrying secretly around with him, even in the village. He laughs with 
delight when the others tremble. 
The third figure of fearlessness is Ivy, the daughter of the head of 
the village. She is blind, but she can feel colors. She has a view of that 
which remains hidden. She surmises, ‘Sometimes we don’t do things we 
would like to do, so that others don’t know that we would like to do 
them’. 
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The exposé of the film, which follows these different embodiments 
of fearlessness, shows that the politics of fear do not at all function 
smoothly. Fearlessness is the intimate tie that binds Lucius, Noah and 
Ivy. It is restless and timid, yet it creates no fear. All three of these 
figures are potential violators of the boundary, but they do not attack 
the matrix of the village. The second dramatic turn comes with an 
interruption when something happens. It consists of a re-
territorialization of the intimacy of the bond between the three figures: 
three become two with the announcement of the marriage between 
Lucius and Ivy. It describes the moment when Noah realizes that he 
will then be alone with his matrix of fearlessness. He tries to kill Lucius 
with a knife. Due to Lucius’ life-threatening injury it is Ivy who sees 
herself forced to continue his project of leaving the village in a different 
way. She wants to go away so that Lucius can be healed with medicine. 
The circumstances of her leaving have nothing to do with either exodus 
or the wish to evade being inscribed in the community of the village, 
nor with what is attributed to Noah. Her project is functional and it is 
formed step by step by the events that have been set in motion. At this 
point it seems that the dramatic secret of the film and thus of the village 
community must be revealed. It is none other than Ivy’s father, the 
head of the village, who is supposed to most strongly embody the 
principle of the isolation of the village, who is confronted with the 
failure of security – especially that of his daughter – that is ensured by 
the politics of fear. He sees himself forced to articulate to Ivy the 
terrible secret about ‘those we do not speak of’, so that she need not be 
afraid on her way to the city: ‘those we do not speak of’ do not even 
exist, or rather they are red costumes worn by the members of the 
council of elders to frighten the others and prevent an exodus. Through 
her father’s revelation Ivy becomes a subject of the knowledge of the 
initiated. And she is given safe directions for the path to the city. Her 
fearlessness is enlightened. 
The third dramatic turn then relates to the appearance of anguish. 
Ivy finds herself in the forest according to all the rules of the plan – and 
she is approached by one of ‘those we do not speak of’, which do not 
exist, as she knows. She tells herself, this is not real. This is not fear, but 
anguish. And yet there is no other practice with regard to the non-real 
than a thoroughly real, haptic action. ‘Being truly anguish-ridden’, 
according to Virno, ‘is just a certain way of confronting anguish’ (2004: 
35). She battles with the unspeakable, and falling into a hole it is fatally 
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wounded. While Ivy was being initiated to make her way through the 
forest, by chance Noah discovered the red costume, with which he 
connects and becomes one of ‘those we do not speak of’ himself. He 
embodies the founding myth of the community, affirms its fear, 
becomes its fear. With it he has set off into the forest to meet Ivy. The 
impossibility for Ivy to be afraid at the moment of encountering the 
unspeakable, is frightening. From this point on, she no longer goes, she 
flees. Yet her flight is not simply a practice of anguish, but rather this is 
where fear and anguish fuse together. Although the directions are still 
valid, she follows them driven by anguish, fleeing. In Virno’s terms this 
is precarity. For the fusion of fear and anguish he proposes the term 
uncanny.3 With our film example we can see that this uncanny flight 
represents a weapon of precarity. Fleeing along the coded path, Ivy 
encounters a wall, the existence of which she was not informed of – a 
further limitation, but one that remains unfounded. Since fleeing 
enables her to break through this wall, she shakes the foundations of 
the outrageous indeterminacy of precarity, one could say. With this 
breakthrough the filmic narration of The Village disambiguates its 
indeterminacy and determines it as a temporal, chronological confusion: 
we find ourselves not in the nineteenth century of the village, but rather 
in the present day. The terrible truth is that the village is nothing other 
than a reservation founded for protection against violence and guarded 
by security personnel. This determination in the narration of the film 
finishes with a happy end. The thorn of the uncanny that Ivy’s story of 
flight bears is pacified, the village’s identity-founding politics of fear are 
maintained, the rules of the village community are reproduced at a new 
level. Yet one could also imagine the return to the village being 
accompanied by an uncanny smile or even grin on Ivy’s face, in which 
the possibility of being something else begins to show. 
Judith Butler, at the end of her text on The Psychic Life of Power 
(Butler, 1997), explores the boundaries of subjectivation. Discussing 
Giorgio Agamben, she raises the question of the lines of flight of desire, 
which remain at a distance from the determinations of being that entice 
identity. She is concerned with a willingness not to be, which can 
assume a form of linguistic survival to assure itself, as she says quoting 
Agamben:  
In fact there is something that human beings are and have to be, but 
that is not an essence and not a thing in the narrower sense: it is the 
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simple fact of one’s own existence as a possibility or potentiality. 
(Butler, 1997: 131) 
Butler inscribes a desire into this statement from Agamben with her 
commentary:  
Here the assertion can be read into this that this possibility must 
dissolve into something, yet without being able to overcome its own 
status as a possibility with this kind of solution. (Butler, 1997: 131) 
Notes 
1 For inspiring discussion prior to this text, we would like to thank Efthimia 
Panagiotidis, Frank John and Isabell Lorey. 
2 Translator’s note: In German, as in other languages, the informal second 
person pronoun (du) is different from the formal second person pronoun 
(Sie). Even though this distinction is obscured by the undifferentiated 
second person pronoun in English (‘you’), the same kind of negotiation still 
takes place in comparable contexts. 
3 ‘We would need to find a new term here, different from ‘fear’ or ‘anguish’, a 
term which would take the fusion of these two terms into account. What 
comes to mind for me is the term uncanny. But it would take too much 
time here to justify the use of this term.’ (Virno, 1994: 65-7) 
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7 
Wit and Innovation 
Paolo Virno 
translated by Arianne Bové 
The human animal is capable of changing forms of life and diverting 
from consolidated habits and rules.1 We would go as far as to say that 
the human animal is ‘creative’, were this term not so equivocal. Put in 
this way, this is an indubitable observation, but far from a happy 
conclusion, it prompts all sorts of questions and doubts. Which 
elements of praxis and discourse give rise to unpredicted outcomes? 
How is a state of equilibrium broken? And finally, what makes an action 
innovative? 
The tried and tested way of settling the discussion whilst appearing 
to fully engage with it demands that the term ‘creativity’ is employed in 
such broad terms that it becomes coextensive with ‘human nature’. 
Thus we rapidly come to several reassuring tautologies: the human 
animal is supposedly capable of innovation because it enjoys the gift of 
verbal language, because it does not inhabit an invariable and delimited 
environment, or because it is historical; in short, the human animal can 
innovate because it is… a human animal. Applause and the curtain falls. 
This tautology eludes the most interesting and awkward issue: that 
transformative action is intermittent, rare even. To try to explain it by 
appealing to distinct features of our species is to bark up the wrong tree: 
these features are equally present when experience is uniform and 
repetitive. 
According to Noam Chomsky, our language is ‘constantly 
innovative’ because it is independent from ‘external stimuli or inner 
states’ (and for other reasons that I won’t recount here) (Chomsky, 
1991: 6-7, 113-46). So far so good; however, why does this unremitting 
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independence only occasionally give rise to unusual and unexpected 
verbal performances? It is no surprise that, having attributed it to 
language in general, that is, to human nature, Chomsky goes on to 
conclude that creativity is an unfathomable mystery. Another example 
of this can be found in philosophical anthropology. Arnold Gehlen 
claims that homo sapiens is an instinct forsaken animal continuously faced 
with an overabundance of stimuli that have no biological direction and 
whence no univocal behavior can derive: that is why his action, 
‘unfounded’ as it is, can be nothing other than creative (Gehlen, 1985: 
60-87). Yet this still fails to answer the crucial question: how is it that 
such overabundance of purposeless stimuli primarily produces 
stereotypical performances and only rarely gives rise to sudden 
innovation? 
It is legitimate to deduce the conditions under which conduct can 
vary from some defining features of our species, but it would be a 
glaring mistake to identify these conditions of possibility with the 
particular logical-linguistic abilities used to actually modify a particular 
behavior. Between one and the other lies a hiatus: the same discrepancy 
that separates the a priori intuition of space from the inferences through 
which a geometrical theorem is formulated or understood. 
Neither the independence of statements from ‘external stimuli or 
inner states’ (Chomsky) nor instinctual forsakenness (Gehlen) can 
explain why when asked ‘How is it going?’ by a blind man a lame man 
replies with a cutting and creative ‘As you can see’. Chomsky and 
Gehlen only point to the reasons why the lame man can react this way 
to the blind man’s involuntary provocation (besides many other less 
surprising ways: ‘well, and you?’, ‘smashing!’, ‘could be worse’); they say 
nothing of the effective procedures that give rise to the unpredicted 
swerve in the dialogue. The logical and linguistic resources used by 
innovative action are more circumscribed and less generic than its 
conditions of possibility. Despite being a natural prerequisite of all 
human animals, only under certain critical circumstances do these 
resources get used and gain greater prominence. Such circumstances 
would be: when a form of life that once seemed incontrovertible begins 
to seem ill-fitting; when the distinction between ‘grammatical’ and 
‘empirical’ realms (respectively, the rules of the game and the facts to 
which those rules should apply) becomes blurred; when, however 
fleetingly, human praxis runs up against that tight corner known by 
jurists as a state of exception. 
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To avoid the danger of tautology I propose a very limited, almost 
narrow, acceptation of ‘creativity’: the forms of verbal thought that 
allow for change in one’s behaviour in an emergency situation. A 
tautological reference to ‘human nature’ explains neither the state of 
equilibrium, nor exodus from it. Vice versa an investigation into the 
logical and linguistic resources that only become prominent in crisis 
emphasizes the techniques of innovation as well as throwing a different 
light on repetitive behavior. Rather than the constitutive independence 
of verbal language from environmental and psychological conditioning, 
it is the unexpected joke of the lame man that clarifies salient 
characteristics of stereotypical responses that probability would have 
had as given. The suspension or change of a rule shows the often 
unperceived paradoxes and aporias that underlie its most blind and 
automatic application. 
The following pages focus on wit in the belief that it provides an 
adequate empirical basis to understand how the linguistic animal 
occasionally imprints an unexpected deviation on its praxis. Moreover, 
wit seems to be a good example of the narrow acceptation of 
‘creativity’: one that does not tautologically coincide with human nature 
as a whole, but is rather tried and tested exclusively in critical situations. 
The main textual reference is to Freud’s essay Der Witz (1960, first 
published in 1905); to my knowledge there is no other significant 
attempt to chart a detailed, botanical, so to speak, taxonomy of different 
kinds of witticism. The profound commitment of the author to clearly 
identify the rhetorical devices and patterns of reason behind the 
occurrence of the scathing joke is notorious. I must warn the reader 
that my interpretation of the material gathered and reviewed by Freud is 
rigorously non-Freudian. Rather than focusing on its affinity with the 
labor of dreams and the functioning of the subconscious, I would like 
to highlight the tight connection between wit and praxis in the public 
sphere. It should not come as a surprise that in regard to successful 
witticism I am going to say nothing about dreams and much about 
phronesis, which is the practical shrewdness and sense of measure that 
guides an agent in the absence of a network of protection from his 
fellow beings. 
Wit is the diagram of innovative action. Along with Peirce and 
mathematicians, I intend diagram to be the sign that reproduces a 
miniature version of the structure and internal proportions of a given 
phenomenon (like an equation or a geographical map). Wit is the logical 
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and linguistic diagram of enterprises that interrupt the circular flow of 
experience in situations of historical or biographical crisis. It is the 
microcosm inside which we can neatly discern changes in the direction 
of arguments and shifts in meaning, that in the macrocosm of human 
praxis cause a variation in a form of life. In short: wit is a circumscribed 
linguistic game with its peculiar techniques and its eminent function is 
to exhibit the transformability of all linguistic games. 
This general premise is articulated in two subordinate hypotheses 
that we ought to state now. Here is the first. Wit has much to do with 
one of the most insidious problems of linguistic praxis: how to apply a 
rule to a particular case. In fact, it has to do with insidiousness, the 
difficulties and uncertainties that sometimes arise at the moment of its 
application. Wit constantly demonstrates that there are many different 
and even contrasting ways to comply with the same norm. But it is the 
divergences arising through the application of a rule that often provoke 
a drastic change of the latter. 
Far from being situated above or outside of norms, human creativity 
is even sub-normative: it manifests itself uniquely in the lateral and 
improper paths that we happen to inaugurate when trying to keep to a 
determined norm. Paradoxical as it may seem, the state of exception 
originally resides in the only apparently obvious activity that 
Wittgenstein names ‘rule-following’. This entails that every humble 
application of a rule always contains in itself a fragment of a ‘state of 
exception’. Wit brings this fragment to light. 
The second subordinate hypothesis is that the logical form of wit 
consists in an argumentative fallacy; that is, an undue inference or an 
incorrect use of a semantic ambiguity. For instance: the attribution to a 
grammatical subject of all the properties of its predicate, the swapping 
of the part for the whole or the whole for the part, the institution of a 
symmetrical relation between antecedent and consequent, the treatment 
of a meta-linguistic expression as if it was in language-object. To say it 
in other words, there is a punctual and meticulous correspondence 
between the different types of wit catalogued by Freud and the 
paralogisms studied by Aristotle in his On Sophistical Refutations. In the 
case of wit, argumentative fallacies reveal a productive character; they 
are useful to something and indispensable mechanisms for verbal action 
that produces ‘bewilderment and illumination’, surprise and 
enlightenment (Freud, 1960: 11-14). Here a delicate question arises: 
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whilst it is true that wit is the diagram of innovative action, we need to 
presuppose that its logical form, that is the fallacy, has an important role 
in so far as it changes one’s mode of living. However, isn’t it bizarre to 
ground the creativity of homo sapiens on reasoning in vicious circles and 
error? Of course it is bizarre and worse even. But it would be foolish to 
believe that someone is so foolish to warmly support such a hypothesis. 
The really interesting point is to understand the circumstances and 
conditions where a paralogism ceases to be a paralogism, that is, where 
it can no longer be considered mistaken or false (in logical terms). It 
follows that only under these circumstances and in these conditions the 
‘fallacy’ becomes an indispensable source of innovation. 
 
Notes 
1 This chapter is a translation of the ‘Prologue’ to Virno, 2005c. 
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GovernCreativity, or, Creative Industries 
Austrian Style 
Monika Mokre 
translated by Aileen Derieg 
As in more or less every country – and especially every big city – 
between Finland and India, the ‘creative industries’ (hereafter ‘CI’) have 
been a big issue in Austrian cultural and economic policy for the last 
decade. This new interest in the CI can be seen as a result both of 
international developments and of national specifics.  
Internationally, we could observe the commercialization of culture 
and the arts since the 1980s when festivals and popular exhibitions 
became an important part of cultural politics. This development was 
complemented by debates on the economic impact of creativity in the 
1990s.  
The specific hype around the CI in Austria, however, was closely 
related to the change of government in 2000, when the Social-
Democratic Party failed to become part of the Austrian government for 
the first time since 1970. Instead, the conservative People’s Party 
formed a coalition with the radical right-wing Austrian Freedom Party. 
This change led in turn to broader changes in Austrian politics that can 
be summarized – rather polemically – as the rise of neoliberal economic 
concepts in combination with a considerable increase of repression 
towards critical political forces, not least of all in the arts. The 
conservative/right wing government was replaced in 2006 by a coalition 
of the Social-Democrats and the Conservatives. However, the focus on 
the CI as well as the disregard of contemporary critical art remained 
part of Austrian cultural politics. And the Social-Democratic municipal 
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government of Vienna has been at least as active in the field of the CI 
as the national government. Still – and although phrases of the kind 
‘what would have happened if?’ are among the most senseless in 
historical analyses – I think it plausible that the predominance of the CI 
in Austrian cultural politics is, to a high degree, caused by the general 
change of political aims that started in 2000, as this change was both an 
effect of the international hegemony of neoliberal political concepts and 
one of the causes for their success in Austria. 
The forms of CI hype are well known, since they are more or less 
the same everywhere: 
! Narratives about the CI begin with the trivial assumption that 
creativity is an important economic factor. 
! Afterwards, definitions of the CI are delivered that are too broad 
to be really classified as definitions. 
! On the basis of these definitions statistical data prove that the 
CI are (1) a crucial economic sector with (2) virtually limitless 
future possibilities. 
! Then we usually find the assumption, shared by more or less all 
countries and cities focusing their attention on the CI, that the 
country or city in question has especially favorable conditions 
for this sector, although specific policy measures are necessary in 
order to further improve the situation. 
! Finally, consequential positive prospects for employment, 
economic growth and success in international competition are 
described. And if working conditions in the CI are mentioned at 
all, profits and work satisfaction for those working in the 
creative industries are promised. 
However, these international developments and assumptions overlap 
with specific national situations, and it is out of the combination of 
these two factors that concrete conditions for the CI develop. Let me 
therefore briefly describe crucial factors of the Austrian ‘culture of 
cultural politics’. 
Austrian Cultural Policy 
For a long time, it was something like an Austrian truism that culture 
and the arts are a public responsibility and should therefore be largely 
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publicly funded. The roots of this specific relationship between politics 
and the arts can be traced back to the eighteenth century and thus to 
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The prosperity of the Habsburg 
territories was an important reason for the flourishing of the arts as well 
as for their dependence on state support, but generous public support 
for culture and the arts has survived the end of the monarchy. It is also 
a legacy of the Habsburgs that the lion’s share of public funds for the 
arts is centrally distributed, that is by the Republic of Austria. 
Furthermore, the strong dependence of cultural and artistic institutions 
as well as individual artists on the state led to an equally strong state 
influence on cultural activities. In short, it may therefore be stated that, 
up to the late twentieth century, Austrian cultural policy was marked by 
the centralist and absolutist power of the Habsburgs. In accordance 
with this tradition, most public funding for culture and the arts went 
(and still goes) to the cultural heritage – including historical buildings, 
museums and the performing arts institutions that developed into high 
art. And it should also be mentioned that, overall, public financing for 
culture and the arts in Austria is still very generous in comparison to 
many other European countries. 
However, this longstanding tradition has also been subject to 
changes. Above all, in the aftermath of the political movement of 1968 
(and at the beginning of the government of the Social Democrats 
without coalition partners) cultural policy began to recognize and also 
to finance more contemporary art forms and projects. In comparison to 
the funds for the cultural heritage, public financing for contemporary 
projects has always been peanuts; still, it was enough to bring about a 
certain dynamic in the artistic and cultural scene in Austria. 
The support for contemporary art by the Social Democrats came 
out of a certain political sympathy with the respective artists and art 
forms as well as a need to contest the conservative cultural hegemony in 
Austria. However, it always remained half-hearted and without a real 
cultural political program. The programmatic understanding of cultural 
politics was mainly a by-product of the general welfare orientation of 
Social Democratic government summarized in the slogan: ‘Cultural 
policy has to be understood as part of social policy.’ Most of all, this 
statement included a mission to open high culture to the lower classes – 
as audiences, not as producers. In this way, a traditional understanding 
of the educational impact of high culture was combined with the 
egalitarian claim of Social Democracy. And it needed only a very slight 
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change of focus to transform this egalitarian claim into the call for 
commercialization in the 1980s: The claim that the uneducated masses 
should learn to appreciate the high arts was changed into the claim that 
the arts should meet the taste of potential consumers of the arts. 
It goes without saying that both concepts are highly problematic 
from the perspective of a democratic understanding of cultural policies 
– the paternalistic public hand is replaced by the invisible hand of the 
free market. However, this description also only partly holds true for 
Austrian cultural policies. Rather surprisingly, commercialization in 
Austria went hand in hand with increasing public expenditure.  
Two examples will make the point: While in the early 1980s the 
musical Cats was performed in all larger European cities, Vienna was 
probably the only city where these performances were highly 
subsidized. In an Austrian region, subsidies for the performing arts were 
calculated as the equivalent of earned income. Thus, those productions 
with the highest share of earned income also got the highest share of 
public money. 
These contradictory or – to put it more bluntly – rather senseless 
ways of financing the arts can be understood as the overlapping of 
different traditions and new developments that is also of crucial impact 
for the Austrian way of dealing with the Creative Industries. While the 
international trend towards commercialization was followed, the 
traditional state dependence of the arts was maintained. While cultural 
policy popularized the arts, commercialization did not quite work out. 
The most important influence of Social Democratic politics, 
however, is not to be seen in the changes of the cultural field, but in its 
general orientation towards distributional politics that led in Austria to 
the development of a strong and very successful welfare state. This 
welfare state was based on social partnership and resulted in a 
comparatively high level of social security that has been upheld for a 
longer time than in many other countries. The Austrian welfare model 
(like most welfare models of this time) was oriented towards large 
enterprises (of which, in the Austrian case, quite a few were state 
owned), fulltime employment and a high degree of job security as well 
as a substantial social net. However, while social security has indeed 
been an important feature of the Austrian model, empirical studies have 
frequently shown that secure fulltime employment has only ever been 
the dominant model for a part of population – specifically for male 
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Austrian citizens working in large enterprises. It has more rarely applied 
to women and never to foreign workers. Nor does the model work in 
the case of artists – regardless of their sex or nationality – who are not 
employed in the flagships of the Austrian cultural heritage. (Those who 
are so employed, however, have been subject to labor laws of a rather 
absurd rigidity. For example, the prolongation of a performance or 
rehearsal of the Viennese Burgtheater leads very quickly to exploding 
costs as overtime has to be paid not only to those actually working but 
to the whole shifts of light and stage technicians, and so on.) 
Independent artists have lived precariously for a long time – and are 
therefore today euphemistically called the avant-garde of the new 
creative entrepreneurs. Still, the ideal of ‘regular employment with 
regular payments’ made it possible to criticize these conditions and, in 
fact, subsidies for small and independent artistic projects somehow rose 
simultaneously with the subsidies for cultural heritage – although on a 
much smaller scale. 
In sum, traditional cultural politics in Austria has exhibited the 
following features: an understanding of culture and the arts as a public 
task that led to a financial structure based almost exclusively on public 
subsidies; an understanding of culture and the arts as mainly consisting 
of the cultural heritage; the non-existence of acknowledgement of 
popular culture; the lack of programs and formulated aims of cultural 
policies; and the assumption of a welfare state based on regular 
employment. 
Creative Industries Austrian Style 
In fact it is hardly surprising that the first attempts to introduce the CI 
in this specific national situation were mainly characterized by 
helplessness. When the then new state secretary for the arts in Austria, 
Franz Morak, published his first press releases in 2000, one could not 
avoid the impression that he expected Austrian CI to emerge simply 
due to his mentioning them. Ten years later we can state that, in a way, 
this is in fact what happened: political speeches are performative speech 
acts, if there is enough power behind them. They actually make a 
difference – however vague their contents may be. And vague they 
were, indeed. Morak told us that everybody is creative, that creativity is 
part of nearly every form of activity, that creativity is important for 
economy. He mentioned the White Paper of the Commission with its 
impressive figures of economic growth and employment chances (and 
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he did not mention that evidence for where these figures came from 
was nowhere to be found in this paper), he mentioned the CI programs 
of the UK, and he mentioned the one and only extremely successful 
Austrian enterprise that could be regarded as part of CI, Swarovski 
glass, which produces jewelry and other luxury items out of crystal glass. 
Then came studies proving the excellent conditions for the CI in 
Austria and especially in Vienna, citing a lot of numbers (of equally 
dubious origin as the ones in the White Paper) on the tremendous 
growth rates to be expected in the CI. And, finally, measures to support 
the CI were developed by the Republic of Austria and the city of 
Vienna. 
Quartier 21 
Let us take a look at these measures. One of the most prominent and 
also most contested one was the creation of a cluster of Creative 
Industries in a rather prominent and central space, the 
MuseumsQuartier Vienna. The history of the MuseumsQuartier would 
be a subject for another essay (maybe not a very interesting one, but 
certainly a rather entertaining one), but to make a long story short: The 
MuseumsQuartier is, basically, a complex of traditional arts museums in 
a partly historical building near the city centre. It was founded because 
(1) this historical building had to be utilized somehow, and (2) because 
some big museums in Vienna needed space to show their collections. 
As an English colleague of mine put it: it is a housing project for 
museums. As this is neither a very attractive nor a very trendy way of 
developing a cultural quarter, the MuseumsQuartier needed a fig leaf to 
make it more hip. This fig leaf was the ‘Quartier 21’ offering space for 
contemporary cultural and artistic production and, above all, the CI. In 
this way the MuseumsQuartier could be peddled as a place that is not 
only devoted to the exhibition of creative achievements, but equally to 
their production, that not only deals with cultural heritage, but also with 
contemporary cultural activities. 
In a way, the Quartier 21 fits perfectly in traditional Austrian 
cultural politics as described above, since it is a centralized, top-down 
project (internationally rather unusual for the development of a cultural 
cluster). On the other hand, it also shows the inability of Austrian 
cultural policy to deal with the CI. 
The (state owned) company administrating the whole 
MuseumsQuartier wants to make money in the space of the Quartier 
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21. Therefore it asks for rents – which are subsidized because rents in 
this part of the city are very high, but even with the subsidies, the rents 
are still too high for most small companies starting something in the 
field of the CI. Consequently, it was difficult to find tenants. 
Consequently, quite a few of them had to leave again as they could not 
afford the rent. Consequently, the only criterion for the selection of 
tenants has been their ability to pay the rent. Consequently, no synergies 
between the tenants emerge – similarly to the big museums in the 
MuseumsQuartier, which do not cooperate because they did not move 
there in order to cooperate, but in order to have new, more attractive 
buildings. The tenants of the Quartier 21 do not cooperate for the same 
reasons. 
The location of the Quartier 21 – although it is generally a very 
attractive site – is particularly poorly suited to small companies needing 
circulation in order to get attention and to sell their products. While 
there are many tourists in the courtyards of the MuseumsQuartier, only 
the most adventurous enter one of the small doors to the Quartier 21. 
Public Support for the CI 
Let us now come to another way in which Austrian cultural policies deal 
with the CI, namely public support. The Republic of Austria as well as 
many Austrian provinces and, most prominently, the city of Vienna 
have developed programs to support and further the CI. Probably the 
most important of these programs are the program ‘impulse’ by the 
Republic of Austria and ‘departure’ by the city of Vienna. None of these 
programs is really adequate to the needs of the CI. Applications for 
financing are complicated and time consuming, and, thus, in many 
cases, not manageable for the many self-employed or companies with 
one or two part-time employees, which make up most of the CI in 
Austria. Consequently, many of the supported projects come from 
relatively successful CI companies that would probably have been able 
to develop their products without this support. Although nobody would 
announce this officially, this bias towards the larger and more successful 
CI enterprises seems to be intended. Every study on the CI in Austria 
has shown that most enterprises in the CI have an under-critical size. 
Obviously, the solution for this problem chosen by the city of Vienna is 
not to help these enterprises to enlarge, but to let them die while 
focusing their support on the fitter ones. This strategy is at odds with 
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the proclaimed aim to foster the CI as a economic sector, because in 
this way not many CI companies will, in fact, survive. 
Both programs mainly finance projects. Thus, even those lucky 
enough to be supported for some time are not able to plan beyond the 
time span of their current project. This again can be seen as an older 
feature of Austrian cultural policy implemented in the field of the CI: 
while it seems probable that none of us will live to see the day on which 
public financing for the large Austrian cultural institutions will end, 
independent artists have always had to live from one project to the next. 
And we all know what this means for individual planning, for the 
possibility of having children and so forth. 
From a different perspective again, the program does not fit its self-
defined aims. The internationally unavoidable Richard Florida, who is 
also the godfather of Viennese CI, does not actually make many points 
in his bestsellers, but one of the most prominent ones is that cities need 
a specific infrastructure in order to be attractive to CI people. And 
infrastructure does not develop through project support, but through 
investment in infrastructure. 
GovernCreativity 
If we summarize the points I have made so far, we can state with some 
confidence that Austrian policy on the CI is a failure. Therefore, we 
could expect that the CI in Austria – which were more or less invented 
by cultural politics, after all – do not exist. However, this is not true. On 
a small scale, CI clusters have actually developed in Vienna – one of 
them around the MuseumsQuartier, not in the Quartier 21 but in the 
surrounding streets, in cheaper buildings. Others can be found in 
former industrial buildings, not financed by the public hand but 
developed by the initiative of those working there. People in these 
clusters frequently do not earn enough to plan for longer than a year, 
they almost never earn enough to be able to re-invest in their 
companies; they are usually young and childless, not because the CI are 
so hip but because you have to find something more secure if you 
become older or want to raise children. 
And many of them like their working and living conditions, at least 
for the most part. They feel that they are, in fact, a kind of avant-garde, 
and they pride themselves on not holding a 9-to-5 job (but probably 9-
to-9 self-employment). 
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I presume that, here again, international trends as well as specific 
national situations are the reason for this attitude. For one, it is simply 
the dogma of neoliberal times that is successfully implemented as a 
form of governmentality in Foucault’s sense. ‘Bear the risk for your 
own life and be proud of it!’ Secondly, the paternalistic form of 
Austrian cultural policy has frequently led to a strong and strongly felt 
dependence, not only on public funding or on an entity as abstract as 
the state, but on concrete politicians and their fancies. It is hardly 
surprising that this is no attractive alternative. 
And the concept of the creative entrepreneur trickles down (or 
sideways) into other parts of society, not least of all into the artistic field 
in a narrower sense. While it is officially maintained that the CI do not 
impact classical arts subsidies, parallel to the development of public 
support for the CI, subsidies for smaller cultural and artistic initiatives 
have continuously been reduced. And more and more often, I have the 
opportunity to listen to artists evaluating their own work in terms of its 
commercial success – something rather unheard of in Austria where the 
arts were frequently defined precisely by their need for public support. 
Contrary to what I said before about the failure of Austrian CI 
policy, one could also – and probably more plausibly – claim its 
tremendous success. After all, it is the main aim of neoliberal policies to 
reduce public support in order for the free market to flourish. 
And Now? 
What does this mean for a critique of cultural industries? In which ways 
does it make sense to criticize what is currently happening in Austrian 
CI? If I were still the Marxist of my earlier years, I would introduce here 
the notion of ‘false consciousness’. Alas, from the perspective of my 
older, post-Marxist days, this notion does not really seem helpful. Still, I 
think a general critique of CI as aimed at within this seminar of eminent 
importance: to show (1) in which ways the hype of the CI is deeply 
embedded in a certain political and economic paradigm, and (2) which 
consequences this hype has for the cultural field as well as for society as 
a whole. At the same time, however, I think we cannot simply ignore 
the fact that an increasing number of people work in the CI and want to 
work there. For this reason, I find it equally important to think about 
new ways of political organization and of social security adapted to the 
working and living conditions as well as the wishes of these people. 
Given the strong and one-dimensional tradition of the Austrian welfare 
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state, this is not an easy task. We do not have much experience with 
political organization outside of political parties and traditional trade 
unions. But maybe, at least in this way, it might be useful that the CI are 
an international hype – hopefully, not only neoliberals but also critics of 
neoliberalism will be able to successfully copy models from other 
countries. 
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The Los Angelesation of London: Three Short 
Waves of Young People’s Micro-Economies of 
Culture and Creativity in the UK 
Angela McRobbie 
This chapter suggests that the recent development of the creative 
economy in the UK in terms of small-scale entrepreneurial activities can 
now be understood as three consecutive short waves. This is activity 
undertaken not at company or organization level, but more 
independently by (and here I apply a kind of Bourdieusian frame), both 
(upper) working class and (lower) middle class young people in the UK, 
who have, for a variety of both historical and social structural reasons 
gravitated to the spheres of culture and creativity and have also in effect 
become individualized and disembedded from employment in large-
scale social institutions, thus corresponding with an updated version of 
Bourdieu’s category of cultural intermediaries (Bourdieu, 1984). Of 
course we could put this another way round and see the regulative 
dynamics of the post-Fordist employment environment exerting its 
effect by addressing a certain class strata of young people as now more 
fully agents of their own employment destiny, where in the past they 
would have been interpellated more surely as subjects of state or 
institutional employment, or else (pace Bourdieu or indeed Ulrich Beck) 
they would be a better educated strata of unemployed young people. 
In fact I am assuming for the sake of this short intervention that 
readers are familiar with the value of the Bourdieusian, and Foucauldian 
dynamics in this debate. Here I aim instead to emphasize what is indeed 
entailed when such subjects are called into action, and what comprises 
their activities. This is followed by a parallel analysis of how the New 
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Labour government has developed a rapid response strategy to the idea 
of a cultural economy. New Labour’s cultural policy agenda has been 
both radical and pervasive and is predicated on an outcome which is 
certainly nebulous or intangible in regard to the actual occupations and 
livelihoods which will emerge, but lucid in regard to the logic of 
unburdening both state and employers from fulfilling statutory 
obligations to employees. 
Indeed let me start by saying that twenty years ago it was possible to 
talk about high culture and the high arts, opera, ballet, fine art, classical 
music, great literature and so on, as very separate from low culture, 
meaning popular music, sub-cultural activity like graffiti, style, black 
expressive cultures like rap and hip hop, and also of course popular 
entertainment, including film and television. And of course this 
distinction and the ensuing patterns of consumption also told us quite a 
good deal about how social hierarchies of class, race and sexuality and 
gender functioned in the UK. I am not claiming that there is no longer a 
division of this type between high and low culture, indeed at some point 
we may wish to have a discussion about how new micro-distinctions are 
produced in regard to hierarchies of art and culture in response to the 
creation of new more fluid and unstable positions in cultural labor 
markets, but for the moment such a process can only be alluded to. 
I will be suggesting that when the arts and culture per se, become 
the focal point for capitalization (the logic of late capitalism as Fredric 
Jameson famously put it), when culture broadly becomes absolutely 
imperative to economic policy and urban planning, when art is 
instrumentalized so that it begins to provide a model for working lives, 
and labor processes, and when government opens a Green Paper 
document as it did in 2001 with the words ‘Everyone is creative’, then it 
becomes apparent that what in the past was considered the icing on the 
cake, has now become a main ingredient of the cake (DCMS, 2001). 
And what had been in the past left to its own devices (subculture and 
style, or black expressive culture or the punk avant-garde) has been 
plucked, over the years, from obscurity, and is now promoted with 
tedious regularity under the prevailing logic of revival in the window 
spaces of Selfridges and Harrods almost every season, as a leading edge 
feature of the UK’s contribution to the new global cultural economy. 
Our imagined community and branded national identity now comes to 
be constituted through practices that are understood to be creative. This 
appellation is then deployed in policies which introduce such things as 
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Creative Partnerships1 into schools across the country to incorporate a 
kind of third sector of education and training which is neither technical 
nor strictly academic and into which are slotted substantial numbers of 
young people. We still have no real idea of how this will work out on 
the longer term and what kinds of careers will develop, but this notion 
of creative education emerges as a modernizing and mobilizing strategy 
that will tap into young people’s existing attachment to arts, popular 
culture and contemporary media. This then is where the investment is 
being made, in a perceived immersion in and connection with the field 
of media and culture. 
What follows is to begin with a narrative account of this 
development, with particular reference not to the big media industries 
and communications corporations, and not to the role of government 
and the subsidies which have always gone to national theatre, the large 
orchestras, opera and ballet, but instead to the innovative youth 
subcultures which have largely comprised of young people who occupy 
precarious positions in regard to educational and cultural capital. 
I undertook an investigation of small-scale UK fashion designers in 
the 1990s in the UK. I focused on fashion because it was female-
dominated and a sector which had no back-up from fashion equivalents 
of the music industry, as was the case for young people in bands, nor 
did it have the prestige and cultural capital associated with the fine arts, 
even if that meant earning a pittance and remaining totally unknown as 
a struggling sculptor or visual artist, it still carried more (usually 
masculine) gravitas than being a fashion designer (McRobbie, 1998). So 
I was interested in the popular, feminine and sub-cultural aspects of 
fashion design, but less on the consumption and more on production. 
This research was actually precipitated from my earlier youth culture 
research, I was fascinated by the way in which, as these forms matured 
in the context of post-war UK society, into the mid to late 1980s they 
seemed to create their own informal labor markets. In one short article 
I examined the work of sub-cultural entrepreneurs, the young people 
who were influenced by the post punk do-it-yourself ethos and who 
sought to create not an ‘alternative cultural economy’ in the late 1960s 
sense but instead an ‘indie’ or independent economy (McRobbie, 
1989/1994). And then Sarah Thornton coined the term sub-cultural 
capital, which showed how these forms were able to generate their own 
micro-economies and micro-media (Thornton, 1995). Indeed it was 
within the world of rag markets and second hand dresses that what was 
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later to become the absolute distinctiveness of British fashion design 
emerged, there was it seemed a fruitful and fortuitous overlap between 
the stylish pursuits of young women on the edge of subcultures and the 
wide range of fashion design courses available in every art school and 
small art college across the country thanks to the work of the great 
nineteenth century Victorian administrators, the social reformers as well 
as the advocates of arts and crafts, and then later in the twentieth 
century the pioneers of art and design. There was in effect wide 
provision of education, training and skills for a wide sector of the 
female population from the respectable working class and from the 
lower middle class especially in the big industrial cities like London, 
Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow. By the 1980s and early 1990s, 
this provision in the UK art schools and universities had become greatly 
expanded (more than 5000 fashion and fashion-related graduates per 
annum) but still directed towards the less-privileged school leavers, 
including young women from immigrant families, or girls whose 
parents, mostly mothers, wanted to see them doing a job they enjoyed 
in a white collar or semi-professional/professional environment. 
The first wave of self-generated sub-cultural entrepreneurs who 
were to be found busily inventing styles, sewing in their own kitchens 
and then selling what they made at weekend street-markets provided 
what we would now call incubators for experimenting in creative self-
employment. This ‘first wave’ in my own analysis made an impact as 
young female pioneers of the small scale enterprises during the years 
1985-1995, through close connections with the new magazines also 
spawned from youth culture like the influential Face and iD (by the way 
all who worked on these were unpaid) they gained all the publicity they 
needed to launch hundreds of ‘small labels’ on a cottage-industry basis 
summed up in the phrase ‘I was knitting away night and day’. 
However this burst of colorful activity had success at the level of 
press and media attention but was financially unsustainable leading to 
bankruptcy and debt. These were always under-capitalized, and received 
very little support from government, for example they were not eligible 
for fine art awards. They in fact emerged out of the shadow of 
unemployment during the Thatcher years and the most the young 
designers could expect was a small bank loan scheduled to be paid back 
with low interest rates. Working literally from the kitchen table to the 
small shop or outlet they were not able to manage sales abroad, many of 
them had their work bought from the shop rails but only to be copied 
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by high street retailers and also by bigger name designers in Europe and 
in the US. 
But there was this incredible bubble of creativity and huge amounts 
of energy and also impact between the worlds of fashion and popular 
music at that time. This was also a feminized sector and the young 
women I interviewed also benefited from the impact of feminism in 
schools and in college, in terms of following an independent career and 
equally important they had parents or mothers who encouraged the idea 
of meaningful or rewarding work. Mostly from lower middle class 
backgrounds and upper working class this was the sector of the 
population for whom the idea passed on by parents of ‘refusal of 
mundane work’ was most visible. In his contribution to this volume, 
Maurizio Lazzarato describes this refusal of tedious, repetitive, 
exploitative and mundane work as part of the workers struggle of the 
1970s now extended inter-generationally. We can add to his argument a 
double-inflection, at least in the UK, first a feminist dynamic that 
permits the refusal of under-paid women’s work and its replacement by 
more independently defined work which also becomes a source of self-
realization. Here there is also a hope for a better working life for 
daughters on the part of mothers. For these young women we could say 
new forms of work (what Lazzarato calls ‘immaterial labor’) become 
sites of ‘passionate attachment’. Creative work is a space of romantic 
idealization perhaps more rewarding than personal relationships. And 
second we could develop a very interesting argument here which 
connected Lazzarato’s account of mundane job refusal as a vector of 
class struggle with the Birmingham CCCS analysis of working class 
youth cultures as in effect also playing out at symbolic level the 
sublimated class struggle which the parent culture both buried and also 
transmitted to their children (Hall and Jefferson, 1976). If the latter 
analysis provided (pace Althusser) an account of sub-cultural style in its 
spectacular modalities, then the former helpfully elucidates the 
productive features of these micro-economies. This adds to existing 
analysis a logic of inter-generational class struggle in my own case of 
course inextricably intersecting with gender. 
This moment of the first wave did not last, but the ethos has 
subsequently been extended across a much wider section of the young 
population. It failed really because government wanted the sector to 
understand free market forces and competition. They had to learn 
lessons the hard way, despite advocates who pushed for better support 
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and investment. However this championing by a few people like myself 
was at the time also rather lonely because the old left and the trade 
unionists were not interested in such small-scale activities, they had 
doubts about any progressive politics emerging from these forms of 
self-employment, and indeed they saw such work as self-exploitation, 
based on deluded fantasies of success, or else as small petty bourgeois 
businesses with no politics of solidarity and also unrealistically 
positioned in relation to the predatory high street and the big fashion 
retailers. Nor were academic feminists specializing in work and 
employment particularly interested since their attention was invariably 
drawn to the conditions of working class women in more traditional 
workplaces. So these incubators had little support and by the mid to late 
1990s they were disintegrating and being replaced by ‘second wave’ 
multi-taskers. 
In the 2002 article Club to Company I chart the characteristics of 
the second wave young creatives in the more ‘speeded up’ cultural 
economy in the UK which benefits more directly from the growth of 
new media and the hovering presence of venture capitalists which 
converge in the clubbing spaces of network sociality (McRobbie, 2002; 
Wittel 2001).2 These include a) de-specialization b) hybrid job 
designations e.g. events organizer, arts advisor c) internships, work for 
nothing and job creation from unpaid work d) the night economy 
creating day-time livelihoods with the growth of leisure culture, 
clubbing and party economy, e) the expansion of network and freelance 
culture in the light of big institutions undertaking organizational change, 
shedding the workforce and then taking them back on as self-employed 
f) the growth of London and other global cities as creative centers for 
arts and culture as attractions for the finance sector and for tourism and 
consequently the increase in the labor markets for multi-skilled and 
adaptable young people, g) decline in possibilities for association and 
collectivity in the light of the speeded-up new media and internet 
economy, replacement by network sociality, such as the informal 
grapevine for job search, in the club, or bar, in culture sector districts. I 
argued this is a more thoroughly neoliberalized model. There is hardly 
any need to deal with bureaucracy, and without any of the anti-
discrimination legislation in place what happens is that old and more 
elite and socially exclusive patterns re-emerge and come to distinguish 
the world of second wave small-scale creative economies. Issues of race 
and ethnicity, of gender and sexuality have no space for expression 
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because either it is assumed in this cultural field that such issues have 
now been dealt with and that equality is taken for granted, or else there 
is such competitive individualization that there is no forum, no space or 
time for such concerns to be aired in a public milieu. Hence there is re-
internalization of anxiety, privatized modes of anger or disappointment, 
the must-try-harder ethos, patterns of self-blame in such a hyper-
individualized environment (as Bauman explains) and in addition the 
non-existence of protection, means that new forms of self reliance must 
also be invented. (Where it is normal to be holding down let us say four 
projects at one time, if at least one of them is a contract with a public 
sector organization or agency of the state, then at least there will be 
some minimal workplace entitlement, for example pay for sickness, or 
holiday.) Thus notions of security become not fixated on full time 
employment but sought out in partial or fractional employment. 
The third wave springs into life in the last five years. It bears all the 
hallmarks of the Blair period. It is characterized not by the post-punk 
ethos of the first wave or the party or night-time entrepreneurialism of 
the second wave, but by the Hollywood effect, the winner takes all, 
indeed if the UK has taken the lead from the US in matters of war and 
on the battlefield, so also, in the field of culture and creativity are we 
looking to the US and to the global entertainment industry as the source 
for shaping working lives, the Los Angelesation of London and the 
impact this has for the rest of the UK and for UK isolationism in the 
context of European cultural policy. More significantly the US is also 
looked to for rationalizations regarding the shift towards the concept of 
creativity and its role in the economy.3 Blair’s go it alone agenda is also 
mirrored in the new creative economy. This third wave is more 
nebulous and hard to define, partly because it is so bound up with 
deeper social transformations that involve re-defining notions of 
selfhood and which encourage more expansive forms of self reliance. 
These new more flexible forms of selfhood are institutionally grounded 
in education through pedagogical styles as well as the transformation of 
the curriculum. In the arts, media and culture self-reliance corresponds 
with styles of working on a project-by-project basis. 
The third wave I am attempting to describe typically entails having a 
single project which is one’s own work, a kind of magic card which it is 
hoped will one day come to fruition, but which in the meantime is 
propped up by three or four more mundane and income-generating 
projects. The underlying logic of the third wave is the idea of the one 
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big hit. If the typical arts or humanities graduate leaving university 
needs to learn to navigate her or his way around the world of funded 
projects in order to put together a living (for example, two days editing 
an on-line fashion magazine, two days working as a stylist for a fashion 
agency, one day a week in reception at a gallery) then she will be 
spending also a lot of time networking, keeping doors open for when 
projects finish, and new ones begin. But what she really wants is in fact 
a big hit of her own, something that allows her to position herself more 
strongly and emphatically in this competitive creative labor market. This 
is usually something related to her own work that she will nurture at 
weekends and in the evening. A single big hit is what almost everyone 
inside the creative economy is hoping for, because it can have a 
transformative effect, it can lift the individual out of the pressure of 
multi-tasking and all the exhausting networking this entails. The one big 
hit also provides a facilitating connection between the small-scale 
activities that can be carried out without major investment by the 
independent producer, and the large company sector which are able to 
provide the capital to turn the small original into a global product. This 
projected passage from micro-activity carried out at home or round the 
kitchen table to macro-activity involving key players from the global 
culture industry also functions as another mode of self-disciplining. This 
is most evident in the encouragement on the part of government to 
uncover one’s own potential, to search out the special qualities of 
creativity that we all surely possess. This ethos is a key feature of the so-
called talent-led economy. This shift into third wave cultural working 
relies on a total mobilization of self, so that every ounce of potential can 
be put to good economic use. It requires an inflated degree of self-belief 
that is surely unsustainable. 
The one big hit can mean a variety of things, but in essence it 
produces a ripple effect in terms of widening options and possibilities 
and it also enhances the status and power of the ‘award-winner’ in the 
cultural economy. For the final year student of fashion it will mean a big 
hit with the degree show that lands a short contract job offer with a 
French, American or Italian fashion house, in television it typically 
means one big idea which establishes a niche or a genre, in music it 
means a single track which doesn’t need to make it to the top of the 
charts but will succeed if it crosses over from the dance floor right onto 
the soundtrack for an advert on television (Shake Your Ass by Groove 
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Armada), or indeed as background for any number of gardening or 
make over TV programs (for example, the ubiquitous Gotan Project). 
While the dream of the big hit has always existed (as Adorno 
pointed out in his famous Culture Industry essay) it has in the last few 
years become normalized and located right in the heart of culture 
industry discourse. As London seems to become a ‘one-company town’ 
and as other cities in the UK each set up their own cultural strategy, the 
big hit in the creative sector is conflated with the star system as a means 
of branding a national and international image of cities across the UK 
(for example, Edinburgh is promoted through its association with JK 
Rowling and Harry Potter, Irvine Welsh and Trainspotting, Ian Rankin 
and his detective hero Rebus). The most sought after big hit is 
frequently a novel or diary (following the lead from Bridget Jones’s Diary 
or the more recent The Devil Wears Prada) that will be published and 
then made into a film. There are some examples, which have been so 
unexpected that the author is catapulted into a very different working 
environment from what she has been used to as Lionel Shriver, the 
author of the novel We Need To Talk About Kevin has recently described.4 
Let me move to a conclusion of this discussion of the normalization 
of the exceptional big hit, and the way in which being in search of one’s 
own talent is now the key element of what used to be called labor 
discipline. In the UK at least, this seeking out of ones own creativity, as 
a kind of inner self, is a dominant feature of contemporary 
governmentality. Within a framework of subjects relevant to this 
practice of cultural governance the new self is defined as primarily 
productive and creative, the two become inseparable with the latter 
compensating for the exhaustive dynamics of the former. 
The third wave of creative economy pushes for change also in more 
bureaucratic, rigid or seemingly inflexible and professional institutions 
such as the university. And although more directly experienced by 
people under the age of 45, it increasingly has an impact across all ages 
of working people. The one big hit model is also supremely exportable, 
in projects across diverse institutions it can mean a windfall, the 
guarantee of an extended lifetime of a range of activities in private and 
public micro- and macro-organizations. The competitive ethos that 
underlies the rationale for the one big hit comes to be applied across the 
various sectors as part of a changing regime of accountability and 
auditing. In the context of small independent projects even those 
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funded ultimately by the state, this model normalizes precariousness 
and uncertainty and makes irrelevant formal social relations of working 
life including statutory obligations, it thus permits the by-passing of the 
old order and of protective and anti-discriminatory legislation associated 
with the previous regime of Social Democratic and welfarist provision. 
By-passing is then an instrument of neoliberal reform which under the 
rubric of what Blair calls modernization in effect de-commissions (or at 
least makes marginal, puts into cold storage) the field of statutory 
obligations in working lives.5 This strategy can be seen in operation 
across a wide range of sectors in which government has a role to play. 
The impact of American thinking in regard to the place of creativity in 
the contemporary economy is highly visible and this work emerges from 
business schools where there is a focus on psychology and cognitive 
sciences rather than sociology. However it is the mark of New Labour’s 
highly innovative approach that these ideas are made to converge with 
more conventionally social policies designed to alleviate disadvantage. 
For example the Chancellor’s award of £30 per week to 16 year olds 
from poor homes as a way of ensuring that they stay on at school until 
18 and gain qualifications to take them into university or college, 
intersects with initiatives being undertaken elsewhere in the education 
system to make arts and creative education a much more significant and 
mainstream element of the curriculum, in effect a good reason to stay 
on at school.6 Other activities and proposals also contribute to the 
combination of arts, enterprise and upskilling within the educational 
field, for example Scottish Enterprise, the possible raising of the school 
leaving age to 18, the role of Creative Partnerships in secondary 
schools, and the introduction of new media and arts qualifications.  
These diverse programs and proposals constitute intense activity on 
the part of government, and from then we can begin to discern a kind 
of theatrical effect. Young people are being trained as though for the 
stage, even when working lives will be far removed from the 
‘greasepaint’. But even David Brent, the lead character in Ricky 
Gervais’s The Office, also a global success for BBC TV, sets his aspiration 
well beyond the tedium of the Slough paper company that he manages. 
It is his nighttime career (not so far successful) as a stand-up comedian 
that lifts him out of the limited horizons of office work. The upskilling 
curve also transforms traditionally low paid or routine jobs into 
something more spectacular. 
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The most recent papers and policy documents by the UK 
government on matters of culture and economy envisage remarkable 
growth in the creative sector and also make a strong case for the 
production of complex culture against the dangers of ‘dumbed-down’ 
entertainment (DCMS, 2004). Taken alongside the cultural (rather than 
social) engineering undertaken in the education system to upskill young 
people who might otherwise fail, this strategy also has the intention of 
expanding the middle classes and making them more self-sufficient, 
indeed it may be that this is, at the present moment in time, a sufficient 
outcome, from the point of view of New Labour. This would also entail 
some kind of coming to terms with long term permanently transitional 
work, it would also require higher degrees of self responsibility and the 
internalization and individualization of failure, it would sideline past 
work ethics which as Sennett (2005) has shown value process, craft, 
solidarity and the patterns of the ordinary working day. It would make 
of us all, if not singers, dancers and Spice Girls, then at least individuals 
or subjects for whom unprecedented degrees of self-belief will be 
needed to sustain a life in the new world of precarious creative labor. 
This theatricalization effect is characterized by a nebulous or even 
opaque sense of outcome. Government reports are almost evangelical 
when it comes to indicating the benefits of the new creative ethos in 
education and employment, but there is silence in regard to the actual 
kinds of work that will be created by all of this effort at the level of 
policy. In addition the discourse of creativity is marked in its preference 
for the language of US psychology and its evasion of research and the 
critical vocabularies associated with European including UK sociology 
and of course cultural studies. 
While the neo-liberal effect is not hard to pinpoint in terms of the 
by-passing mechanism referred to above, I would say that there is a 
good deal more to this revolution in the category of work and 
productive activity than the obviously pejorative label neo-liberal 
suggests. Earlier in this article I alluded to the proposal from Lazzarato 
that the desire for meaningful work emerges from a context of previous 
generations of class struggle. We could attach onto this a more 
Foucauldian sense of the desire for new more rewarding work as a 
variant on self-aestheticization, a body politics rendered at the level of 
re-orchestrating the available technologies of self inscribed in current 
practices of governmentality. 
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To focus on such a terrain would be to understand these sites of 
creativity and productive activity in regard to self-employment as 
micrological sites of conflict and tension. What remains of class struggle 
is now deflected onto this field of precariousness. The most apparent 
sign of success on the part of New Labour in the UK, is the by-passing 
of ‘old labour’ and its terrain of entitlement and protection, and in 
addition the newly configured landscape of mental labor as the site for 
the extraction of surplus value on a scale undreamt of by previous 
theorists of labor process, with the added advantage that this now 
entails the suspension of critique in favor of the hope, indeed 
expectation that there will be some tangible reward in such a form that 
will promise both status and security.7 What is also by-passed in the new 
discourse of creative self-realization is the intellectual landscape of 
critical aesthetics certainly associated with the Marxist philosophical 
tradition which of course disputed the myth of genius, which 
undermined the ideology of individual creativity, and indeed which in 
subsequent writing from Bourdieu to Barthes and from Foucault to 
Derrida, drew attention to the inflated place of the author or artist as a 
field of secular belief which among other things devalued an ethics of 
collaboration and a politics of critique. Thus what appears to be at stake 
in the new field of mental labor is the role and meaning of intellectual 
labor, currently being seen as outmoded in contrast to the creative 
energies of the new cultural producer. In such a context this process of 
championing new forms of creative education (for example, the live 
project, the links with industry, internships, the role of creative 
partnerships) also occludes the place of theory, and the space of critical 
pedagogy.  
 
Notes 
1 See http://www.creative-partnerships.com/. 
2 See http://www.nelp.de/beitraege/02_farbeit/mcrobbie_e.htm. 
3 Kim Allen is currently researching New Labour implementation of US 
theories of creativity in the school, training and the workplace. 
4 See various interviews with Lionel Shriver in the UK Guardian and 
Independent. 
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5 This is a polemical point on my own part, in need of further elaboration 
regarding legislation to cover part time working, and the role of the 
industrial tribunal system. 
6 See the PhD by Kim Allen (2005), in particular the growth of Arts 
Academies, performing arts education and media arts provision across all 
sectors of the UK education system. 
7 An example from the academy: write a PhD thesis, then use all the research 
to write a novel. If it succeeds, as was the case for author Sarah Waters, the 
author of among other novels Fingersmith, and Tipping the Velvet, then the 
rewards in terms of BBC TV adaptations can be tremendous.  
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Unpredictable Outcomes / Unpredictable 
Outcasts: On Recent Debates over Creativity 
and the Creative Industries 
Marion von Osten 
Let me begin with a question: how does the currently hegemonic 
discourse of creativity, the creative industries and the artist as a role 
model for the new economy correspond to or conflict with the field of 
cultural producers and cultural activists? To bring out the problem even 
more sharply, I would first of all put in question the assumption that the 
‘creative industries’, about which we are talking and against which we 
are struggling, are already in existence. Are they really there before us? 
Or do we perhaps face a field of political visions that aim to privatize 
the cultural sector in general but have not yet been realized in anything 
like an ‘industry’? I don’t think we can speak yet of an industry as such, 
either in the UK, where the discourse of ‘creative industries’ is 
established and the where cultural production was reorganized and 
repositioned (Davies, 2001), or in Germany, where the Social-
Democratic Schröder government set in motion, with different results, 
a transformative shift toward a culturalization of the economy and a 
corresponding economization of culture (Pühl, 2003). Have we really 
reached a moment in which social interactions and forms of 
autonomous labor open possibilities for making a living in self-
organized ways, ways that at the same time are exploitable by capital as 
immaterial resources? Or do we find ourselves within a transformation 
process in which outcomes are produced by diverse interactions, some 
of which can be said to be industrial, within a cultural field increasingly 
dominated by the interests of capital? Or is there, as many critics since 
Adorno have held, an unbridgeable contradiction in any 
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industrialization of cultural production, insofar as ‘creativity’ has 
nothing at all to do with the sphere of economy? 
In the midst of all of this, I propose that we reflect on our 
discourse. Being in the midst means that there is still space to influence 
and change the discourse, even our own. I would therefore like to 
discuss creativity as a discursive term, in the genealogy of which we can 
see both a process of secularization and the reflected constitution of the 
modern form of subjectivity that plays such a central role in capitalist 
societies. The suggestion that the mass production of cultural goods 
directly contributes to a blunting or loss of capacity is not part of my 
argument. What interests me instead is the symbolic function of the 
debates about creativity and creative industries for the cultural 
representation of political, economic and social processes. In this light, I 
doubt that the so-called creative industries are already here. What there 
is, at least, is a discourse about them and the international will to make 
them a reality as soon as possible. We participate critically in this 
discourse and shape it too. 
With regard to the term ‘industry’, it has been observable in recent 
years – even in this book, in our use of language – that a qualitative shift 
is taking place, that the social and cultural could be transformed by 
processes of partial industrialization and by technology undergoing 
partial industrialization processes and technologies – at least if we do 
not intervene to stop it. Examples of this include the current debates 
about cognitive skills or abilities in general, which the new subject of 
labor in post-Fordist societies should learn or already possesses. In 
these debates, social competence, creativity and intelligence are now 
increasingly presented and discussed as separate, abstract entities. The 
question, what and why and for whom something can be done with 
these abilities, thus appears to be of no relevance. Social and cognitive 
abilities are treated as values and as self-standing resources, resources 
that can be produced and improved by training methods, or exploited 
by capital. But this can only happen if these abilities are conceptualized 
as non-relational and segregated from each other and if they are 
highlighted and represented as entities within scientific and popular 
perspectives. Another example here is the requirement of ‘lifelong 
learning’ that is isolated as a process and emphasized as a value in itself. 
The concept ‘lifelong learning’ no longer asks what should be learned 
and why; instead the process of learning itself, whatever that should be, 
is simply assigned a positive value. So it is not about learning for 
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something, but rather the learning of a readiness to learn, according to 
which the subject is thought of as oriented toward the market and 
increasingly accommodated to changes in conditions. The subject 
conceptualized in this way holds itself in ready dependency to every 
situation and is ‘trained’ in the sense of having its abilities rationalized in 
strict conformity to the moment. It is contingent and dependent on the 
context, and at the same time, however, it is expected to perform and 
make choices autonomously. 
This new conception of the subject of labor, then, is made up of 
fragmented and abstracted cognitive processes that can be treated 
industrially in the future. This process of abstraction and the 
establishment of technologies to improve and optimize cognitive 
capacities can be linked to the key processes and technologies of 
industrialization developed in earlier periods of the industrial age. Then, 
the movements of laboring bodies were abstracted and fragmented, in 
order to synchronize the body of the worker with the actions of 
machines. With Taylorism, abstracted movements became the object of 
research and training, and the rationalization of body-machine-
management relations was fully realized. This newly composed relation 
between body, machine, management and sciences became the 
international standard, opening the way to the full development of the 
Industrial Age and mass production. In this new era, the struggles of 
labor also began to be more successful. The Marxist analysis of capital 
and its relation to labor-power, reflected in the experiences of the 
workplace and in organizations and parties, became an aspect of 
everyday life. 
Against this background, it makes sense to think about the discourse 
of ‘creative industries’ as a technology that aims not so much at the 
capitalization and mobilization of the cultural sectors in particular as at 
the restructuring of relations between the subject of labor and processes 
of valorization, optimization and acceleration. For what is usually 
forgotten in the debates about creative industries is that this discussion 
about creativity and cultural labor has an impact on the understanding 
and conceptualizing of labor, subjectivity and society as a whole. 
Through the vocabulary of creativity and the references to bohemian 
life and work biographies, society is transformed in ways that affect 
policymaking as well as the general political field – and not excluding 
our own discourse. 
Marion von Osten 
 136 
Creator of New Ideas 
Artist-subjects, intellectuals and bohemians are specifically European 
constructs. Since the sixteenth century the creative, world-making ability 
has been regarded not as an exclusively divine power, but a human one 
as well. A mode of production based on a new relation between 
intellectual and manual abilities emerged in distinction from activities 
that are purely a matter of craft. In this sense, the term ‘creativity’ 
included reflexivity, technical knowledge and an awareness of the 
contingency of the creative process. In the eighteenth century, creativity 
was defined as the central characteristic of the artist, now thought of as 
an autonomous ‘creator’ who brings forth the world all over again. In 
the emerging capitalist form of society, the concepts of ‘aptitude’ and 
‘property’ were combined with the traditionally male notion of genius to 
produce the idea of the artist as an ‘exceptional subject’ – the owner of 
an ingenious and exceptional artistic mind. From then on, notions 
about ‘creative talent’ and what it means to ‘be creative’ have served 
bourgeois individualism as a more general description of activity meant 
to transcend or elude economic determinants. The culturalization of 
labor and production has been based as well on forms of image 
production. These forms, which organize a specific regime of the gaze 
through institutional frameworks such as museums, galleries and their 
related cultural discourses, have been central to the constitution of 
national ideologies in the nineteenth century. 
The figure of the artist as exceptional creator of innovations in 
modes of production, notions of authorship and forms of living 
circulates today in various discourses of social transformation. 
Moreover, the classical exceptional subjects of modernity – artists, 
musicians, non-conformists and bohemians – also function as role 
models in European Union debates on labor and social politics. This 
can be seen clearly in Germany and Switzerland – and in the UK, the 
frontline. As Angela McRobbie argues in her influential text ‘Everyone 
is Creative’:  
One way to clarify the issue is to examine the arguments presented by 
this self-consciously ‘modern’ government, which since 1997 has 
attempted to champion the new ways of working as embodying the rise 
of a progressive and even liberating cultural economy of autonomous 
individuals – the perfect social correlative of post-socialist ‘third way’ 
politics. (McRobbie, 2004) 
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In political debates, the figure of the artist – or ‘cultural-preneur as 
Anthony Davies once named it – seems to embody that successful 
combination of an unlimited diversity of ideas, creativity-on-call and 
smart self-marketing that today is demanded of everyone. Subject 
positions outside the mainstream labor force are presented as self-
motivated sources of productivity, and those who occupy these 
positions are celebrated as passionately committed ‘creators of new, 
subversive ideas’, innovative lifestyles and ways of working. Among the 
reasons for this change in values is the fact that, as formerly stable 
institutional and organizational arrangements have been loosened by 
deregulation, the typical, masculine, long-term job biography has been 
eroded. From the perspective of groups oriented toward long-term 
labor biographies, such as bourgeois or labor parties – it now becomes 
difficult to determine how and when to differentiate between ‘work’ and 
‘non-work’ – or even why one should need to do so. The figure of the 
artist seems to be the point of reference for this new understanding of 
the relation between life and work, and for mediating it to broader 
audience. 
In the general political debate in the UK and Germany, support for 
the employed or unemployed depends now on their willingness to align 
working time and lived time ‘productively’, as required. Activities once 
experienced as private now take on economic functions. The ‘labor-
entrepreneur’ must simultaneously be the artist of her/his own life. It is 
precisely this mystification of the subject of exception, the ‘artist’ whose 
way of working is based on self-responsibility, creativity and 
spontaneity, which grounds the slogans of today’s discourse on labor. 
This can be seen in the rhetoric of the Hartz Commission tasked with 
drawing up plans for the structural adjustment of the German labor 
market; in this terminology, the unemployed emerge as self-motivated 
‘freelancers’ and artists, journalists and other self-employed or freelance 
professionals are revalorized as ‘the professionals of the Nation’. 
The classical subject of exception, with its precarious employment 
situation, has thus been discursively transformed into a model economic 
actor. In current managerial and consulting discourses, creative action 
and thought are no longer expected only of artists, curators and 
designers. The new flexible, time-based employees are the customers of 
the booming creativity-promotion market, provided with the 
appropriate advice brochures, seminars, software and so forth. These 
educational programs, learning techniques and tools supply applicable 
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methods, at the same time projecting new potential forms of being. 
Their aim is to make ‘optimizing’ the self seem desirable. Creativity 
training demands and supports a liberation of creative potential, without 
addressing existing social conditions that might pose an impediment. 
On the one hand, then, creativity shows itself to be the democratic 
variant of genius: the ability to be creative is bestowed on everyone. On 
the other hand, everyone is required to develop her/his creative 
potential. The call for self-determination and participation no longer 
designates only an emancipated utopia, but also a social obligation. The 
subjects comply with these new relations of power apparently by free 
will. In Nicolas Rose’s terms, they are ‘obliged to be free’ (Rose, 1996: 
17), urged to be mature, autonomous and self-responsible. Their 
behavior is not regulated by a disciplinary power, but by ‘governmental’ 
techniques grounded in the neoliberal idea of a ‘self-regulating’ market. 
These techniques are intended to mobilize and stimulate, rather than 
discipline and punish. As contingent and flexible as the ‘market’ is, the 
new labor subjects shall be. 
The requirement or imperative to ‘be creative’, to fit yourself into 
the market, relates to the very traditional understanding of the artistic 
production, as an artist’s income is conditioned on the sale of products 
in the art market (a myth that receives vehement reinforcement today). 
But at this point an important difference in the field of the managerial 
discourse comes into play. For failure in the labor market is not 
comparable to failure in the field of art. The artist who fails can still fall 
back on other subject positions and recuperate this failure by 
transforming it. The unrecognized or undiscovered artist can be 
mobilized in every moment of loss, because the absence of success can 
still be legitimated with rationalizations such as ‘the time is not yet ripe’, 
‘quality will out’, and ‘recognition takes time’, (it may even come after 
you are dead). But this myth of the unrecognized, unsuccessful but still-
talented, if misunderstood, artist cannot be easily integrated into the 
managerial discourse. We may have to wait some time for an enterprise 
that would become the object of scientific inquiry only years after its 
death-by-bankruptcy. That hyper-motivated, super-flexible and mobile 
person who just did not land a job in the labor market is not likely to 
get a retrospective in the MOMA, with a coffee table book and a place 
in the hall of fame… after his or her death. 
Still the subjectivity of non-recognition is integrated into the self-
representations of immaterial laborers at large. The artist as a model for 
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the self-representation of the new flexible labor force can be found in 
several recent studies of the Germany business world, and the media 
and IT field in particular. A study of T-Mobile Germany showed that 
the humiliation of a time-limited or badly paid job was interpreted by 
many employees as a transition, a short-term experience that would 
soon be overcome, once the desired job is secured. The path to that job 
may be difficult, but the goal is clear. Contingent subjectivities are 
forming here, for which failures in the free market can be reinterpreted 
as positive individual experiences, and privatization and structural 
transformations in the social, political and economical fields can be 
treated as personal challenges. 
Moreover, the mythology of the artist continues to project the 
image of a particular metropolitan lifestyle, where living and working 
are done in the same place – in a café or on the road – with the further 
illusory possibility of the added enjoyment of ‘leisure’. As Elisabeth 
Wilson has shown in her Bohemians: The Glamorous Outcasts, the notions 
of flexibility and mobility emerge historically from the tradition of the 
‘drop-out’ established by generations of artists who sought to resist 
modernism’s dictums of discipline and rationalization (Wilson, 2000). 
The social status and cultural capital attached to the image of the ‘artist’ 
thus also points to a higher, indeed a more ethical form of work; this 
form of labor has discarded the coercion of disciplinary regimes and is 
destined for something ‘better’. The artist’s studio or ‘loft’ became a 
symbol for the convergence of labor and leisure in everyday life and for 
innovation and the diversity of ideas. In this way, neoliberal ideology 
acquires the aesthetic dimension it needs for full realization, as can be 
seen in office design and living spaces, now become ‘habitats’. Subjects 
are placed in new environments; associated lifestyle opportunities 
proliferate. Shared aesthetic experience, then, becomes an instrument of 
initiation. 
The style of living and working originally attributed to the artist 
promises new ‘urban living experiences’ throughout Europe. Today the 
term ‘loft’ no longer refers only to an artist’s studio in an abandoned 
industrial space, but is applied to almost all the attic conversions and 
building extension projects fashionable in Switzerland and Germany in 
the late 1990s. Since then, driven by the competition for geographic 
advantages in the global market, European labor markets have been 
revamped and city districts enhanced with a culturalized vocabulary. 
Meanwhile, budget cuts in the social and cultural fields are legitimized 
Marion von Osten 
 140 
under the paradigm of the ‘self-reliance’ of cultural producers as 
entrepreneurs (the core concept of the creative industries ideology) in 
this notion of economy based on ‘talents’ and self-initiative. 
Figures of Resistance 
These discourses have not been marginal. Moreover, they have 
consequences for society as a whole. Meanwhile the conditions of 
production are disguised in the surviving remnants of industrial 
production, as well as in art and design and in other precarious jobs in 
the service sector. Despite their economic crash, the IT and media 
industries, which referred constantly to the image of the ‘artist’, have 
become as influential a model of labor as the Taylorist and Fordist car 
industry once was. As shown in the spurious emulation of bohemian 
lifestyles by the IT industry, among other sectors, much remains to be 
learned about a discourse on labor suffused with ‘cultural language’ – 
namely, about the everyday circulation of this discourse, its effects on 
the formation of subjectivity and the relation between adjustment, 
failure and resistance. So far the erosion of the old paradigm of 
production, along with the new working conditions and their reference 
to ‘artistic practice’, have been analyzed almost exclusively from within 
the logic of ‘industrial work’ or in relation to stable labor biographies 
oriented toward white males, the so-called breadwinners of western 
societies. With only a few exceptions, there have been few attempts to 
address the cultural rationale and effects of these phenomena, and little 
attention to the motives and desires of the actors involved. The real 
relations of production involved in the construct of ‘creative’ 
production (self-employed artists, media workers, and multimedia, 
sound, and graphics designers) have been neglected or idealized in these 
optimistic discourses. 
With this in mind, I initiated a series of collaborative studies or 
projects centered on interviews with cultural producers of different 
backgrounds. My investigation began in Zurich in 2002, while I was still 
engaged at the Institute for the Theory of Design and Art, with a focus 
on cultural labour in the self-organized design and multimedia sector 
and its agents. In its cultural and qualitative methods, the study 
attempted not so much to review the political discourse about the 
transformation of wage-labor as to approach it in a new and different 
way. This seemed necessary, in order to develop a theory of social 
constitution that is clearly distinct from the notion of ‘accumulative’ 
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productivity familiar from the materialist tradition. Instead of seeking to 
prove how life is economized, I tried to find out how cultural actors in a 
specific place are attempting to develop tactics or strategies for resisting 
the common discourse. 
So in the spring of 2002, I initiated discussions about contemporary 
relations of production at ‘Atelier-/Büro-Blocks’, a complex of studio 
and office spaces in which the norm is a hybrid cultural production 
combining art, graphics, journalism, photography, multimedia and 
music. Moreover, I myself have participated in production projects 
there. The building belonged to a SWISSCOM company before it was 
sublet at the end of the 1990s to different groups of cultural producers. 
Most of the discussions took place on a floor-level of the complex that 
was leased collectively in the late 1990s by a group of artists, journalists 
and electronic musicians who called themselves ‘k3000’, an 
appropriation of the name of Swiss supermarket chain that had gone 
out of business but had been known for low-priced goods. The k3000 
collective sublet the floor to various producers including multimedia 
and graphic designers, sound and visual artists, and social scientists. In 
one office space, called ‘labor k3000’, media equipment was used and 
knowledge shared collectively. The group Labor k3000, of which I am 
also a member, has been active in critical artistic practices and cultural 
production since 1997. In the late 1990s the division between the artists 
and the designers was still quite marked. In the last five years it has 
become more and more common for critical artists, together with 
activists and theorists, to produce web projects, mailing lists, 
newspapers, videos, project exhibitions, actions and events. In this case, 
such collaborative production is only made possible by the spatial and 
social fabric of the Atelier-/Büro-Blocks, which maintains openings for 
the participation, ideas and skills of friends and colleagues from other 
fields of production.1  
My research led me to revise several of my earlier assumptions 
about transformations in the conditions of production. I had assumed 
that the fields of design would perfectly exemplify the culturalization of 
economy – even more than would critical art practices. But here I had 
to correct myself, because those working in the field of design had 
work-biographies as freelancers and self-employed ‘creatives’ that 
already revealed very different results, and very different kinds of exit. 
And these transformations cannot be attributed solely to the economic 
situation following the crash of the ‘e-economy’. 
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First of all, the interviews showed that the concepts and imaginaries 
involved in office and studio production spaces have already undergone 
a high degree of mixing. In Zurich’s graphic design and art scene, after 
twenty years of personal computer culture, it is primarily the studio, 
rather than the office, that survives as a model of independent 
production. The people I spoke with had by the mid to late 1990s all 
been very active in producing multimedia applications for multinational 
companies or in enterprise branding. It was astonishing to see that this 
situation had shifted a few years later into a common agreement on the 
‘floor’, that one should try to avoid working in this field of image 
production in general and that clients, whoever they may be, should no 
longer be invited into the building, even for signing contracts and so 
forth. 
While multimedia producers and graphic designers shifted their 
orientation towards the ‘studio’, the artists in contrast used terms like 
‘laboratory’ or ‘office’ in their attempts to describe a more collective and 
multimedia-oriented mode of production. As both groups shared the 
same building, the divergence in language seems to have been the result 
of strategic decisions on the part of each group. Moreover, my 
discussions with diverse producers showed, to my surprise, that 
temporary, collective networks were no longer typical among graphic 
and multimedia designers engaged in the production of corporate 
images. The production on the ‘floor’ did not function as a ‘factory’ at 
all, contrary to what Maurizio Lazzarato claims in his canonical text on 
‘immaterial labor’ (Lazzarato, 1996). Lazzarato lays great stress on the 
links between the new conditions of production under post-Fordism 
and artistic-cultural work. He assumes that the characteristics of the so-
called post-industrial economy, with regard both to its mode of 
production and to the relations of living in society as a whole, are 
condensed in the classical forms of ‘immaterial’ production. Even if 
these appear in fully realized form in the areas of the audio-visual 
industries, advertising and marketing, fashion, computer software, 
photography, and in artistic-cultural work in general, and even if artistic-
cultural workers appear as agents and representatives of ‘the classical 
forms of immaterial labor’, the results of my study suggest that it is 
important to draw out their implicit potentials for resistance and 
emphasize everyday tactics in opposition to processes of 
economization. 
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The self-employed designers in the Zurich scene functioned more as 
an ‘alternative economy’ dependent on alternative cultural spaces; in 
these spaces they earned their small but quite adequate incomes. In 
discussions they presented themselves as enclosed studio monads who 
consciously resist cooperation with the ‘branding’ and ‘marketing’ 
systems. They cooperated – and this point makes it even clearer – only 
when in urgent need of money and doing a ‘job’ to pay the rent or fund 
a holiday trip. This group has no political strategy. They did not discuss 
unions or the transformation of society and the conditions of labor in 
general. Instead, they invented a way to make their living through self-
organized, partially freelance relations. 
In the interviews, almost all of them claimed that they did not reject 
a 9-to-5 job solely because this regimentation of time seems paternalistic 
to them, but also because they could not bear either business culture 
and its social dynamics or the idea of having to subordinate themselves 
to a hierarchical working relationship. Multimedia and graphics jobs – 
as I found out in the discussions – also made it possible for (mostly) 
young men to move up in class position. However, these jobs do not 
seem to enact noteworthy transformations in the gender dynamics, even 
if this is repeatedly postulated in labor market policy assumptions. This 
aspect could have something to do with the traditional relationships of 
women and men to technology. On the other hand, it could also be 
influenced by anachronistic assumptions about the ‘artist’ as solitary 
male genius. 
Moreover, the graphic-designer’s self-image increasingly aligns with 
that of the artist (as single author) to this day, allowing him or her to 
discard the image of the designer as a success-oriented craft-worker 
who following the demands of the client. Such self-images are to be 
found in the art-scene as well, where many actors do not appropriate 
the image of the artist in hopes of economic gain but much more with 
regard to social status and a possibility of dorm of social mobility not 
bound solely to money exchange. In the graphic art scene, the drift 
toward the artist’s self-image even draws from the polar opposite of 
economic success – from the tradition of the failed and misunderstood 
artistic subject and its sub-cultural variations, with scant regard for 
whether that subject is desirable to capital. 
The motifs of bohemian life come up not only in the discourses of 
labor market policies and economic success, but also in the field of 
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applied art, where it is used as a social value to distinguish oneself from 
business as usual. Among this specific group of ‘young creatives’ as 
well, precarious working conditions are not determined solely by 
business. In every case I encountered, a way of living was deliberately 
chosen. In other words, freelancing or working independently, rather 
than in a position of permanent employment, corresponds to the desire 
for an enjoyable way of life that is not structured by others – a life that 
is precarious and will never lead to great riches or the social status of 
international fame but which may still lead to a comfortable living. This 
seems a great privilege that most of the people globally do not share, 
and that even some of us over-stressed theorists do not share. 
This cultural ‘niche economy’ only exists because of a still-existing 
alternative cultural scene – alternative networks of institutions which it 
was possible to establish in the wake of riots in Zurich and other cities. 
It exists because unemployment money is still available in Switzerland 
for young people who have just finished their education, and also 
because a network of cultural producers relates to this alternative world 
of cultural spaces, bars and clubs, political initiatives, temporal teaching 
jobs and self-initiated projects. Within these networks, people always 
find ways to generate small incomes and involve other people from the 
‘floor’ or their buildings in their small but real streams of money. Here 
the niche economy must be described as a key factor in cultural policy 
and the specifics of localities. 
Even if the self-understanding and self-organization of an ‘artistic 
subject’ constituted as a kind of historical citation seem to correspond 
to the fantasies of labor market redevelopers and creative industries 
apologists, making this form of subjectivation ‘productive’ for 
economic processes, still the success of this conjunction remains 
questionable in both theoretical and epistemological perspectives. 
Artistic ways of living and working contain forces that cannot fully be 
controlled because they not only engender but also always take part in 
the dissolution of their own conditions. Furthermore, myths of artistic 
ways of life are not at exclusive disposal of human resource managers. 
These myths can also be used by social groups that would otherwise be 
silenced within existing power relations. Historical quotation of the 
artistic subject and aesthetic ways of living cannot serve as a source of 
the measurable data required by economic discourses because the 
production of a context of equivalency between the economical and 
specific forms of life is a reduction of the inherent complexities and 
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antagonisms. In its functioning as ideology, however, it effectively 
obscures this shortcoming. 
 
Notes 
1 On projects such as MoneyNations, Be Creative, Transit Migration and 
MigMap, see www.k3000.ch. 
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Chanting the Creative Mantra: The 
Accelerating Economization of EU Cultural 
Policy 
Raimund Minichbauer 
language edited by Aileen Derieg 
That the creative industries are high on the European Union’s cultural 
political agenda has been evident in recent EU presidencies – the 
United Kingdom, Austria and now also Finland have given it a 
prominent place in their work programs.1 They organized a series of 
conferences starting with ‘The Creative Economy Conference’ in the 
UK,2 followed by ‘Content for Competitiveness – Strengthening the 
European Creative Industries in the Light of the i2010-Strategy’ in 
Austria,3 and ‘creativity.online.fi – European Content and Copyright 
Policy’ in Finland.4 The series was continued in the course of the 
German presidency.5 Central issues in the conferences were intellectual 
property rights and copyright policies, with a special focus on online 
communication/distribution. 
And creative industries has a prominent place not only in the 
context of these presidencies: The European Council’s work plan for 
culture 2005/2006 lists this topic in first position, with plans including a 
study to be organized by the European Commission ‘on ways in which 
creativity, creative industries, and public-private partnerships in the 
cultural sector already contribute to European economic, social and 
cultural potential and thereby to the achievement of Lisbon targets’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2004b: 31). An invitation to 
participate in an online consultation organized by the Directorate 
General Education and Culture (DG EAC) in autumn 2006 explicitly 
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mentions the cultural industries when defining the stakeholders as ‘in 
particular, organizations and individuals active in the cultural sector, 
including cultural industries’.6 
This chapter analyzes an economistic approach that has become 
increasingly predominant, is in danger of becoming a paradigm of 
cultural policies as a whole, and moreover contributes to the 
predominance of the paradigm of creativity in post-Fordist production 
contexts in general. 
I begin with an introduction to the structural setting, within which 
creative industries policies in the EU context are situated, and then 
analyze current developments. Three topics in particular are elaborated: 
the Lisbon strategy as a root; the shift from a policy largely oriented to 
support for creative production (for example, regional policy) to a 
policy of ‘hard law’ regulations (such as those pertaining to copyright). 
The final section analyzes the interconnection between two 
contradictory relations: economic and cultural aspects on the one hand, 
and political competences on European and national levels on the 
other. 
Policy Network 
The aforementioned conferences are interventions in a very 
heterogeneous policy field. EU policies have a relatively long history in 
specific sectors; for example the EU flagship policy field within cultural 
industries – audiovisual policy – goes back to the early 1980s.7 Policy 
strategies explicitly relating to ‘creative industries’ or ‘cultural industries’ 
as a global concept, however, have been developed only since the 
second half of the 1990s. Yet this did not lead to a common definition 
and consistent common policy, but took the form of a highly 
heterogeneous kind of policy network. 
A working paper by Ellen Huijgh and Katie Segers (2006) gives an 
overview of the developments in European and international policies in 
that field. The authors describe EU policies on cultural industries as 
something that was introduced relatively late, as mainly being pragmatic, 
and – due to the lack of a common definition8 – as an ‘amalgam of 
policies’ (Huijgh and Segers, 2006: 7). ‘The documents of the European 
Parliament, European Commission and European Council’, the authors 
observe, 
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do not leave any doubt about the fact that cultural industries contribute 
to the global economic and cultural interests […]. Besides this, one 
never mentions explicitly whether the cultural industries are considered 
as an economic service or a service of global cultural interest […]. Due 
to the lack of consensus on the concept cultural industries the EU 
institutions seem not to be able to adjust their policies to apply the 
existing laws to the cultural industries. (Huijgh and Segers, 2006: 8) 
What Huijgh and Segers evidently have in mind is a traditional policy 
setting, which departs from a discussion about the economic and 
cultural aspects, leading to clear definitions, on the basis of which a 
consistent policy can be developed. Several EU documents also refer to 
such a policy setting, asking for a clear definition of cultural industries 
and/or a coherent policy. However, they do not develop definitions 
themselves and sometimes tend to ‘put the responsibility on the others’ 
(Huijgh and Segers, 2006: 6).9 
This is no mere insufficiency. Culture in EU policy is a cross-
sectional matter.10 To a much greater extent than in traditional cultural 
policy – regarding contemporary arts and cultural heritage – in the 
broader field of creative industries this seems to be an everyday reality. 
Audiovisual and media policy, regional policy, art policy, competition 
policy, internal market policy, including policies on intellectual property 
rights etc., all intervene in this field.11 The different Directorate 
Generals and other political actors analyze the sector from their own 
perspective and intervene in that field according to their own logic. A 
network-like structuring of policy fields can have various consequences. 
In the present case it appears to be very important to the proponents of 
economization that the possibilities for action are not constrained by 
binding definitions and valuations, but to leave these interventions to a 
free play of forces. 
Let us look, for example, at the conclusions drawn from their 
conference by the Austrian presidency: 
Creativity is an important source for competitiveness in a knowledge-
based society, and the application of ICT for content production and 
dissemination is a key factor for the promotion of growth and 
employment. It is important, however, not to see culture and the 
market, creativity and competition as contradictory. On the contrary, 
creativity and innovation need to be present in all policy areas. (Rat der 
Europäischen Union, 2006: 4) 
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There is obviously no interest in differentiating between economic and 
cultural aspects. The striking point about this quote is, in my view, not 
only that the existence of a contradiction between economic and 
cultural aspects is denied, but that this denial is combined with a 
reference to the cross-sectional policy approach and implicitly to the 
heterogeneity of the policy field. The free play of forces integrates the 
sector into the general trend in EU-policy to an ever increasing market 
liberalization. 
The Lisbon Strategy as a Root 
Reading the current EU-documents which deal with creative industries 
or aspects of the sector and looking at which other policy objectives 
they refer to, one always ends up with the Lisbon strategy – either 
directly, or indirectly through other EU documents. 
The Lisbon strategy, as is well known, was formulated in the year 
2000 with the aim of making the European Union ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 
2010 (Council of the European Union, 2000 and 2001). Due to the fact 
that the economic perspectives at the end of the 1990s were quite 
positive and most of the EU member states had social democratic 
governments at that time, the first formulation of the Lisbon strategy 
not only focused on competitiveness in the world markets, but also 
made reference to higher job quality, social cohesion, and sustainable 
development. 
Some years later it became clear that the EU was behind schedule, 
and it became obvious that it would not be possible to reach the aspired 
aims by 2010. An interim report criticized mainly the inconsistent 
implementation of the strategy (namely on the part of the member 
states), and that the aims were too complex to be reached.12 There was 
no critical appraisal of the underlying neoliberal principles. Instead, ‘the 
European Commission and the Council adhered to the basic neoliberal 
conception and tried to implement it in its pure form – liberated from 
all ecological and social aspirations’ (Huffschmid, 2006: 73). In 2005 a 
new start of the Lisbon process was proclaimed, with growth and jobs 
as the two main targets and with a tendency to eclipse all other aims, 
while reaffirming at the same time that social cohesion and ecological 
sustainability must not be attenuated.13 
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There is some insistence behind this new start. This is evident for 
example in the strategic guidelines on cohesion, which state that the 
policy mix in a regional strategy may vary according to the context, but 
the Commission’s governing principle when negotiating the different 
regional and national programs will be their contribution to the 
‘Growth and Jobs Strategy’ (Council of the European Union, 2006: 7). 
Or, even virtually in a tone of exhortation:  
In this context, it is important for the key stakeholders at national, 
regional and local level to rally behind the reform agenda so that 
resources are genuinely concentrated on promoting growth and jobs 
and put in place the necessary partnership networks to that effect. 
(Council of the European Union, 2006: 7) 
There are several links between the Lisbon Strategy and 
cultural/creative industries. One link is the jobs in this sector. 
Interestingly, DG Employment seems to have been the first EU 
institution that became interested in ‘cultural industries’ as a global 
concept. A broader debate was started with a study which was 
published in 1998. (Huijgh and Segers, 2006: 5-6) This paper stresses 
the high job potential of the sector, and it at least also mentions the 
high degree of precariousness and uncertainty of many jobs in this 
sector. 
In later studies and documents both aspects are repeatedly 
mentioned, with an increase in the sheer number of jobs as the main 
aspect for policy intervention (even though this aspect often seems to 
be more evoked in a way that is hardly scientifically coherent, than 
actually based on facts). The aspect of uncertainty and precariousness is 
either simply taken for granted, or possible solutions are sought in 
current neoliberal so-called empowering strategies – education, training, 
including workshops on how to become self-employed. 
The contradiction between high job potential and the lack of social 
security has at least led to some demands in studies – that statistics 
should not just count the sheer number of jobs, but also collect data 
about income, and whether people can live from their jobs, and so 
forth, and also calls for an employment strategy for the cultural sector. 
But these are only very small steps. It may be expected that the topic 
of employment in the creative industries will be even more strongly 
emphasized against the backdrop of the renewed Lisbon strategy. 
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However, taking into account the general tendency of this renewal – the 
attenuation of aspects which go beyond improvement of growth and 
jobs in sheer numbers – the policy approach is not likely to change 
substantially. 
The second link, which is stressed frequently, is the role of creativity 
in the knowledge and information economy. A few years ago, this was 
not a main topic in EU cultural policy. In the Commission’s proposal 
for the ‘Culture 2007’ program, for example, which was published in 
July 2004, the terms ‘Lisbon’, ‘information society’ or ‘knowledge 
economy’ do not appear at all (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004). This might be due to timing; the proposal was 
finalized some time before the new start of the Lisbon strategy was 
officially launched. It may also have to do with content: the program’s 
main aim has been to support non-profit arts and cultural heritage 
projects. Various attempts on the part of special interest groups to 
enforce the implementation of an additional (beyond audiovisual policy) 
support program for the cultural industries (or a budget line within 
‘Culture 2007’) were either forestalled or did not materialize.14 
In contrast to this, the Lisbon Strategy has an important place in the 
mentioned invitation of autumn 2006 to participate in the DG EAC 
consultation. This is also apparent in the questionnaire: ‘Do you see a 
role for culture as a stimulus for creativity in Europe and as a catalyst 
for innovation and knowledge? If so, please indicate how this role 
should be supported at European level?’15 Another current document, 
the Commission’s proposal to make 2008 the European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue, gives one possible answer to this question. It 
states that intercultural dialogue contributes toward achieving a number 
of the Union’s strategic priorities, among others: ‘by including the 
renewed Lisbon strategy, for which the knowledge-based economy 
requires people capable of adapting to changes and benefiting from all 
possible sources of innovation in order to increase prosperity’ 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). 
What appears to be manifested and reinforced here in conjunction 
with the Lisbon strategy is a process that is also generally described in 
relation to cultural policy developments as a transition from policy 
concepts relating to ‘cultural industries’ to policy concepts relating to 
‘creative industries’:  
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Further developments towards a wider context of application led to a 
shift from the concept of cultural industries to the notion of creative 
industries, the understanding of the creativity concept itself moving 
from the activities having a strong artistic component to ‘any activity 
producing symbolic products with a heavy reliance on intellectual 
property and for as wide a market as possible’. (Marcus, 2005: 3) 
In recent developments on the EU level, there seem to be two more 
aspects in addition to this general description. There is the threat that 
this development will not be restricted to creative industries but shape 
cultural policies as a whole (Gleibs and Schmalfeldt, 2005). And there is 
a tendency to go beyond the realm of symbolic products to become the 
predominant paradigm in post-Fordist production contexts in general. 
From ‘Soft Law’ to ‘Hard Law’ 
It seems that in the current discussion on creative/cultural industries, 
references to regional policy are quite rare. For example in the programs 
and materials of the three conferences mentioned at the beginning, 
there are a few minor references to the ‘regional’, but nothing 
substantial. In the ‘i2010’ strategy paper, regional policy is referred to, 
but only in a passage about technical infrastructure and Internet 
broadband access, with the task of ensuring equal technical standards in 
all regions (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a). 
This is a bit surprising – not just in terms of the general fact that the 
major portion of creativity discussions, which are inspired by authors 
like Richard Florida, and the cluster theories mainly refer to location, 
but also in terms of the historical function of regional policies in EU 
politics with an impact on the cultural sector. 
As early as the late 1980s the EU already abandoned the concept of 
regional policies that understands solidarity among regions in the sense 
of a direct compensation/balancing between richer and poorer regions. 
Unlike Thatcher’s regional policy in the UK, for example, the EU 
basically maintained the aspect of solidarity, but it has been a model of 
solidarity based on the concept of competitiveness: a poor region gets 
support with the aim of making it competitive, so that it can participate 
in the overall competition between regions. EU cultural policy and 
cultural support on regional levels have been part of this, and I think 
that in the context of EU policies this was a primary instrument for 
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turning economic aspects into an influential point of view in cultural 
policies (Minichbauer, 2004). 
Seen against this background, it is remarkable that the connection 
between the current discussion and regional policies seems quite weak. 
My interpretation so far is that regional policy has contributed to 
making creative industries approaches an acknowledged part of cultural 
policy at the regional level and is now an everyday reality. At the same 
time, leading EU policies have moved to different levels: from being 
space oriented to the internet, from regional to pan-European, to some 
extent from content to infrastructure and hardware,16 and seemingly 
also from so-called ‘soft-law’ (enabling through support-programs) to 
‘hard-law’ regulations, for example about intellectual property rights. 
Proposed restrictions in the field of intellectual property rights imply 
a certain tendency to criminalize media users and especially people who 
actively promote the free flow of information. The question arises as to 
whether such a development as has been briefly sketched here may 
signal an indication of a transition in neoliberalism from a mainly liberal 
to a more repressive stage (Raunig, 2005). 
These kinds of displacements and re-compositions of policy fields 
also imply the threat that certain policy styles and basic attitudes could 
be transferred into other sectors. This might be similar to developments 
in the mid-1990s, which Christina Holtz-Bacha (2006) has described: 
the increasing convergence of audiovisual media policy and policy in the 
field of digital communication infrastructure led to an import of the 
‘spirit of deregulation and liberalisation’, which had been omnipresent 
in EU action in the telecommunications sector. 
Identity/Economy 
The aforementioned invitation to the cultural sector to participate in the 
online consultation in preparation of the 2007 Communication on 
Culture of the European Commission mentions two ‘main sets of 
objectives’: ‘developing active European citizenship, respecting cultural 
diversity, promoting intercultural dialogue, while fostering a sense of 
“European identity” complementary to other identities’ and ‘the 
economic and social objectives of the Lisbon agenda, and the role of 
creativity in enhancing the competitive edge of Europe’.17 
Condensed into core aims, this means: identity politics and the 
economic aspects of the cultural sector. Both have been among the 
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main objectives in EU cultural policy since the early 1980s18 at the 
latest. In a cultural policy, which has become more and more 
pragmatic,19 these core aims – including the economic aims – are 
increasingly becoming overwhelming today. 
Identity 
At the centre of EU cultural policies are still the national cultural 
identities and at the same time the aim of propounding a European 
cultural identity on the basis of a diversity of these national cultural 
identities (Kaufman, 2003). This forms the foundation for cultural 
action at the EU level in two respects: in the allocation of competences 
within the multilevel political system, and as an ideological grounding. 
In the EC treaties cultural competences have not been mentioned at 
all for a long time. At that stage, legal and political competences for 
culture (at all levels, including the international) automatically belonged 
to the member states, apart from a few first initiatives such as the 
European Cultural City. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) an article on 
culture was included. The main competence, however, stayed with the 
member states, whereas only a supplementary competence is granted at 
the European level – in a complementary manner and only in 
connection with a European added value. 
Gudrun Quenzel has analyzed the ideological grounding – the 
constructions of Europe – as laid down in the legal documents of the 
EC. She states that ‘the conception of a shared European culture and 
different national cultures are not found in explicit contradiction to one 
another anywhere within the legal documents’ (Quenzel, 2005: 138). She 
thus concludes: 
In summary, it is initially evident that the Council presumes 
homogeneous cultures and attributes a territorial foundation to them. 
In the legal documents cultures correspond to peoples and/or nations, 
or they coincide with the borders of these: either nations are the same 
as cultures, or they have a culture. In addition, the field of cultural and 
artistic production is regarded as a representation of nations and/or 
cultures. […] In terms of the integration of national identity into a 
shared European identity, the Council thus pursues the strategy 
returning cultural diversity to a diversity of antecedent European 
culture. The subjects are appealed to as members of their nation, and at 
the same time the nation is defined as an equal part of Europe. 
Through this process, in the appellation as national citizens there is 
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simultaneously the echo of an appellation as Europeans, and national 
identity becomes part of a European identity. (Quenzel, 2005: 159-60)20 
In this context, Quenzel points out the practical problems that in this 
approach the phenomenon of migration is totally neglected and that the 
EU can comprehend states such as Russia or Turkey only as national 
and cultural entities, which are as a whole either European or not. 
In general, the concept of national and European identities is 
completely inadequate in terms of serving as a basis for the 
development of political concepts able to deal with the processes of 
social re-composition that are currently taking place (Nowotny, 2003). 
And although it is evident that the European identity that the European 
Union aims at, is not of a comparably totalitarian nature as the classical 
political identity that the European nation-states developed, the model 
still is one of a territorially defined cultural identity, which conforms 
quite well to the political reality of a ‘fortress Europe’, which 
increasingly closes its borders and tightens laws. 
It is not possible to develop a really transnational cultural policy on 
the basis of this ideological foundation, thus the attempts to this until 
now have been quite weak and undetermined. 
Economy 
In this policy setting, the convergence between economic and cultural 
aspects is a clear objective. Reaching these kinds of convergences, or at 
least making them plausible, seems to be especially easy once the 
‘cultural aspects’ have been simplified to essentialist cultural identities. 
Examples for these kinds of convergences include the European cities 
of culture, which are supposed to contribute to building a European 
cultural identity and at the same time have considerable economic 
impact.21 Also exemplary are the minimum quotas for European 
productions in the television directives, in which the arguments 
concerning a European identity converge with the arguments about 
raising market shares against the superiority of American movies.22 
Yet on the other hand, these convergences are also not always so 
easy to achieve, so tensions between economic and cultural aspects 
remain present as a topic – either in the form of a critique of 
economistic cultural policies, or in the neoliberal denial of the 
contradictory nature of this relation. 
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Partly due to the allocation of competences (culture as a 
competence of the member states vs. for example internal market as a 
competence of the Union), contradictions between economic and 
cultural aspects often take the form of conflicts between member states 
and the Union, especially the European Commission.23 An example 
here is the audiovisual and media policies of the EU, as analyzed by 
Christina Holtz-Bacha (2006). In the early 1980s there were attempts to 
set up a European TV-channel – arising mainly in association with the 
European Parliament. After these experiments failed, primarily because 
there were no proper solutions developed to deal with the many 
languages involves, the EU completely changed its policy, mostly due to 
urging from the European Commission. TV broadcasting was then 
recast as a service, and largely negative integration followed from 
deregulation. Holtz-Bacha’s account of the subsequent developments 
documents the contradiction between the member states and their 
public broadcasting organizations bringing up cultural arguments, 
program quality, and so on, on the one hand, and the European 
Commission on the other, which argues economically in the sense of a 
free market policy in general, and also takes in the arguments of the 
private broadcasters. 
Cases like this seem to confirm the allocation of competences and 
the cultural competence of the member states (which might be true for 
certain aspects of TV policy), but should not be generalized to a setting: 
nation states defending culture vs. the neoliberal Commission. But what 
we can see at the same time is that the practical realization of the 
member state’s cultural competences – in the sense of actually enforcing 
decisions and rules – is much more challenged in this contradiction 
between economic and cultural aspects than it is in the relation national 
and European identities. And this challenge is all the more obvious if 
we take into consideration what was said earlier about the policy 
network. 
In the conclusion of a study, which was commissioned by the 
Austrian Presidency as preparation for their 2006 conference, the 
authors argue that ascribing cultural competency to the member states 
in the European Treaty on a practical policy level does ‘not say much, 
since […] content is a cross-sectional matter, which in many ways and 
respects falls within the competence of the community legislators’ 
(Holoubek and Damjanovic, 2006: 153). They see the new television 
Raimund Minichbauer 
 158 
directive and the developments in the field of intellectual property 
rights as steps in the right direction and conclude:  
A European content policy that is more than the sum total of the 
individual member states’ policies must be clearly identifiable as such. 
European primary law would be the right place for embodying 
democratic and cultural policy guideline principles for a special 
European market model covering important parts of the content sector. 
The ‘cultural article’ in its present form […] does not appear to live up 
to this challenge. […] If, in an open and proactive approach a culture-
oriented European content policy is sought that preserves and 
promotes the global competitiveness of Europe’s content industry, the 
community must be equipped with the necessary regulatory 
competences in the field of cultural policy. (Holoubek and Damjanovic, 
2006: 150) 
In the neoliberal discourse that accompanies these developments, there 
is also a tendency to incorporate arguments that were considered part of 
the ‘cultural aspects’ in functions that are ascribed to the market or 
economic policies. Thus, it is no longer a ‘logic of the market’ versus 
‘broad access to culture’, but rather ‘the market provides broad access 
to cultural goods’. Equally, there is no longer a juxtaposition of the 
‘logic of competitiveness’ versus ‘cultural diversity’, but rather 
‘competition policy basically supports cultural diversity, because it aims 
to prevent the emergence of monopolies’. 
As it has not been possible – nor even really attempted – to go 
beyond the concept of national cultural identities and develop a 
genuinely transnational cultural policy, there is a certain likelihood that 
in the near future the only path in this direction will follow the concepts 
of creative industries. But then it will not be realized as a cultural policy 
oriented to content/structure, but as a cultural policy that is to be 
shifted to form part of a free market policy. 
Conclusion 
The economization of the cultural sector, basically a long-term trend in 
EU policies, has been clearly intensified in recent years. One of the 
driving forces of the actual developments is the Lisbon strategy with its 
‘jobs and growth strategy’ and concepts of information and knowledge 
economy. In terms of practical policy, three fields can be identified in 
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which the EU is especially active: audiovisual, digital communication, 
and copyright policies. 
‘Cultural industries’ or ‘creative industries’ as a global concept have 
also been part of the discussion at the EU level. While there have been 
rapid developments in certain sectors, the impact of the global concept 
was rather limited – at least until recently. In recent years, however, the 
terms ‘creativity’ and ‘creative industries’ (or even ‘creative economy’) 
seem to be proliferating in EU cultural policy. At the moment, it seems 
to be a set of terms that has no clear outline, but exists mainly to link 
the fields mentioned here, in which concrete policy is developed on the 
one hand, and the global concept of the Lisbon strategy or knowledge 
economy on the other. And this corresponds with the general process 
of the increasing economization of the cultural sector. 
Accordingly, I don’t think it would be useful to put the term 
‘creative industries’ at the center of the development of counter-
strategies against the increasing economization in EU cultural policy. 
This term should rather be seen as merely one element among others. 
Counter-strategies can mainly relate to concrete developments in certain 
sectors. For example, copyright policy has already led to broader 
resistance. And the tensions between economic and cultural aspects, 
which are not so easily resolved, open up possibilities for intervention. 
As far as the term ‘creative industries’ is concerned, it will be important 
in the near future to observe whether and how far the proliferation 
continues and which performative effects deriving from this become 
apparent at the EU level.  
 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Therese Kaufmann for discussions that inform this 
chapter, which is the result of a research collaboration between FRAME 
and eipcp. 
2 See http://www.creativeeconomyconference.org/. All web links in this text 
were accessed in October 2006. 
3 The conference-website (http://contentconference.at) was taken offline 
after the conference. A print-publication about the conference by the Arts 
Division of the Austrian Federal Chancellery has been announced. Press 
releases on different panels/topics of the conference are available in 
German on the website of the Austrian EU Presidency 
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(http://www.eu2006.at/de/Meetings_Calendar/Dates/March/0203Conten
tforCompetitiveness.html), including a few texts in English. Holoubek and 
Damjanovic, 2006, is a study commissioned by the Arts Division in 
preparation for the conference. 
4 See http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Tapahtumakalenteri/2006/07/creativity_ 
online.html. 
5 The Conference ‘Kultur- und Kreativwirtschaft in Europa – Kohärente 
Politik in einer globalen Welt’ was held in Berlin in 2007; see 
http://www.european-creative-industries.eu/. 
6 The invitation appeared on the European Commission’s Culture website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/communication/consult_en.html. 
7 Two other fields in which the EU is especially active are digital 
communication and copyright policies. For an overview of the 
developments in EU media and audiovisual policy, see Holtz-Bacha, 2006. 
The early 1980s marked the start of audiovisual media policy, while first 
regulations in the field of film production were already determined as early 
as the 1960s (Holtz-Bacha, 2006: 68, 258). 
8 Huijgh and Segers note the problem that different political actors use the 
same terms and so seem to refer to the same subject, but in fact interpret 
the terms quite differently. Beyond this, the terms ‘creative industries’ and 
‘cultural industries’ are only used to a certain extent. For example, the terms 
do not occur at all in many relevant documents on current programs for 
regional and structural funding. (See for example Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006.) The Austrian Presidency in their 
conference, while using also the term ‘creative industries’ to a certain extent, 
focused their inquiry/argumentation on the term ‘content’ – in its neoliberal 
meaning which effectively and lastingly dissociates cultural contents from 
societal, political and communicative contexts and makes it utilizable for 
economic exploitation beyond creative production, including information 
services. Cf. Holoubek and Damjanovic, 2006: 20. 
9 They go on to write:  
[The] European Parliament doesn’t want to formulate a definition for 
the cultural industries on its ‘own initiative’ (European Parliament, 
12/05/2003, 22/04/2003, 14/07/2003). But in its resolution of the 
4th of September 2003 on the cultural industries the Parliament 
requests the European Commission to come up with a definition 
(European Parliament, 04/09/2003: point (1)). Meanwhile the 
European Commission’s opinion group on cultural industries stresses 
that it did opt for not defining the cultural industries (European 
Commission, 28-29/01/2004: 1). (Huijgh and Segers, 2006: 6) 
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10 Clause 4 of Article 151 of the Treaty asserts: ‘The Community shall take 
cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this 
Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its 
cultures’. For an analysis of Article 151, see Kaufmann and Raunig, 2003: 
18-23. Also important in the context of increasing economization of the 
cultural sector is the impact of this regulation on the level of practical 
fundraising for cultural projects: interest groups and networks in the 
cultural sector had claimed for a long time that the inadequate budget for 
the predecessor funding programs of ‘Culture 2000’ should be significantly 
increased. This demand was not met, and in this context Clause 4 had the 
effect of increasingly pushing cultural operators to apply for funds in other 
– much more economically oriented – programs, especially in regional and 
structural funds. 
11 This is also evident in the questionnaire which was used by DG EAC for 
the consultation mentioned above:  
In your opinion, which are the Community policies and their specific 
aspects that have the greatest impact on the activities of the cultural 
sector at European level or to which the cultural sector could make 
an important contribution? How are you affected by these policies, 
which developments in these policies could contribute to the 
development of your sector and its cross-border activities, what might 
this contribution consist of, serving which specific aims and with 
which partners? Have you identified any concerns or difficulties in 
relation to these policies? Which European developments could 
facilitate the involvement of your sector? 
Please rank the policies or policy areas in decreasing order of priority 
and indicate, if necessary, their specific aspects (max. 500 characters): 
Agriculture, Audiovisual and Media, Civil Society, Competition, 
Culture, Customs Union, Economic and monetary union, Education 
and Training, Employment and Social affairs, Enterprise and 
Industry, Environment, Freedom, security and justice, Information 
Society, Internal Market, Maritime Affairs, Regional policy, Research, 
Development, Technology and Innovation, Sport, Taxation, Trans-
European networks, Transport, Youth, Development, Enlargement, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, External assistance, External trade, 
Foreign policies.  
The questionnaire is online at http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/ 
communication/pdf_word/questionnaire_en.doc. 
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12 See the report of the High Level Group, chaired by Wim Kok (Council of 
the European Union, 2004a). 
13 ‘The European Council took on the core issues of this proposal, which does 
not contain any new economic policy ideas, for the spring summit in March 
2005. It neutralized these issues, however, by indicating several times in its 
final communiqué that the new priorities for growth and employment must 
not lead to an attenuation of social cohesion and ecological sustainability. 
Nevertheless, this is seriously misleading; attenuation is indeed the core of 
the recommendations from the Kok report and the Commission paper. 
Growth and employment are the aim and nothing else. The Council 
accepted both documents and undermined them at the same time with 
attenuations, but without putting a different economic policy conception in 
their place. The “Conclusions of the Presidency” document neoliberal 
helplessness’ (Huffschmid, 2006: 85). 
14 From this former broader coalition, it is mainly the music industry that 
keeps up lobbying. See for example the website of the ‘European Music 
Office’: http://www.musicineurope.org/presentation/objectives.html. 
15 See ‘The 2007 Communication on culture’, online at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
culture/eac/communication/comm_en.html. 
16 Several EU documents, for example Commission of the European 
Communities, 2005, give the impression that the main focus of European 
policy is the development of communication infrastructure, and in a second 
step, European content is required in order to enable the attainment of full 
economic returns. 
17 See footnote 15 above. 
18 ‘The presentation of the European documents by E. Colombo and H.-D. 
Genscher in 1981 marks the beginning of a third, not yet completed phase, 
the main characteristic of which is the start of a genuine cultural action 
founded on economic argumentation moving closer to a redefinition of 
cultural identity, but limited to the audiovisual sector and the field of 
education.’ (Dumont, 1994: 126) 
19 This is also evident when comparing the ‘Culture 2000’ program and its 
successor ‘Culture 2007’. See Minichbauer, 2005. 
20 Quenzel also speaks of a ‘split of national identity into a potentially 
European part and another that is pushed into the background and cannot 
be integrated’ (2005: 138). 
21 Quenzel, 2005: 270. The European Capital of Culture program was started 
in 1985, and the cities chosen as capital of culture in the first years were 
cities that already had an international profile as cultural cities, like Athens 
or Paris. But in 1990 the UK made Glasgow European Capital of Culture, 
based on an argumentation referring to urban development, cultural 
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tourism, the context of public-private partnerships etc. Glasgow led to a 
reversal in trend, and these arguments became hegemonic in later 
discussions and decisions about cultural capitals. 
22 But this cannot be interpreted as a convergence in a broader picture – 
taking into account the whole television directive –, since deregulation and 
commercialization suggest that the broadcasting corporations should work 
with the financially more competitive US products. See Dumont, 1994: 127. 
23 The EU has developed political procedures for these kinds of 
contradictions. There have been processes of permanent negotiations for a 
long time, and it seems that the implicit tendency of this is that 
compromises between free market policies and essentialist identity politics 
are being developed, while other political/societal aspects of the cultural 
sector are being marginalized in political discourse at the same time. 
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Culture Industry and the Administration of 
Terror 
Gene Ray 
‘Enjoy your precarity!’1 This is the command behind the bubbling 
ideological re-descriptions and compensating revalorizations of the so-
called creative industries. The contributors to this volume show this 
well, through analyses in various critical modes and keys and with 
regard to various national contexts. If such a command is to stick, it 
needs appeal, allure, mystique. The figure of the artist as creative rebel, 
dusted off and shined up, seems to do the trick. In the new imaginaries 
of post-Fordist cognitive capitalism, the old categories of autonomy and 
creativity are jolted back to life and luster. On the subjective level, it’s all 
about moods, fantasies and libidinal investments. Self-exploitation can 
be hip, if deep knee-bends are performed to an appropriate sound track. 
It really is possible to find freedom in unfreedom, correct living in the 
false, if only you look for it in the new and approved ways. How much 
potential for resistance comes with these shifted productive relations 
and this readjusted subject of labor is a matter of some dispute, even 
between the covers of this book. 
In any case, trends in the labor market, characterized by a painful 
intensification of precarity, dependency and demoralization, are 
evidently a firmly established aspect of the contemporary social process, 
even if claims about post-Fordist production arguably are more 
applicable to certain sectors in the Global North than generalizable as 
capital’s new avant-garde.2 Such shifts clearly have a material basis, not 
least in the dominant position capital has for decades held in the global 
force field. Neo-liberalism may be more than ever exposed by the 
current economic and biospheric meltdowns. But whatever legitimation 
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crisis it suffers as a result, the social processes this hegemonic ideology 
was shaped to cover and justify are proceeding apace; with regard to 
policy and state interventions, this aggressive, offensive posture in the 
class war against labor has ceded hardly any momentum at all. In 
Europe in 2010, misery is advancing under the sign of an ‘austerity’ 
aiming to protect finance capital and mop up the remnants of organized 
labor-power. ‘There is no alternative’ is still the official mantra of the 
day.  
How are we to explain this remarkable intransigence of capital in its 
neo-liberal posture? The classical balance of forces framework offers a 
sobering optic. It suggests that capital can go on wreaking such havoc 
because labor as an organized counter-power has been decomposed and 
pulverized. The reasons for this de-organization are debatable. Is it due 
to decisive defeats and co-optations – the result of a cumulative 
overpowering? Or is it rather attributable to deep shifts in the 
organization of social production, shifts in which labor has actively 
participated, by its selective resistance and exodus? But even the latter 
appears more and more as another form of defeat today, as the real and 
continuing costs of labor-power’s weakness in relation to capital 
relentlessly come to light. 
Back to Benjamin and Adorno then, back to the melancholy of 
impasse? Old school, no doubt, but a measure of Frankfurt pessimism 
is bracing corrective to an optimism become foolish. It is a willful gaze 
that can take in the last century and still see progress. Such a return 
would not be unproductive in this context, either, for as several authors 
in this volume remark, the discourse of creative industries is premised 
on a neutralizing appropriation of Adorno’s critical category of ‘culture 
industry’. This category certainly poses the problematic of subjectivity. 
But it also gives heavy weight to the dominant tendencies of objective 
reality. It is this second aspect that is sometimes discounted in even 
critical responses to the celebration of creative industries. Over the 
course of the 1950s and 1960s, Adorno came to see ‘administration’ and 
‘integration’ as the decisive immanent tendencies of late capitalism. 
Both, it will be shown, are inseparably bound up with the category of 
terror, which has to be a part of any adequate account of the global 
social process that dominates life today.  
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The Stakes of Culture Industry 
Discussions of culture industry typically begin with the famous chapter 
from Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. There, the 
tendencies and processes engulfing ‘culture’ – ‘tendencies which turn 
cultural progress into its opposite’ (2002: xiii) – are registered across 
‘philosophical fragments’ emplotting ‘the tireless self-destruction of 
enlightenment’ (2002: xiv; 2003: 1): Enlightenment, the dream suicided 
by society. The liberation of man from a dominating ‘nature’ is 
converted into the class domination of man by man, and this dialectic 
takes catastrophic and genocidal turns under late capitalism, as the nets 
of the social whole tighten. The rationalized production of cultural 
commodities for mass consumption reinforces culture’s affirmative 
ideological functions in a vicious spiral. Spaces for critical autonomy 
tend to be squeezed out and critical capacities atrophy, leaving 
conformity and resignation as the paths of least resistance. In a hostile 
takeover and permanent occupation of leisure time, the exploitative 
social given advertises itself unceasingly. Mass culture, as Adorno puts it 
in the continuation of the chapter, becomes ‘a system of signals that 
signals itself’ (Adorno, 2001: 82).3 Culture industry denotes the 
dominant logic of cultural ‘goods’ that are impressively varied and 
apparently free of direct censorship, but which nevertheless exhibit a 
strong tendency toward uniformity. In this they mirror the logic of the 
global social process, that persistence in domination that Adorno in 
1951 described vividly as ‘the ever-changing production of the always-
the-same’ (Adorno, 1976: 13-14; 1992: 23; cf. Adorno, 2001: 100). 
The culture industry chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment was only a 
preliminary formulation of this thesis, however. Adorno offered some 
important elaborations of the argument in the 1960 essay ‘Culture and 
Administration’ and ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’, from 1963. 
Additional glosses and remarks in passing can be found throughout his 
texts of the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the published book chapter 
represents only the jointly edited first half of a longer manuscript 
drafted by Adorno; in the 1944 mimeograph edition circulated to 
Frankfurt Institute members, the chapter ends with the line ‘To be 
continued.’ The unedited remainder was published posthumously in 
1981, under the title ‘The Schema of Mass Culture’. 
The additional writings do not greatly change the argument and 
certainly do not retract the conclusions. But the clarifications and 
Gene Ray 
 170 
elaborations they offer get in the way of writers wishing to dismiss 
those conclusions too easily, on the grounds that changes since have 
made them obsolete. In the new preface to the 1969 edition of Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge that time does 
not stand still; processes change as they unfold. But they insist that the 
tendency they pointed to continues to hold: 
We do not stand by everything we said in the book in its original form. 
That would be incompatible with a theory which attributes a temporal 
core to truth instead of contrasting truth as something invariable to the 
movement of history. The book was written at a time when the end of 
the National Socialist terror was in sight. In not a few places, however, 
the formulation is no longer adequate to the reality of today. All the 
same, even at that time we did not underestimate the implications of the 
transition to the administered world. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 
xi; 2003: ix) 
The general tendency or immanent drift of the global process has not 
changed, because the capitalist logic that grounds and generates it 
remains in force. This general tendency is the essence of capitalist 
modernity, which unfolds through all the dynamic processes that are its 
concrete appearance-forms. It holds, so long as the social world is a 
capitalist one. 
In ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’, Adorno recalls that he and 
Horkheimer chose the term ‘culture industry’ not only to express the 
paradoxical merger of an at least quasi-autonomous tradition with its 
opposite. They also aimed to critique the concept of ‘mass culture’, with 
its implication of an authentically popular culture: ‘The customer is not 
king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject but its 
object.’ (Adorno, 1973: 60-1; 1991: 99) Adorno does not hesitate to 
reaffirm the tendency at work. The production and consumption of 
commodified culture ‘more or less according to plan’ tends to produce 
conformist consciousness and functions in sum as ‘a system almost 
without gaps’: ‘This is made possible by contemporary technical 
capacities as well as by economic and administrative concentration.’ 
(1973: 60; 1991 98)  
The term ‘industry’, then, refers to the market-oriented rationality or 
calculus that drives all aspects of the processes involved. It registers the 
fact that there is a master logic, operative through technical 
developments and shifts in particular processes: 
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Thus, the expression ‘industry’ is not to be taken too literally. It refers 
to the standardization of the thing itself – such as that of the Western, 
familiar to every movie-goer – and to the rationalization of distribution 
techniques, but not strictly to the production process. (Adorno, 1973: 
62-3; 1991: 100) 
The production processes themselves often still involve the input of 
individuals who have not been entirely severed from their means of 
production and who may be celebrated as stars – or today’s ‘creatives’. 
But their contributions are still integrated according to the logic of 
valorization and accumulation that dominates commodified culture: 
It [culture industry] is industrial more in a sociological sense, in the 
incorporation of industrial forms of organization even when nothing is 
manufactured – as in the rationalization of office work – rather than in 
the sense of anything really and actually produced by technological 
rationality. (Adorno, 1973: 63; 1991: 101) 
It is no refutation of the culture industry thesis, then, simply to point to 
this or that aspect of the cultural field today and note how aged and out 
of date those old examples from the 1940s have become. If micro-
enterprises are the norm in today’s creative industries, this means little if 
their very existence is an effect of technology and ‘economic and 
administrative concentration’. The internet feels like freedom, but 
Google and Verizon can still decide together how they will undo the 
principle of net neutrality.4 Nor will it suffice to point to counter-
tendencies, local or not, if these do not displace the master logic; over 
time, generally if not in every case, the dominant tendency wins out, so 
long as it is dominant.   
To refute the argument, it would be necessary to show that the 
overall drift or tendency no longer holds – or never did. The issue at 
stake is manipulation: the restriction, impoverishment and seduction of 
consciousness. Are the gaps, in which autonomous subjects can emerge 
and from which practices of critical resistance might produce real 
effects, still closing? Or are these gaps of autonomy expanding now, as 
some claim, indicating a reversal of the trend? How are autonomous 
subjects formed, anyway? What are the conditions of their formation 
and, if they are to be considered as ‘actors’ in a cultural field, what 
freedom of action is actually theirs? 
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Here, of course, the argument of culture industry clashes with 
theoretical orientations firmly established in academe in the wake of 
1968. Rejecting Frankfurt pessimism, the new disciplinary hybrid of 
cultural studies took aim at the manipulation thesis. The dominated 
classes are not the passive objects of manipulation, it was countered; 
even as consumers, they find ways to express their resistance to control 
and exploitation. From one angle, scholars such as Edward Thompson, 
Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall insisted in Marxist terms on the 
existence of cultures of popular resistance, even within the forms of 
dominant culture. In a different vector, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, and Michel de Certeau became new reference points 
for an end-run around the manipulation problem that rejected the 
Marxist conception of social power; in this approach, the forms or 
modes of subjectivation constituted by specific relations of power gain 
priority over macro structures of exploitation and direct repression. 
How far do such retorts and re-conceptions really come to grips 
with Adorno’s dialectic of subjectivation and the dominant objective 
tendency? In answering this question, we need to avoid caricatures and 
straw-arguments. Whatever the rhetorical hyperbole of certain 
formulations, Adorno does not argue that the consumers of mass 
culture are merely passive slaves invariably doomed to eternal 
reification. He is careful to acknowledge that gaps and openings for 
critical autonomy still exist. The argument is that the dominant process 
is systematically reducing such gaps and that the constriction is well 
advanced; those critical and autonomous subjects who do emerge are 
increasingly blocked from any practice that could change the dominant trend 
or aim radically beyond it. In this sense, the system is ‘totalizing’.  
But totalizing does not and cannot mean totalized, as in actualized 
with an exhaustive completeness that would, once and for all, eliminate 
every gap and permanently block critical subjects from ever emerging 
again. This is a basic point of Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ and of his 
critique of Hegel. Social systems tend toward closure, but they can only 
actualize closure through the final solution of genocidal integrations and 
subsumptions; the once-and-for-all of global closure would simultaneously 
eliminate the conditions of the system itself, which cannot do without 
the subjects it needs to activate, mobilize and control. The catastrophic 
aspect of late capitalism is that techno-power and so-called Weapons of 
Mass Destruction make the literal suicide of enlightenment a real 
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historical possibility for the first time – this is where terror will have to 
come in, and will do later in the essay.  
The point about subjectivation, however, is that there are chains – 
there are objective constraints that function as obstacles to subjective 
autonomy and limit what subjects can do with their autonomy. The 
problem is not exhausted in the question, why do people choose their 
own chains (or: give their consent to the hegemonic culture). Some may 
do so as the result of an economic calculation, or a specific fear, or the 
compensatory enjoyment of more unconscious repressions. But the 
high stakes of the culture industry argument are in the claim that the 
objective tendency reaches far back into the processes by which 
subjects are formed. ‘Pre-formed’ subjects begin to emerge, who no 
longer even recognize this choice – yes or no to their chains: 
The mesh of the whole, modeled on the act of exchange, is drawn ever 
tighter. It leaves individual consciousness less and less room for 
evasion, pre-forms it more and more thoroughly, cuts it off a priori as it were 
from the possibility of difference, which is degraded to a nuance in the 
monotony of supply. (Adorno, 1976: 10; 1992: 21, translation modified, 
my italics) 
The modes and processes of subjectivation are a proper focus, then, for 
the forms and qualities of subjectivity are precisely what are at stake. 
But these modes and processes of formation are themselves shaped and 
constrained in ways that cannot be avoided or dismissed: ‘Society 
precedes the subject’ (Adorno, 1975: 132; 1995: 126). Subject-centered 
approaches are premised on the possibility of intervention into the 
modes of subjectivation. This entails the freedom and autonomy 
required to refuse an imposed or offered form of subjectivity, for 
example by withdrawing from a specific relation of power and 
domination. But how free are existing subjects? Are they masters of 
destiny who can do what they want, regardless of objective factors and 
forces? That hardly seems likely, and if they are not, then there is no 
reason to think Adorno has been answered or refuted.  
Some post-structuralist approaches to subjectivation risk one-sidedly 
discounting the headlock of the objective – the constraints imposed by 
prevailing structures, conditions and tendencies. There is an implicit 
voluntarism in the assumption that subjects can simply refuse and leap 
out of every subjugating relation of power or de-link themselves at will 
from the forms of dominated subjectivity that correspond to such 
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relations. (If they could, things would presumably be much different.) 
Adorno is clearly arguing against such voluntarism. But it would be a 
distortion of Adorno’s position to attribute to him some version of 
absolutized passivity and servility. For him, critical autonomy is the 
necessary subjective vector of emancipation. Critical subjects can still 
emerge, but only through the hard mental work of self-liberation – 
against the processes and dominant tendencies of which the culture 
industry is an ideological mediator. This becomes increasingly 
improbable as critical capacity is systematically attacked, undermined, 
blocked and repressed. Unlikely but still possible: Adorno also insists it 
cannot be excluded. Individual subjects can through their own efforts 
break the spell and see through the mirages of social appearance. While 
the conditions of autonomy objectively dwindle, its subjective condition 
remains the subject’s own desire for liberation.  
Consider the ending of the full, extended version of the culture 
industry chapter: 
The neon signs that hang over our cities and outshine the natural light 
of the night with their own are comets presaging the natural disaster of 
society, its frozen death. Yet they do not come from the sky. They are 
controlled from the earth. It depends upon human beings themselves 
whether they will extinguish these lights and awake from a nightmare 
that only threatens to become actual as long as men believe in it. 
(Adorno, 1991: 96)5 
Taken out of context, these lines could even leave an impression of 
idealistic voluntarism. But there is too much continual emphasis 
elsewhere, indeed throughout, on the objective domination of the 
global social process to warrant any such precipitous reading. The 
aporia is not that subjects cannot, here and there, break the spell, but 
rather that the conditions for a critical mass of such subjects, and thus for 
a passage to strategic social transformation, are evidently blocked.  
Relative Autonomy, Resistance and Struggle 
The problem with the culture industry argument is that, even if it 
reflects a sober and basically accurate estimation of social forces and 
tendencies, its pathos of pessimism threatens to become paralyzing. It 
tells us why there is less and less space for resistant subjects and 
practical resistance, without telling us what can be done about it. We are 
called to stand firm and seek whatever vestiges of critical autonomy are 
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left to us, but at the same time we are told why this cannot possibly alter 
or transform the status quo. If critical theory does no more than reflect 
the given double-bind, then it too fosters resignation and contributes to 
the objective tendency it would like to critique. The heliotropic 
orientation toward praxis in late Frankfurt theory has wizened too 
much. The resistant subject (even qua object of exploitation and target 
of manipulation) cannot be less stubborn and intransigent than the 
agents of its systemic enemy.  
One way out of the theoretical impasse opens up by pushing the 
notion of autonomy – not the mystified autonomy that returns in the 
discourses of creative industries, but the potential that is actually ours. 
Pure autonomy, we can agree, is a myth. For ‘autonomy’ we have to 
read ‘relative autonomy’. The culture industry subverts artistic 
autonomy and tends to absorb it, but never does so entirely. Relatively 
autonomous art, holding to its own criteria and to the historical logics 
of its own forms, goes on – and insofar as it does, it remains different 
from the merely calculated production of cultural commodities. Such an 
art shares the social guilt and is always scarred by the dominant social 
logics it tries to refuse. Still, by its very attempts at difference, it 
activates a relative autonomy and actualizes a force of resistance. In 
comparison, the culture industry has less relative autonomy; there 
capital holds sway much more directly. But even in the culture industry, 
there is some relative autonomy to claim and activate. Even Adorno 
acknowledges as much in his discussion of individual forms of 
production in ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’. Although certain 
cultural commodities are produced through technical processes that can 
properly be called industrial, there is still a ‘perennial conflict between 
artists active in the culture industry and those who control it’ (Adorno, 
1973: 63; 1991: 101). 
Absolute autonomy is a sublime mirage. But so is its opposite. The 
absence of autonomy is slavery. But its utter absence, the elimination of 
even potential autonomy, would be absolute, totalized slavery – a 
closure impossible, short of global termination. Relative autonomy, 
then, is both the condition of resistance and the condition that actually 
obtains most of time. What varies – in the specifics of place, position 
and conjuncture – is the extent and kind of relative autonomy. This 
granted, we regain a focal point for possible practices of resistance. The 
culture industry, we can now see, may operate according to a dominant 
logic, but the operations of this logic cannot exclude all possibilities for 
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resistance. The culture industry is not utterly monolithic, any more than 
the capitalist state is. It too is fissured by the tensions and antagonisms 
that plague any hierarchical system; it too mediates and condenses the 
social force-field, as a ‘crystallization’ of the forces in class struggle, as 
Nicos Poulantzas would have put it. To continue this analogy, the 
culture industry is neither an object-instrument of capital with zero 
autonomy nor a neutral, domination-free system in which actors can do 
anything, without regard for the power of capital. Obviously the 
institutional nexus of culture industry is also very different from the 
nexus of the state, but that difference can also be thought of as a 
difference in kind and degree of relative autonomy.  
Such a focus brings back into view the class war of position and 
reopens the struggle for hegemony. It is compatible with the Frankfurt 
account, remembering the latter’s caveats about the impossibility of full 
systemic closure. And in re-posing the linkage of resistant practices and 
radical aims, it goes beyond Frankfurt pessimism, without lapsing into a 
naïve voluntarism or pretending that there are no grounds for worry. 
The project of subjective liberation is bound to the liberating 
transformation of the objective whole, the global process. For that aim, 
the unorganized league of impotent critical subjects is clearly 
inadequate. Even within spheres of relative autonomy, individual or 
cellular micro-resistance remains merely symbolic and token, if it cannot 
organize itself as a political force capable of gaining and holding a place 
in the balance.6 In the current weakness, the need is to recompose, 
reorganize and link struggles, through practical alliances and strategic 
fronts. Easier said than done, but concrete aims stimulate the search for 
strategies. Pessimism may be justified but need not freeze us: even in 
the culture industry, there is always something to be done. 
Terror, Culture and Administration 
For Adorno, ‘integration’ and ‘administration’ named the two linked 
tendencies of the late capitalist global process. Integration is the logic of 
identity and the subsumption of particulars, and Adorno traced its 
workings in social facts and cultural appearance-forms, from 
philosophical positivism and empirical sociology to astrology columns 
and Walt Disney cartoons. Administration, or techno-power 
concentrated in specialized institutions, is congealed as the instrumental 
logic of entrenched and expanding bureaucracies. Social subjects are not 
left untouched by processes of integration and administration; in fact, 
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these processes reach into and shape the conditions for possible forms 
of subjectivity. Adorno emphasizes this point in ‘Culture and 
Administration’: 
Administration, however, is not simply imposed upon the supposedly 
productive human being from without. It multiplies within the person 
himself. That a particular situation in time brings forth those subjects 
intended for it is to be taken very literally. Nor are those who produce 
culture secure before the ‘increasingly organic composition of mankind’. 
(Adorno, 1991: 122; 2003: 137)7 
The objective tendency, produced by subjects and only transformable 
by subjects, nevertheless constricts the forms and modes of 
subjectivation: this dialectic, precisely, generates the perennial 
catastrophe. And as already noted, these tendencies do not stop short 
before the physical reduction and liquidation of actual subjects. 
‘Genocide is the absolute integration’ (Adorno, 1975: 355; 1995: 362).8 
Genocide, then, cannot be dismissed as a deviation from the rule of law 
and humanist norms, for it belongs to the immanent drift of the global 
process. And after the demonstrations of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, we 
must live in a social world in which the final integration – the global 
termination of systemic logic that would at the same time terminate all 
life and the conditions of all systems – has become objectively possible. 
Exit, ruined, the myth of progress. 
Terror and late capitalism, then, go together. What begins as the 
pressure of conformity and the market – today, the terrors of precarity 
and the miseries of austerity – tends toward the logic of exterminism. In 
the last pages of ‘The Schema of Mass Culture’, Adorno elaborates the 
connection between the ‘anxiety, that is the ultimate lesson of the fascist 
era’ and techno-power in the hands of administration: 
The terror for which the people of every land are being prepared glares 
ever more threateningly from the rigid features of these culture-masks: 
in every peal of laughter we hear the menacing voice of extortion and 
the comic types are legible signs which represent the contorted bodies 
of revolutionaries. Participation in mass culture itself stands under the 
sign of terror. (Adorno, 1991: 96) 
The conformity and resignation fostered by a system of cultural 
uniformity is connected, through the mediations of an unfolding master 
logic, to the defeats of radical struggles and the triumphs of capitalist 
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war machines. State terror, resurgent today, declares the bogus ‘war on 
terror’. 
Enjoyment and Enforcement  
Another way to think about subjectivation is through Jacques Lacan’s 
notion of jouissance or enjoyment. I began by détourning the title of a 
book by Slavoj !i"ek (1992). Other Lacanian theorists have produced 
stimulating recent work on the problem of ‘commanded enjoyment’, a 
term introduced by Todd McGowan (2004) and helpfully elaborated by 
Yannis Stavrakakis in his The Lacanian Left (2007). Enjoyment, a form of 
pleasure that does not necessarily exclude pain, displeasure or even 
terror, compensates for impotence. The subjective investment in 
fantasmatic object choices and identifications is not experienced as a 
conflict with objective reality because enjoyment as it were flies under 
the radar of conscious reason. This embodied return on investment 
offers a compelling, if partial, account of our social ‘stuckness’ – our 
inability to resist our addiction to social processes we know, on another 
level of awareness, to be self-threatening. The notion of commanded 
enjoyment acknowledges that the repressed also returns, however, as 
the hidden cost, the element of unfreedom and compulsion. However 
indirectly, terror haunts enjoyment issued as a social imperative. 
If enjoyment is one side of the coin, then, what we can call 
enforcement is the other. Enforcement, as I have developed this 
concept elsewhere (Ray, 2010), is the irreducible element of violence in 
capitalist reproduction. What begins as the asymmetry of antagonistic 
productive relations is channeled and intensified, through market 
competition and imperialist rivalries, into a global process that requires 
and culminates in war and state terror. The concentration of executive 
power and the rise of the national security-surveillance state, with its 
nuclear arsenals of mass destruction and rapidly expanding squadrons 
of terminator drones – these social processes mutating the capitalist 
state and hollowing out the carcass of democracy are the continuing 
condensations of what Adorno called integration and administration. As 
an unfolding master logic, capitalism has proved to be a self-driving 
terror machine. We know who and what it drives over. 
In this light, coercion and the paradigm of discipline and punish 
have not been superseded so much as driven deeper into the structures 
of everyday subjectivity. Demonstrations of terror, from water-boarding 
and the dirty war technics of disappearing enemies to the ‘shock and 
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awe’ of spectacular weaponry, show what is done to those who rebel or 
directly oppose the system. Absorbing the lesson in their bodies, 
spectators do not need to think twice about it. Terror pre-forms 
subjectivity and saturates labor relations within the cultural sector as 
everywhere else, but also circulates as the shadow or reflected presence, 
as insidious as it is demoralizing, of the real war machines globally in 
perpetual motion. 
Moreover, the celebratory discourses of the creative industries, 
countersigned by the smirks of pseudo-bohemians, are giving cover to 
cultural trends that are alarming indeed. Hiroshima had already 
demonstrated the tendency for science and war machine to merge under 
the administrations of dominant states. What can be seen today, in 
company with the politics of fear and the increasing militarization of 
everyday life, is the merger of war machine and culture industry. 
Deployments of state terror are accompanied every step of the way by 
machines of image and spin; these sell the wars that never end by 
rendering them supremely enjoyable. More and more often, their 
operators are ‘creatives’ co-opted from the culture industry. The big-
money world of bellicose computer gaming – dominated by the 
Pentagon-funded America’s Army and its commercial rival, Modern 
Warfare 2 – is one case in point.9 The career of Adrian Lamo, the 
convicted ex-hacker turned snitch for Homeland Security, is another: in 
2010, Lamo informed on US Army Private Bradley Manning, who 
allegedly had leaked a damning video of a 2007 massacre of civilians by 
US forces in Iraq.10 The first case indicates the addictive power of 
enjoyment; the second, the corrupting effects and reach of 
enforcement. 
Theories of subjectivation that do not give due weight to the 
objective factor of a dominating global logic risk lapsing into 
voluntarism. Those that do will have to face and grapple with the 
tendencies Adorno pointed to. Strategic resistance begins by assessing 
the preconditions for its own actual effectiveness. Unhappily, 
developments since Dialectic of Enlightenment have not yet refuted its case. 
But if we cannot make our history just as we like, oblivious to inherited 
constraints, we can always transform our pessimism by organizing and 
aiming it, as both Benjamin and Gramsci counseled at the dawn of the 
new terror.  
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Notes 
1 This chapter comes from Ray, 2010b, a longer exploration of these issues 
for a Brumaria special issue on revolution and subjectivity. 
2 As we now know, processes of ‘new enclosure’ in China and India have 
actually resulted in a massive increase in the size of the planet’s industrial 
proletariat. These new ‘direct producers’ of commodities work in factories 
and sweatshops that combine elements of Fordist and pre-Fordist (in fact 
nineteenth-century) forms of organization and discipline. Evidently, the 
new ideal-typical worker is a young or teenage woman who has been 
separated from her family and social networks for the first time and who 
sends home the bulk of her earnings. These vulnerable workers, who may 
be charged with pay cuts for talking on the work floor or socializing off-
hours with members of the opposite sex, clearly do not fit the model of 
post-Fordist virtuoso. Moreover, their terms of employment are precarious 
in the extreme; they have been largely stripped of representation and 
Fordist securities and can be fired at will. For a chilling glimpse into the 
new factory, see David Redmon’s 2005 documentary film Mardi Gras: Made 
in China. 
3 This formulation brings out the proximity of the culture industry argument 
to Guy Debord’s later category of ‘spectacle’. Both denote systematic and 
totalizing organizations of manipulation and social control. 
4 In August 2010, corporate giants Verizon Communications and Google 
published detailed proposals for lawmakers regarding regulation of the 
internet. These proposals included provisions purportedly intended to 
protect net neutrality, the principle that Internet Service Providers and 
governments should not transform the structure of access and services in 
ways that favor certain users and contents over others, thereby introducing 
indirect forms of censorship. Critics have argued that the Verizon-Google 
proposal would in fact put in place the conditions for a two-tiered or class-
inflected internet, with high-speed connections and access for corporate 
content providers and low-speed access for other providers. For analysis 
and assessment, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2010. 
5 The scintillation of these lines begs comment. The alignment of ad-
saturated pop culture (neon signs) with mystification (comet reading, or 
astrology) becomes a negative evocation of arcing V-2 rockets and aerial 
bombing – a prefiguring echo of the famous first line of Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow (‘A screaming comes across the sky.’) While I will not 
remark it further, the oblique allusion to terror will be relevant to the last 
two sections of the essay. 
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6 Some tendencies within autonomist theory have had trouble acknowledging 
this. Indeed, autonomy-oriented approaches are pulled between the claims 
of subjective empowerment and the instrumental demands of struggle. See 
Ray, 2009.  
7 This formulation is remarkably close to the kind of internalized discipline 
and governmentality analyzed by Foucault, who must have had such 
passages, as well as Dialectic of Enlightenment, in mind when he offered his 
disarmingly candid endorsement of Frankfurt critical theory in a 1978 
interview: ‘Perhaps if I had read those works earlier on, I would have saved 
useful time, surely: I wouldn’t have needed to write some things and I 
would have avoided certain errors. At any rate, if I had encountered the 
Frankfurt School when young, I would have been seduced to the point of 
doing nothing else in life but the job of commenting on them’ (Foucault, 
1991: 119-20).  
8 The passage continues: ‘It is on its way wherever people are leveled off 
[gleichgemacht werden] – ‘polished off’ [geschliffen], as they called it in the military 
– until one exterminates them literally, as deviations from the concept of 
their utter nullity. Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity 
as death’ (Adorno, 1975: 355; 1995: 362). 
9 On the merger of war machine and culture industry, see Der Derian, 2001; 
on America’s Army and computer gaming, see Singer, 2010. I discuss both 
and analyze the dialectic of enjoyment and enforcement in Ray, 2010a. 
10 The video was famously posted by WikiLeaks, online at 
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Collateral_Murder,_5_Apr_2010. See also 
Greenwald, 2010.  
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Add Value to Contents: The Valorization of 
Culture Today 
Esther Leslie 
Culture and Value 
In Britain today, as elsewhere, culture is the wonder stuff that gives 
more away than it takes. Like some fantastical oil in a Grimm fairytale, 
this magical substance gives and gives, generating and enhancing value, 
for state and private men alike. Culture is posited as a mode of value-
production: for its economy-boosting and wealth-generating effects; its 
talent for regeneration, through raising house prices and introducing 
new business, which is largely service based; and its benefits as a type of 
moral rearmament or emotional trainer, a perspective that lies behind 
the ‘social inclusion’ model, whereby culture must speak to – or down 
to – disenfranchised groups. Culture is instrumentalized for its ‘value-
generating’ spin-offs. To exploit maximum benefits the value-producing 
output, culture, needs to be produced industrially. Hence, the ‘culture 
industry’, about which Adorno wrote scathingly, has been promoted 
with redoubled force as ‘cultural and creative industries’, affirmed as 
such by various bodies, from governments to supra-governmental 
forms, NGOs and private initiatives. The discourse of ‘creative and 
cultural industries’ penetrates at both national and supranational levels. 
Supranationally, UNESCO, which describes itself as ‘a laboratory of 
ideas and a standard-setter to forge universal agreements on emerging 
ethical issues’, insists that ‘cultural industries’, which include publishing, 
music, audiovisual technology, electronics, video games and the 
Internet, ‘create employment and wealth’, ‘foster innovation in 
production and commercialization processes’ and ‘are central in 
promoting and maintaining cultural diversity and in ensuring democratic 
Esther Leslie 
 184 
access to culture’.1 UNESCO pushes the industrial analogy further in 
the insistence that cultural industries ‘nurture creativity – the “raw 
material” they are made from’. In short, they ‘add value to contents and 
generate values for individuals and societies’. Contents are apparently 
without inherent value, or enough value, before the magic wand of 
industry touches them. In addition, creative industries mysteriously 
make values – out of nothing, out of themselves. Value is a gift of 
industry, not a quality of artifacts themselves. 
Many policy documents reference ‘cultural value’. In such 
documents value has become a debased term, conceivable only from 
the perspective of quantification, as in, for example, visitor numbers 
with statistical breakdowns of type, in order to monitor social inclusion 
and provide data for advertisers or sponsors. As such value is easily 
subsumed into economic value. The value that is more valuable than all 
others is monetary. Tate Modern’s fifth anniversary report from 2005 is 
one of many thousand examples. Here the former government Culture 
Secretary Chris Smith crows about culture’s magical powers of wealth 
generation, asserting that ‘Creative industries amount to well over 100 
billion pounds of economic value a year, employ over a million people 
and are growing at twice the rate of growth of the economy as a whole’. 
(Tate Modern, 2005) Culture’s marketability must be assured: culture is 
valuable only if it contributes to ‘the economy’. Culture is quantified – 
witness the graphs on the UNESCO site of world imports and exports 
of cultural goods. This point is banal. Of course an industry, in a 
capitalist world, produces commodities. This particular industry 
produces art as commodity variously. Art-buying is commodified for 
broader layers by the encouragement of well sponsored and marketed 
‘affordable art’ fairs, which generalize ownership of small art objects. 
Art experience is commodified through exhibition sponsorship by 
corporations and in policy-makers’ quantification of social benefits 
derived from exposure to culture. And the art institution markets itself 
as commodity. Art galleries are reinvented as ‘for profit’ space, where 
the expertise of art workers is leased out to business and education; and 
merchandise is offered at every opportunity, including gift shops and 
digital reproductions for download. Tate is innovative here, licensing its 
strategically developed ‘brand’ Tate Modern to household paint and 
home improvements retailer B&Q. Another joint venture is with 
telecommunications provider BT. Specially commissioned artworks 
emblazoned on ‘limited edition’ BT vans support BT and Tate’s joint 
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rationale to bring ‘art to all’ by ‘literally taking art out on to the streets’.2 
Art is conceived as an abstract quantity, another product, like baked 
beans, but the language of limited editions emulates the exclusivity 
inherent to art. This is art as commodity, another option on the 
supermarket shelf, conveniently delivered to your door or at least past 
it. It wants art to be a special, bonus-providing, life-enhancing 
substance, and, at the same time, it wants it to be on ‘the streets’, utterly 
accessible, completely everyday, so that its benefits might be widely 
distributed, along with those purported to stem from BT’s private 
phone network. 
Corporate partnership in culture – like the Public-Private 
Partnership in health, education and transport sectors – is part of 
désétatisation, a French term situated between ‘privatization’ and the 
public sector in the world of cultural provision. Crucial aspects of 
désétatisation include ‘divestiture’, free transfer of property rights, the 
change from state to independent organization, contracting-out of 
cleaning and catering, use of volunteers, private funding, individual 
patronage and corporate sponsorship. As in other state sectors (for 
example health and utilities), the shift in cultural policy sunders cultural 
institutions from the state and pushes them to attract private money. 
Artworld privatization (where economic rationale is central) is 
combined with a devolution of power that offers some autonomy as 
well as accountability to local managers. 
In a paradox typical of neoliberalism, the rise of privatization and 
the inclusion of private industry as sponsors in the art sector has been 
accompanied by the subjection of culture to government and state 
intervention, under the name of cultural policy. The corollary of 
‘creative industries’ in the private and especially the state sector is 
‘cultural policy’. Culture-making is a crucial industry in today’s global 
battle for tourist cash. As such, like any other industry, it is subject to 
government policy. Cultural policy bears the same relationship to 
cultural criticism that the culture industry bears to culture. It is its 
commodification without counter-measure. The rhetoric of much 
cultural policy is, at best, propagandistic hot air or consolatory 
compensation, and, at worst, partner to the economic remodeling of the 
cultural front, akin to neoliberal IMF restructuring of economies. What 
is remarkable is that cultural policy has been pushed by the very same 
forces that once engaged in cultural criticism, in the guise of cultural 
studies and theory. If the ideology of privatization needed to promote 
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the industrialization of culture and its annexing to the production of 
values, monetary and other, various cultural theorists were willing 
ideologues for this refunctioning. 
Value Added: Theory as Policy 
Cultural policy has a broad remit, from the banal to the fatal. Such 
scope did not prevent Tony Bennett, the leading Australian proponent 
of Cultural Studies, insisting, back in 1992, that Cultural Studies turn 
practical, engaging in policy, advising managers and governments rather 
than moaning on about ideological effects. Cultural Studies’ long-
standing promotion of cultural populism segued into the rhetoric of 
choice, which presents itself as anti-elitist. The irony is that theorists 
who once professed to adhere to some type of Marxism now promote 
culture as the benevolent and ameliorating face of capitalism. How did 
this happen? Cultural Studies observed a lack in the Marxist theories of 
culture that first impelled them. Marxism – according to cultural studies 
theorist Stuart Hall, ‘did not talk about or seem to understand […] our 
privileged object of study: culture, ideology, language, the symbolic’ 
(Hall, 1992: 279). Note here that culture is subsumed into the 
intangible, non-material or simply ‘cognitive’. Labor, the role of 
production, slips away as theorizable component of practice. This 
animus against production is reinforced with the focus on audiences 
and consumption. The labor of cultural production disappears. 
After getting to just ‘within shouting distance’ of Marxism, as Hall 
termed it, Cultural Studies bifurcated. One wing headed for a sociology 
of culture that traffics in popular cultural practices. The other opted for 
style, surface, textuality and the allure of ‘theory’. Precipitate of both 
was a shift in the understanding of ideology. Initially an Althusser-
influenced delineation of ideology, and ideological state apparatuses 
conceived the state and its organs as producing contexts for thinking 
that serve class interests and the market as a force of control, an 
ideological justification of class oppression. This is replaced by an 
embrace of culture – or ideology – as authentic or post-authentic 
expression of subjectivity. Ideology is no longer a problematically 
inescapable effluent, but rather the very locus of pleasure, resistance, 
power and counter-power. Ideology is culture, and so culture is 
immaterial, purely Geist. This conceptualization made possible the 
remolding of Cultural Studies as Cultural Policy. It is culture’s presumed 
immateriality, its symbolic accent that forwards the fixation on the 
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consumer, who receives culture as adjunct to his or her identities, a 
marker of taste. Numerous cultural theorists reinvent themselves as 
wannabe policy makers in the ‘cultural industries’. Still echoing terms 
from the cultural theory they absorbed, they marshal the language of 
market research and niche marketing, capitalism’s tools for product 
placement in competitive industries (McGuigan, 2004: 139). John 
Holden, Head of Development at the think-tank Demos and a former 
investment banker with Masters degrees in law and art history, tells us 
in his essay ‘The Cultural Value of Tate Modern’, people attending Tate 
Modern, are not ‘spectators’ but ‘actors’ (Tate Modern, 2005). Here he 
adopts a version of Walter Benjamin’s idea of the cultural auditor as 
producer. But the meaning is twisted into its contemporary parody. He 
goes on to claim:  
This [appearance of museum goers as actors] can be accounted for in 
marketing terms – people reinforcing their own coolness through their 
alliance with one of Britain’s Coolest Brands, or it can be thought of as 
something loftier – forming identity and stretching the self through an 
interaction with what Tessa Jowell, the Secretary of State for Culture, 
has called ‘complex culture’. (Tate Modern, 2005) 
Adorno against Industry 
Art is not only part of ‘business as usual’. It is the universal grease relied 
upon to make the cogs of business turn better and the joints of society 
mesh smoother. Adorno’s ‘Culture Industry’ concept – a yoking of the 
unyokeable – assumed that industry was anathema to culture. Industry 
signifies business, endless production. For Adorno, art is a placeholder 
for utopia, but this did not mean it had anything in common with 
technological utopias that imagined busy ways through and out of 
capitalism. Adorno posited utopia as a place for indolence, non-
productivity, uselessness. Art likewise is not about ceaseless production, 
an industrial manufacturing of artefacts, values, by-products, outputs, 
outcomes and objectives – all necessary for grant applications and 
monitoring reports. Art is not even a place for manufacturing concrete 
alternatives: ‘Like theory, art cannot concretize Utopia, not even 
negatively’ (Adorno, 1984: 48). Adorno states: 
It is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives, but to resist by its 
form alone the course of the world, which permanently puts a pistol to 
men’s heads. (Adorno, 1977: 180) 
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In its form art proposes something other than business as usual. Art 
holds a place for utopia, its form marking utopia’s outlines. But it 
cannot represent it, instead figuring this future time negatively: 
We may not know what the human is or what the correct shape of 
human things is, but what it is not and what form of human things is 
wrong, that we do know, and only in this specific and concrete 
knowledge is something else, something positive, open to us. (Adorno, 
1986: 456) 
It is this negative imagining that impels art. But still it is possible to 
imagine – without concretizing – futures for and in art, as Adorno did 
when he wrote the following in Aesthetic Theory: 
While firmly rejecting the appearance of reconciliation, art none the less 
holds fast to the idea of reconciliation in an antagonistic world. Thus, 
art is the true consciousness of an epoch in which Utopia… is as real a 
possibility as total catastrophic destruction. (Adorno, 1984: 48) 
Art might, because of its precarious, anomalous situation within 
commodity society, bear a non-concrete relation to Utopia. It marks the 
place of the ‘idea’ of utopia. In the face of cultural industry Adorno 
cleaves to art as utopia’s only refuge, and our chance for another life. 
Adorno’s clinging to art is correct enough, in that without the thought 
of art, just as without the thought of utopia, there would be no 
alternative to industry. But it goes only so far. 
After Adorno: Cultural Policy as Aestheticization of Politics 
Art cannot in itself recover from a situation intrinsic to industrial 
capitalism, whereby it has been made an adjunct of the political, for 
which read economic. It cannot separate itself off again into ‘the 
aesthetic’. To deny its embroilment would only reinforce pre-critical 
ideas, as if Walter Benjamin, T.W. Adorno and Guy Debord had never 
existed. Art movements have fused with the business of politics in a 
number of ways. Politics has become an art of display. Walter 
Benjamin’s closing statements to his Artwork essay, on ‘the 
aestheticization of politics’ and the ‘politicization of art’, have taken on 
a new validity. It is easy to observe an aestheticization of politics 
everywhere today. We live in a world of mediated political spectacle that 
enforces passivity and knee-jerk reactions. Politics is a show that we are 
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compelled to watch and where the ‘sides’ on offer are simply divisions 
within the essentially identical. Benjamin’s phrase indicates that beyond 
the aestheticization of political systems, figures and events is a more 
fundamental aestheticization (or alienation): the aestheticization of 
human practice. This amounts to an alienation from species-being, to 
the extent that we accept and enjoy viewing our own destruction. 
Benjamin discusses the issue of art’s politicization in the context of 
human annihilation. War has become the ultimate artistic event, because 
it satisfies the new needs of the human sensorium, which have been 
remolded technologically. This was the completion of l’art pour l’art, or 
aestheticism, as seen in 1936, which means that everything is an 
aesthetic experience, even war. Humanity watches a techno-display of 
‘shock and awe’ proportions, which amounts to its own torture. It 
revels in it. Genuine politics – the rational management of technologies, 
the democratic incorporation of the users of those technologies, 
revelations about the property-stakes that drive the system – require 
self-activity: authors as producers, audiences as critics, as Benjamin put 
it (Benjamin, 2005). Likewise the art that communism politicizes is not 
art as known and inherited (and reified for passive consumption), but 
rather, yet again, an opportunity for self-activity. This is a dialectical 
reversal not a negation. It might on the surface appear as if the 
politicization of art has been adopted in a widespread manner within 
the ‘artistic community’. Exhibitions frequently draw attention to 
‘political’ questions of poverty, gender, ethnicity, globalization, war. But 
this is not the victory of the Benjaminian idea of art’s politicization. In 
fact, it is a further symptom of the aestheticization of politics. For what 
is produced by the real politicization of art is not that which we have 
become accustomed to in galleries – politically correct art that largely 
satisfies itself with and within the gallery and grant system, competing 
within the terms of the creative and cultural industries. Rather the 
politicization of art means a thorough rejection of systems of display, 
production, and consumption, monitoring and inclusion as well as 
elitism and exclusion, as art disperses into everyday practice and 
becomes political, that is, democratically available to all as practice and 
matter for critique. 
Karl Marx notes that human activity constitutes reality through 
praxis, and truth is gained through the process of self-development. As 
he put it famously: the rounded individual of mature communism is a 
hunter in the morning, a fisherman in the afternoon, and a critical critic 
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at night, without being defined socially as hunter, fisherman or critic. It 
is an unfreedom characteristic of class society that some people are 
charged with the task of being an artist, and bear that social role, while 
others are excluded from it. Conversely, marred by commodification, 
artistic practice today is a deformation of the sensuous unfolding of the 
self that indicates real human community. The reification of human 
activity into the separate realms of work and play, aesthetics and politics 
damages all and must be overcome. The aesthetic must be rescued from 
the ghetto of art and set at the centre of life. 
What I mean finally to say is this: the critique of cultural and 
creative industries makes no sense unless you are prepared to criticize 
the capitalist industrial model as a whole, wherever it appears, for the 
manufacture of whatever ends. While Adorno may be right that art is a 
special type of labor, which reveals the critical pressure points of the 
system, in as much as it is industrialized, it has become effectively like 
all labor – shit to do, alienated and boring. This is where we should start 
– with the conditions of labor wherever they occur, not just the specific 
woes of artists. This means asking why ‘social inclusion’ is necessary in 
the first place, and why class society both needs and doesn’t need art.  
 
Notes 
1 All quotations from UNESCO are taken from the UNESCO website, 
specifically the section on ‘Culture, trade and globalisation’. See 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/industries/trade/. 
2 The language of ‘the streets’ is used by BT’s Head of Sponsorship on the 
BTPLC website and reproduced elsewhere in promotional competitions 
and the like. 
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Creative Industries as Mass Deception 
Gerald Raunig 
language edited by Aileen Derieg 
The chapter from Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s Dialectic 
of Enlightenment on the culture industry was entitled ‘Kulturindustrie: 
Aufklärung als Massenbetrug’ (‘Culture Industry: Enlightenment as 
Mass Deception’). When Horkheimer and Adorno wrote their essay in 
the early 1940s, they were objecting to the growing influence of the 
entertainment industries, to the commodification of art, and to the 
totalizing uniformity of ‘culture’, especially in the country of their 
emigration, the USA. Their skeptical attitude toward the new media of 
radio and film moved the two authors to cover, in an eloquent style 
with cultural pessimistic undertones, a broad range of the cultural field 
with a concept that could hardly appear more alien in cultural spheres: 
they named culture as an industry. 
For almost two decades, even after their return to Europe, 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s theses remained more of an insider tip 
discussed only among the affiliates of the Institute for Social Research. 
Over the course of the 1960s, however, their impact began to develop, 
finally becoming fully established in the updated media critique of the 
1970s: Dialectic of Enlightenment became a cornerstone of the literature 
not only on the ambivalence of the Enlightenment, but also and 
especially on the rigorous rejection of an ‘economization of culture’. 
And in the cultural field, where the myths of genius, originality and 
autonomy are still significant factors, the term ‘industry’ is still regarded 
today, sixty years after the late publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment, as 
not much more than a dirty word. Thus the question arises as to how 
could it happen that with only a small shift from singular to plural, from 
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culture industry to creative and cultural industries, this conceptual brand 
has now been reinterpreted as something like a promise of universal 
salvation not only for politicians, but also for many actors in the field 
itself.1 
One possible explanation for this paradox arises from a closer look 
at the modes of subjectivation in the fields, structures and institutions 
that were and are described with the terms culture industry and creative 
industries. I will discuss these conditions of modes of subjectivation and 
the specific institutions in the field by analyzing four components of the 
concept of culture industry and then comparing them in reverse order 
from four to one with their updated counterparts within the creative 
industries today. 
I 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry chapter was mainly about 
the growing film and media industries, especially Hollywood cinema 
and private radio stations in the US. In clear contrast to the writings of 
their colleague Walter Benjamin and also of Bertolt Brecht, who both 
had a more ambivalent idea of the opportunities and the problems 
engendered by mechanical reproduction, mass media and the manifold 
aspects of production and reception under new conditions, Adorno and 
Horkheimer took a thoroughly negative view of the culture industry: as 
an increasingly totalizing spiral of systematic manipulation and the 
‘retroactive need’ to adapt more and more to this system: ‘Films, radio 
and magazines form a system. Each branch of culture is unanimous 
within itself and all are unanimous together.’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2002: 94; 2003: 128) In the interpretation of the Institute for Social 
Research, this unified form of culture industry is the institutional 
structure for modes of subjectivation that subjugate the individual 
under the power and the totality of capital. 
The first component of the concept of culture industry, according 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, is that it totalizes its audience, exposing 
this audience to a permanently repeated, yet ever unfulfilled promise: 
‘The culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers of what it endlessly 
promises’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 111; 2003: 148). It is this 
eternal cycle of promise generating a desire and continually suspending 
this desire in an unproductive way that is at the core of the idea of 
culture industry as an instrument of mass deception. For Horkheimer 
and Adorno the products of culture industry are all designed in a way 
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that they deny or even prevent imagination, spontaneity, fantasy and 
any active thinking on the part of the spectators. This ultra-passive form 
of consumption correlates to the tendency on the part of the culture 
industry to meticulously register and statistically process its audience: 
‘On the charts of research organizations, indistinguishable from those 
of political propaganda, consumers are divided up as statistical material 
into red, green and blue areas according to income group’ (Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 2002: 97; 2003: 131). 
The consumers appear as marionettes of capital, counted, analyzed, 
captured in the striated space of the culture industry:  
The consumers are the workers and salaried employees, the farmers and 
petty bourgeois. Capitalist production hems them in so tightly, in body 
and soul, that they unresistingly succumb to whatever is proffered to 
them. However, just as the ruled have always taken the morality 
dispensed to them by the rulers more seriously than the rulers 
themselves, the defrauded masses today cling to the myth of success 
still more ardently than the successful. They insist unwaveringly on the 
ideology by which they are enslaved. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 
106; 2003: 141-2) 
What is evident, of course, in the image of the consumers that have 
succumbed to the anonymous culture industry apparatus of seduction, 
is both the culmination and simultaneously the limitation of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach: the figure of the ‘deceived masses’ 
victimizes them as passive, externally determined, betrayed, and 
enslaved. 
II 
As a second component in Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of 
culture industry we also find a specific image of production: whereas the 
authors present the positions of producers and consumers as being 
clearly separated, this separation is not thought of as a dualistic figure of 
passive and active subjects of culture industry. Like the consumers, the 
producers also appear as subjugated, passive functions of the system. 
Whereas in Benjamin’s theories of authorship and new media, authors 
are able to turn into producers by changing the production apparatus, 
and in Brecht’s Lehrstück theory and practice of the early 1930s, in 
which there are inherently only authors and producers, instead of a 
consuming audience, Horkheimer and Adorno’s rigid image shows only 
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strangely passive producers trapped in the totality of the culture 
industry. Social subordination remains the only imaginable mode of 
subjectivation, even on the side of production. The most striking 
example in the chapter on culture industry shows the actors in radio 
broadcasts who are ‘denied any freedom’ as functions of the business:  
They confine themselves to the apocryphal sphere of ‘amateurs’, who, 
in any case, are organized from above. Any trace of spontaneity in the 
audience of the official radio is steered and absorbed into a selection of 
specializations by talent-spotters, performance competitions, and 
sponsored events of every kind. The talents belong to the operation 
long before they are put on show; otherwise, they would not conform 
so easily. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 96; 2003: 130) 
In light of its updated version in Reality TV, docu-soaps and casting 
shows, in fact the image of extras that only appear to be protagonists 
seems more plausible today than ever. Looking at a broader idea of 
producers producing and presenting not only materialized goods, but 
also affects and communication, we see the picture of a totalizing 
system determining every move and every mood of the subject growing 
even darker. Horkheimer and Adorno anticipated this darkening, but in 
a strangely feminized form:  
The way in which the young girl accepts and performs the obligatory 
date, the tone of voice used on the telephone and in the most intimate 
situations, the choice of words in conversation, indeed, the whole inner 
life […] bears witness to the attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus 
meeting the requirements of success, an apparatus which, even in its 
unconscious impulses, conforms to the model presented by the culture 
industry. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 136; 2003: 176) 
The human-apparatuses correlate to the apparatus of the culture 
industry. Both consumers and producers appear as slaves of a totality 
and ideology, shaped and moved by an abstract system. As apparatuses 
they are cogs in a bigger apparatus; part of an institution called culture 
industry. 
III 
As an effect of this relationship between the apparatus and its cogs, the 
third component of the culture industry concept is that the actors, the 
cultural producers, are prisoners as employees of the institution(s) of 
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culture industry. The institutional form, into which the culture industry 
developed according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is that of a gigantic 
music, entertainment or media corporation. Those who create find 
themselves enclosed within an institutional structure, in which their 
creativity is suppressed by the very form of dependent work. In Dialectic 
of Enlightenment this connection between creativity-constraining 
employment and social subordination is generally described in this way:  
Fundamentally, it is all about the self-mockery of man. The possibility 
of becoming an economic subject, an entrepreneur, a proprietor, is 
entirely liquidated. […][T]he independent firm […] has fallen into 
hopeless dependence. Everyone becomes an employee […] (Adorno, 
2002: 123, translation modified; 2003: 162) 
Just as hopeless dependency and social control generally predominate in 
the world of employees, even the last resort of autonomy (and here 
there is an early echo of the romanticism of artistic autonomy in 
Adorno’s later work, Aesthetic Theory,2 the production of creativity is 
described as striated, structured and stratified, and the majority of its 
actors originally regarded as resistive are finally civilized as employees. 
According to the anthropological definition of institution, in return the 
institution is said to provide the employees with security and to promise 
a certain degree of control over irresolvable contradictions. Even if the 
specific institutions of the culture industry do not last forever, their 
apparatuses are intended to create this impression specifically because 
of their apparatus nature and to exonerate the subjects in this way. For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, however, even this notion itself is due solely 
to the effect that ‘the managed provision of comradely care cultivation 
of comradeship, administered by every factory as a means of increasing 
production, brings even the last private impulse under social control’ 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 121, translation modified; 2003: 159). 
IV 
As the fourth and final component, according to Horkheimer and 
Adorno the development of the culture industry as a whole is to be seen 
as a delayed transformation of the cultural field catching up with the 
processes that had led to Fordism in agriculture or what is 
conventionally called industry. Nevertheless, Horkheimer and Adorno 
regard culture monopolies as weak and dependent in comparison to the 
most powerful sectors of industry – steel, petroleum, electricity, and 
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chemicals. Even the last remainders of resistance against Fordism – and 
here again there is an echo of the formerly heroic function of 
autonomous art – are regarded as having finally become factories. The 
new factories of creativity (publishing, cinema, radio and television) 
conformed to the criteria of the Fordist factory. The assembly line 
character of culture industry consequently structured the culture 
industry production of creativity in a way similar to agriculture and 
metal processing before: through serialization, standardization, and the 
total domination of creativity. ‘At the same time, however, 
mechanization has such power over leisure and its happiness, 
determines so thoroughly the fabrication of entertainment commodities, 
that the off-duty worker can experience nothing but after-images of the 
work process itself’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 109; 2003: 145). 
Thus according to Horkheimer and Adorno, the function of the 
factories of creativity is the mechanized manufacture of amusement 
goods on the one hand, and on the other – beyond conventional areas 
of production – the control and determination of reproduction, 
whereby reproduction increasingly becomes like working in a factory. 
IV 
Instead of regarding culture industry as something which replaced 
bourgeois art and the avant-gardes in the cultural field and translated a 
Fordist model that was developed elsewhere, outside culture, into the 
cultural field, the post-operaist philosopher Paolo Virno asks about the 
role that the culture industry assumed with relation to overcoming 
Fordism and Taylorism. According to his reflections in Grammar of the 
Multitude, the culture industry 
fine-tuned the paradigm of post-Fordist production on the whole. I 
believe therefore, that the mode of action of the culture industry 
became, from a certain point on, exemplary and pervasive. Within the 
culture industry, even in its archaic incarnation examined by Benjamin 
and Adorno, one can grasp early signs of a mode of production which 
later, in the post-Fordist era, becomes generalized and elevated to the 
rank of canon. (Virno, 2004: 58)  
Here we find a fruitful inversion of the interpretation of culture industry 
as an industrialized field robbed of its freedom, as conceptualized by 
Critical Theory: whereas Horkheimer and Adorno call culture industry 
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an obstinate latecomer in the Fordist transformation, Virno sees it as an 
anticipation and paradigm of post-Fordist production. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno the institutions of culture industry 
formed modern culture monopolies, but also at the same time the 
economic area in which some part of the sphere of liberal circulation is 
able to survive, along with the corresponding entrepreneurial types, 
despite the process of disintegration elsewhere. Although some small 
spaces of difference and resistance still emerge within the purported 
totality of the culture industry, of course this difference is quickly 
reintegrated in the totality of culture industry, as Horkheimer and 
Adorno do not hesitate to explain:  
What resists can only survive by fitting in. Once a particular brand of 
deviation from the norm has been noted by the culture industry, it 
belongs to it as does the land-reformer to capitalism. (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 2002: 104, translation modified; 2003: 140) 
In this description, difference serving to achieve new levels of 
productivity is nothing but a vestige of the past, which is cast off in the 
general Fordization of the culture industry as a remnant. From Virno’s 
perspective,  
it is not difficult to recognize that these purported remnants (with a 
certain space granted to the informal, to the unexpected, to the 
‘unplanned’) were, after all, loaded with future possibilities. These were 
not remnants, but anticipatory omens. The informality of 
communicative behavior, the competitive interaction typical of a 
meeting, the abrupt diversion that can enliven a television program (in 
general, everything which it would have been dysfunctional to rigidify 
and regulate beyond a certain threshold), has become now, in the post-
Fordist era, a typical trait of the entire realm of social production. This 
is true not only for our contemporary culture industry, but also for Fiat 
in Melfi. (Virno, 2004: 59) 
From the view of post-operaist theory, the old culture industry is not 
only a weak and late-coming industry in the process of Fordization, but 
also a future model and anticipation of the wide-spread post-Fordist 
production modes: informal, non-programmed spaces, open to the 
unforeseen, communicative improvisations that are less a remnant than 
the core, less margin than centre. 
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III 
The culture industry media and entertainment corporations, according 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, prove to be an institutional structure for 
subjugating the individual to the control of capital. Hence they are sites 
of pure social subjugation. Even if we accept this one-sided structuralist 
view for early forms of the culture industry, it seems that something has 
changed here since the mid-twentieth century. On the one hand, this 
change may be grasped with terms developed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari in the 1970s: the point here was primarily the insight, 
further explained below, that a second line develops beyond social 
subjection, which emphasizes active involvement and modes of 
subjectivation in addition to structural factors. In contradistinction to 
social subjection (assujettissement social), Deleuze and Guattari call this 
second line ‘machinic enslavement’ (asservissement machinique) (1987: 456-
60). In addition to this problematization at the terminological level, the 
question can also be raised with regards to today’s phenomena about 
which modes of subjectivation are arising in the new institutional forms 
of the creative industry. For what is now called ‘creative industries’, not 
only by neoliberal cultural politics and urban development, differs 
substantially in form and function from the old-school culture industry. 
Turning to the third component that involves the institutional form, 
in particular, it is obvious that the arrangements labeled as creative 
industries are no longer structured in the form of huge media 
corporations, but mainly as micro-enterprises of self-employed cultural 
entrepreneurs in the fields of new media, fashion, graphics, design, pop, 
conceptualized at best in clusters of these micro-enterprises. So if we 
ask about the institutions of the creative industries, it seems more 
appropriate to speak of non-institutions or pseudo-institutions. Whereas 
the model institutions of culture industry were huge, long-term 
corporations, the pseudo-institutions of creative industries prove to be 
temporary, ephemeral, project based. 
These ‘project institutions’3 seem to have the advantage of being 
grounded in self-determination and the rejection of the rigid order of 
Fordist regimes. In the last two sections of this article, I will question 
how convincing this argument is. At this point, however, and in 
reference to the previously described function of the institution as a 
manager of contradictions with an exonerating effect, I want to stress 
that the project institutions of the creative industries conversely 
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promote precarization and insecurity. In fact, it is clear that a glaring 
contradiction is evident in the idea of ‘project institutions’: on the one 
hand the desire for long-term exoneration that the concept of the 
institution implies, and on the other a distinct time-limit implicit to the 
concept of the project. Following again from another motif from Paolo 
Virno’s A Grammar of the Multitude and relating to the phenomenon of 
the ‘project institution’, the contradictoriness of the institution as a 
project inevitably leads, as Virno described, to the complete overlapping 
of fear and anguish, relative and absolute dread, and ultimately to a total 
diffusion of this concern throughout all the areas of life. (Virno, 2004: 
32) 
Horkheimer and Adorno still lamented the fact that the subjects of 
culture industry as employees lost their opportunities to become 
freelance entrepreneurs, it seems that in the present situation this 
problem has been completely reversed. The freelance entrepreneur has 
become mainstream, no matter whether s/he is floating as a part-time 
worker from project to project or building up one micro-enterprise after 
another. And even the successors of the twentieth-century culture 
industry, the major media corporations, conduct a policy of outsourcing 
and contracting sub-companies under the banner of entrepreneurship. 
In these newer media corporations with their convergence from the 
field of print to audiovisual media all the way to the Internet, all that 
remains for permanently employed workers in many cases – and this 
applies even to public service media – are only a few core functions of 
administration. In contrast, most of the people labeled as ‘creatives’, 
work freelance and/or as self-employed entrepreneurs with or without 
limited contracts. Somewhat cynically one could say that Adorno’s 
melancholy over the loss of autonomy has now been perversely realized 
in the working conditions of the creative industries: the creatives are 
released into a specific sphere of freedom, of independence and self-
government. Here flexibility becomes a despotic norm, precarity of 
work becomes the rule, the dividing lines between work and leisure time 
blur just like those between work and unemployment, and precarity 
flows from work into life as a whole. 
II 
But where does this universal precarization come from? Is the creative 
industry, like the culture industry, a system that enslaves its subjects, or 
is there a specific form of involvement of the actors within this process 
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of precarization? To discuss this second component, the contemporary 
modes of subjectivation in the cultural field, I would like to take up 
Isabell Lorey’s discussion of ‘biopolitical governmentality and self-
precarization’ (Lorey, 2009). Lorey speaks of precarization as a force 
line in liberal governmentality and biopolitical societies. This force line 
that reaches far back into early modern times was actualized in a 
specific way by the living and working conditions that emerged in the 
context of the new social movements in the 1970s and the principles of 
the post-1968 generations: deciding for yourself, what and with whom 
and when you want to work; freedom, autonomy, self-determination, 
and in this context consciously choosing precarious living and working 
conditions. Here Lorey develops the term of self-chosen precarization, 
or self-precarization: people already had to learn to develop a creative 
and productive relationship to the self under liberal governmentality as 
well; this practice of creativity and the ability to shape one’s self has 
been a part of governmental self-techniques since the eighteenth 
century. But what is changing here, according to Isabell Lorey’s 
argument, is the function of precarization: from an immanent 
contradiction in liberal governmentality to a function of normalization 
in neoliberal governmentality, from an inclusive exclusion at the 
margins of society to a mainstream process. In the course of these 
developments, which also explain the transformation of the phenomena 
described by Horkheimer and Adorno into the current forms of the 
creative industries, the experiments of the 1970s to develop self-
determined forms of living and working as alternatives to the 
normalized and regulated regime of work were especially influential. 
With the sovereignly imagined emancipation from spatially and 
temporally rigidly ordered everyday life, there was also a reinforcement 
of the line that allows subjectivation beyond social subjugation to be 
imagined no longer only in an emancipatory way:  
[I]t is precisely these alternative living and working conditions that have 
become increasingly more economically utilizable in recent years 
because they favor the flexibility that the labor market demands. Thus, 
practices and discourses of social movements in the past thirty to forty 
years were not only dissident and directed against normalization, but 
also at the same time, a part of the transformation toward a neoliberal 
form of governmentality. (Lorey, 2009: 196) 
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So here we are in the present: at a time when the old ideas and 
ideologies of the autonomy and freedom of the individual (especially 
the individual as genius artist) plus specific aspects of post-1968 politics 
have turned into hegemonic neoliberal modes of subjectivation. Self-
precarization means saying yes to exploiting every aspect of creativity 
and of life. 
This is the paradox of creativity as self-government: ‘Governing, 
controlling, disciplining, and regulating one’s self means, at the same 
time, fashioning and forming one’s self, empowering one’s self, which 
in this sense, is what it means to be free’ (Lorey, 2009: 193). Here there 
is perhaps also an echo of the conceptual difference defining the 
distinction between the branding of the culture industry and the creative 
industries: whereas the culture industry still seemed to emphasize the 
abstract collective component of culture, a constant appeal to the 
productivity of the individual occurs in the creative industries. A 
distinction of this kind between the collective and the individual, 
however, only exists at the level of this appeal. What distinguishes the 
industries of creativity is that they traverse these dualisms. 
I 
Recalling now in conclusion the first component in Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s concept of the culture industry, which totalizes the individual 
and completely subjugates consumers under the power of capital, an 
expansion of the horizon should become possible in conjunction with 
Isabell Lorey’s theses: a shift of focus from the promotion of 
reductionist totality and heteronomy concepts in the direction of a 
focus on the specific involvement of practices of resistance against the 
totalization of creativity, which have in turn led to the present modes of 
subjectivation. 
The culture industry generates ‘role models for people who are to 
turn themselves into what the system needs’. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2002; 2003) Even though it is logically contradictory, an ambivalence is 
suggested here – as in other places in Dialectic of the Enlightenment – 
which, if it does not quite conjoin self-active enslavement and externally 
determined subjugation through a totalizing system, at least places them 
next to one another on an equal level. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
enslavement and subjugation are simultaneously existing poles that are 
actualized in the same things and in the same events. In the regime of 
social subjugation, a higher entity constitutes the human being as 
Gerald Raunig 
 202 
subject, which refers to an object that has become external. In the 
modus of machinic enslavement, human beings are not subjects, but 
are, like tools or animals, parts of a machine that overcodes the whole. 
The interplay of the two regimes is particularly evident in the 
phenomenon of the creative industries, two poles that perpetually 
reinforce one another, whereby the components of machinic 
enslavement grow in significance due to a surplus of subjectivation. 
‘Should we then speak of a voluntary servitude?’ ask Deleuze and 
Guattari. And their answer is no: ‘There is a machinic enslavement, 
about which it could be said that it appears as re-accomplished; this 
machinic enslavement is no more “voluntary” than it is “forced”’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 460). 
From this perspective of the double movement of the subjugation 
to a social unity and the enslavement within a machine, we cannot 
adhere to Adorno and Horkheimer’s idea of a system that works as a 
totality on the one side and the actors as passive objects of the system 
on the other side. Rather, the modes of subjectivation reconstruct 
totality over and over again; their involvement in the processes of social 
subjugation and machinic enslavement is neither voluntary nor forced. 
And here we also finally find an answer to the question raised at the 
beginning: how could it happen that this small shift from culture 
industry to creative and cultural industries became a brand of universal 
salvation not only for politicians, but also for many actors in the field? 
It happened precisely because the modes of subjectivation of machinic 
enslavement are conjoined with both desire and conformity, and the 
actors in creative industries interpret the appeal as meaning that they 
have at least chosen self-precarization themselves. 
In this sense, and to return to the title of this text, in light of the 
involvement of the actors in the mode of machinic enslavement it is 
hardly appropriate to speak of ‘mass deception’ – and I would doubt 
that it was meaningful at any time. In the context of the creative 
industry it would thus be more apt to speak of a ‘massive self-
deception’ as an aspect of self-precarization. And we could also add to 
this ‘self-deception’ the possibility of resistance, which is actualized in 
the plane of immanence of what is still labeled as creative industries 
today.  
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Notes 
1 In the cultural political context, the most likely interpretation seems to be 
that in the course of establishing the term creative industries throughout 
Europe in the programs of cultural policies, the aim has increasingly been to 
shift state funding for art from support for critical/deviant positions to 
support for commercial enterprises. 
2 Contrary to Adorno’s substantialization of the autonomy of bourgeois art, 
however, it has long been asserted that specifically this has the effect of a 
total, heteronomizing and hierarchizing praxis, striating both the space of 
production and of reception: the four-stage production apparatus of 
bourgeois theatre, for instance, or the extreme discipline in classical 
orchestras correlates to the habits of reception in both fields. 
3 See Stefan Nowotny’s contribution to this volume, chapter one, above. 
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